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**STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS**

15 U.S.C.  
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Lead Counsel respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with its representation of the Settlement Class in the above-captioned litigation, and for an award to Lead Plaintiff Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California ("Lead Plaintiff") in connection with its representation of the Settlement Class.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Through their efforts, Lead Counsel secured a \$14,750,000 settlement for the benefit of the Settlement Class. The Settlement is a very good result given the serious obstacles to recovery, the numerous credible defenses to liability and damages that Defendants have articulated, the fact that the Court might have accepted Defendants' arguments at summary judgment following the completion of fact and expert discovery, and the recovery relative to the amount of estimated recoverable damages suffered by the Settlement Class.<sup>1</sup> To obtain this Settlement, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel overcame a number of significant challenges that existed from the filing of the initial complaint. In recognition of these risks and the result obtained, Lead Counsel now respectfully moves this Court for an award of attorneys' fees of 25% of the Settlement Amount, and \$355,355.92 in expenses that were reasonably and necessarily incurred in prosecuting and resolving the Action, plus interest on both amounts. As set forth below, the relevant factors articulated in the Second Circuit's *Goldberger* decision strongly support the requested awards. *See Goldberger v. Integrated*

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<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms used herein are defined and have the meanings contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (ECF 177) (the "Stipulation"), the accompanying Declaration of Spencer A. Burkholz in Support of: (1) Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Approval of Plan of Allocation; and (2) Lead Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and an Award to Lead Plaintiff Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4) (the "Burkholz Declaration"), and in the Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Approval of Plan of Allocation ("Settlement Memorandum"), submitted concurrently herewith. Internal citations are omitted and emphasis is added throughout unless otherwise noted.

*Res., Inc.*, 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000). In addition, Lead Plaintiff seeks an award of \$22,255.46 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4) in connection with its time and unreimbursed expenses incurred in its representation of the Settlement Class.

This fee request has the full support of Lead Plaintiff. *See* Declaration of Robert O. Glaza, ¶¶7-8, submitted herewith (“Lead Plaintiff Declaration”). In addition, following an extensive Court-ordered notice program in which over 162,000 Notices have been mailed to potential Settlement Class Members, to date not a single Settlement Class Member has objected to the requested fees or the expenses (not to exceed \$500,000, as set forth in the Notice).

As detailed below, in the Burkholz Declaration, and in the Settlement Memorandum, the Settlement achieved here represents a very good result for Lead Plaintiff and the Settlement Class, particularly when judged in the context of the significant litigation risks in this Action. The \$14.75 million Settlement that Lead Counsel obtained provides the Settlement Class with an immediate and certain recovery in a case that faced significant risks. In achieving this result, Lead Counsel worked more than 5,100 hours over the course of more than four years on this complex litigation, all on a contingency basis, with no guarantee of ever being paid.

Lead Counsel believes that an attorney fee award of 25%, together with payment of its litigation expenses, properly reflects the many significant risks taken by Lead Counsel in prosecuting the Action, as well as the result achieved. When examined under either of this Circuit’s methods of contingency fee determination (*i.e.*, percentage of the fund or lodestar), it is abundantly clear that an award of fees of 25% is reasonable, and well within the range of attorneys’ fees awarded in similar complex, contingency cases. In addition, the expenses requested by Lead Counsel are reasonable in

amount and were necessarily incurred, and the request by Lead Plaintiff adequately reflects its efforts and contributions to the litigation.<sup>2</sup>

## II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION

A detailed description of Lead Plaintiff's claims and Lead Counsel's prosecution of this case (including key pleadings, motions, discovery, and mediation efforts) is set forth in the accompanying Burkholz Declaration. For the sake of brevity, the Court is respectfully referred to that declaration.

## III. ARGUMENT

### A. Lead Counsel Is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses from the Common Fund

The Supreme Court has long recognized that "a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole." *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *see also Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 47; *Fresno Cnty. Emps' Ret. Ass'n. v. Isaacson/Weaver Family Tr.*, 925 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2019), *cert denied*, \_\_U.S.\_\_, 140 S. Ct. 385 (2019). The purpose of the common fund doctrine is to fairly and adequately compensate class counsel for services rendered and to ensure that all class members contribute equally towards the costs associated with litigation pursued on their behalf. *See Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 47; *In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007).

Courts have recognized that, in addition to providing just compensation, awards of fair attorneys' fees from a common fund also serve to encourage skilled counsel to represent those who seek redress for damages inflicted on entire classes of persons, and to discourage future alleged misconduct of a similar nature. *See City of Providence v. Aeropostale, Inc.*, 2014 WL 1883494, at

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<sup>2</sup> Lead Counsel's fee and expense request includes the time and expenses of additional counsel The Rosen Firm, P.A. and Johnson Fistel, LLP, as reflected in each firm's accompanying declaration.

\*10-\*11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014), *aff'd sub nom. Arbuthnot v. Pierson*, 607 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2015); *In re Telik, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 576 F. Supp. 2d 570, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); *Veeco*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*2. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that private securities actions, such as this one, provide “‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement to [SEC] action.’” *Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner*, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting *J. I. Case Co. v. Borak*, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)); *accord Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).

Courts in this Circuit have consistently adhered to this precedent. *See In re Interpublic Sec. Litig.*, 2004 WL 2397190, at \*10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004) (“It is well established that where an attorney creates a common fund from which members of a class are compensated for a common injury, the attorneys who created the fund are entitled to ‘a reasonable fee – set by the court – to be taken from the fund.’”); *Fresno Cnty.*, 925 F.3d at 68. Fairly compensating Lead Counsel for the risks it took in bringing this Action is essential because “[s]uch actions could not be sustained if plaintiffs’ counsel were not to receive remuneration from the settlement fund for their efforts on behalf of the class.” *Hicks v. Morgan Stanley*, 2005 WL 2757792, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005).

#### **B. The Court Should Award a Reasonable Percentage of the Common Fund**

Lead Counsel respectfully submits that the Court should award a fee based on a percentage of the common fund obtained. Courts routinely find that the percentage-of-the-fund method, under which counsel is awarded a percentage of the fund that they created, is the preferred means to determine a fee because it “‘directly aligns the interests of the class and its counsel and provides a powerful incentive for the efficient prosecution and early resolution of litigation.’” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.*, 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005); *see also Hayes v. Harmony Gold Mining Co.*, 509 F. App'x 21, 24 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A]s the district court recognized, the prospect of a

percentage fee award from a common settlement fund, as here, aligns the interests of class counsel with those of the class.”); *see also Nichols v. Noom, Inc.*, 2022 WL 2705354, at \*10 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2022) (“The trend in this circuit is toward the percentage method, which directly aligns the interests of the class and its counsel and provides a powerful incentive for the efficient prosecution and early resolution of litigation.”) (citing *In re Parking Heaters Antitrust Litig.*, 2019 WL 8137325, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019)). The percentage approach also recognizes that the quality of counsel’s services is measured best by the results achieved and is most consistent with the system typically used in the marketplace to compensate attorneys in non-class contingency cases.<sup>3</sup>

The Supreme Court has indicated that attorneys’ fees in common-fund cases generally should be based on a percentage of the fund. *See Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (“[U]nder the ‘common fund doctrine,’ . . . a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class.”). The Second Circuit has expressly approved the percentage method, recognizing that “the lodestar method proved vexing” and had resulted in “an inevitable waste of judicial resources.” *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 48-49 (holding that the percentage-of-the-fund method may be used to determine appropriate attorneys’ fees, although the lodestar method may also be used); *Savoie v. Merchs. Bank*, 166 F.3d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the “percentage-of-the-fund method has been deemed a solution to certain problems that may arise when the lodestar method is used in common fund cases”). Indeed, the Second Circuit has acknowledged that the “trend in this Circuit is

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<sup>3</sup> *See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.*, 991 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The percentage method better aligns the incentives of plaintiffs’ counsel with those of the class members because it bases the attorneys’ fees on the results they achieve for their clients, rather than on the number of motions they file, documents they review, or hours they work. . . . The percentage method also accords with the overwhelming prevalence of contingency fees in the market for plaintiffs’ counsel.”); *Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.*, 827 F. Supp. 2d 172, 184 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (the “advantages of the percentage method . . . are that it provides an incentive to attorneys to resolve the case efficiently and to create the largest common fund out of which payments to the class can be made, and that it is consistent with the system typically used by individual clients to compensate their attorneys”).

toward the percentage method.” *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 121; *see also Noom*, 2022 WL 2705354; *City of Providence*, 2014 WL 1883494, at \*11-\*12.<sup>4</sup>

Recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed these principles in rejecting an objection to the percentage approach for awarding attorneys’ fees in PSLRA cases. *See Fresno Cnty.*, 925 F.3d at 63, 72 (confirming the propriety of the percentage approach for awarding attorneys’ fees in PSLRA cases). *Id.* at 72.

The determination of attorneys’ fees using the percentage-of-the-fund method is also supported by the PSLRA, which states that “[t]otal attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a **reasonable percentage** of the amount” recovered for the class. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(6). Courts have concluded that, by drafting the PSLRA in such a manner, Congress expressed a preference for the percentage, as opposed to the lodestar, method of determining attorneys’ fees in securities class actions. *See Veeco*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*3; *Maley v. Del Glob. Techs. Corp.*, 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); *In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc.*, 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); *In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 225 F.R.D. 436, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Given the Supreme Court’s indication that the percentage method is proper in this type of case, the Second Circuit’s explicit approval of the percentage method in *Goldberger* and *Fresno*, as

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<sup>4</sup> All federal Courts of Appeal to consider the matter have approved the percentage method, with two circuits requiring its use in common-fund cases. *See In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.*, 56 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 1995); *In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 55 F.3d 768, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1995); *Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc.*, 669 F.3d 632, 644 (5th Cir. 2012); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1993); *Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc.*, 945 F.2d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 1991); *Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp.*, 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996); *Powers v. Eichen*, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000); *Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 838 F.2d 451, 454-56 (10th Cir. 1988); *Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp.*, 668 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011); *Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261, 1269-71 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits require the use of the percentage method in common-fund cases. *See Faught*, 668 F.3d at 1242; *Swedish Hosp.*, 1 F.3d at 1271.

well as the trend among the district courts in this Circuit and the language of the PSLRA, the Court should award Lead Counsel attorneys' fees based on a percentage of the fund.

**C. The Requested Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable Under the Percentage-of-the-Fund Method**

The Supreme Court has recognized that an appropriate court-awarded fee is intended to approximate what counsel would receive if they were bargaining for their services in the marketplace. *See Missouri v. Jenkins*, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989). An “‘ideal proxy’ for the award should reflect the fees upon which common fund plaintiffs negotiating in an efficient market for legal services would agree.” *In re Colgate-Palmolive Co. ERISA Litig.*, 36 F. Supp. 3d 344, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). If this were a non-class action, the customary fee arrangement would be contingent and in the range of 33% of the recovery. *See Blum*, 465 U.S. at 903 (“‘In tort suits, an attorney might receive one-third of whatever amount the plaintiff recovers. In those cases, therefore, the fee is directly proportional to the recovery.’”) (Brennan, J., concurring).

Here, the Court does not need an “‘ideal proxy’” for what counsel would receive if they were bargaining for their services in the marketplace, because Lead Plaintiff supports the requested fee percentage. *See* Lead Plaintiff Decl., ¶¶7-8. Moreover, the requested 25% fee is well within the range of percentage fees awarded by courts within the Second Circuit (including this Court) in other comparable complex cases. *See, e.g., Noom*, 2022 WL 2705354, at \*10 (awarding fee of one-third of \$56 million settlement fund, finding “[f]ee equal to one-third of a settlement fund is routinely approved in this Circuit”); *Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Tr. Fund v. AMC Entm’t Holdings, Inc.*, No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN-SLC, ECF 230 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022) (awarded 33-1/3% fee of \$18 million settlement) (Ex. A); *In re BRF S.A. Sec. Litig.*, No. 1:18-cv-02213-PKC, ECF 178 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2020) (awarded 25% of fee of \$40 million settlement) (Ex. B); *Xiang v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., et al.*, No. 1:16-cv-04923-VM-KNF, ECF 191 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019) (awarding

27% fee on \$17 million settlement) (Ex. C); *City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. Kinross Gold Corp.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181932, at \*12-\*13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (awarding 30% fee on \$33 million settlement); *Patel v. L-3 Commc 'ns Holdings, Inc.*, No. 1:14-cv-06038-VEC, ECF 167 at ¶4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2017) (awarding 25% fee on \$34.5 million settlement) (Ex. D); *In re Deutsche Bank AG Sec. Litig.*, 2020 WL 3162980, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) (awarding one-third of \$18.5 million settlement, plus expenses); *In re J.P. Morgan Stable Value Fund ERISA Litig.*, 2019 WL 4734396, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2019) (awarding one-third of \$75 million recovery); *Strougo v. Barclays PLC, et al.*, No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF, ECF 146 at ¶15 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2019) (awarding 33% of \$27 million settlement) (Ex. E); *In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 2019 WL 1577313, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (awarding fees of 25% of \$50 million recovery, plus expenses); *In re Genworth Fin. Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. 1:14-cv-02392-AKH, ECF 178 at ¶3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (awarding 25% of \$14.75 million recovery, plus expenses) (Ex. F); *In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig.*, 2015 WL 6971424, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2015) (awarding 33% of \$26.5 million settlement), *aff'd*, 674 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2016).<sup>5</sup>

#### **D. The Fee Request Is Reasonable When a Lodestar Cross-Check Is Applied**

When using the percentage-of-the-fund method, courts can also look to “hours as a ‘cross check’ on the reasonableness of the requested percentage,” *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50, “to ensure that an otherwise reasonable percentage fee would not lead to a windfall.” *Colgate-Palmolive*, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 353. When used as a “mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court.” *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50.

The lodestar method requires a two-part analysis: “first, to determine the lodestar, the court multiplies the number of hours each attorney spent on the case by each attorney’s reasonable hourly

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<sup>5</sup> All unreported authorities are attached hereto as Exhibits A-I.

rate; and second, the court adjusts that lodestar figure (by applying a multiplier) to reflect such factors as the risk and contingent nature of the litigation, the result obtained, and the quality of the attorney's work." *City of Providence*, 2014 WL 1883494, at \*13. Performing the lodestar calculation here confirms that the fee requested by Lead Counsel is reasonable and should be approved.

Counsel and their paraprofessionals have spent, in the aggregate, 5,125.60 hours in the prosecution of this case, producing a total lodestar amount of \$4,646,891.00 when multiplied by counsel's billing rates. See accompanying Declaration of Spencer A. Burkholz Filed on Behalf of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP in Support of Application for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, ¶4 ("Robbins Geller Decl."), Declaration of Michael I. Fistel, Jr. Filed on Behalf of Johnson Fistel, LLP in Support of Application for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, ¶4 ("Fistel Decl."), and Declaration of Phillip Kim Filed on Behalf of The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. in Support of Application for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, ¶4 ("Rosen Decl.").<sup>6</sup> The amount of attorneys' fees requested by Lead Counsel herein, \$3,687,500 represents approximately 80% of counsel's aggregate lodestar, resulting in a negative multiplier.<sup>7</sup> "Courts have repeatedly

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<sup>6</sup> In determining whether the rates are reasonable, the Court should take into account the attorneys' professional reputation, experience, and status. Here, the lawyers and paraprofessionals are experienced securities practitioners with track records of success, and among the most prominent and well-regarded securities practitioners in the nation. Lead Counsel's billing rates are reasonable and have recently been judicially approved. *Fleming v. Impax Labs. Inc.*, 2022 WL 2789496, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2022) ("The Court finds [Robbins Geller's] billing rates in line with prevailing rates in this district for personnel of comparable experience, skill, and reputation."); Hr'g Tr. at 160:22-24, *In re Am. Realty Cap. Props., Inc. Litig.*, No. 15-MC-40 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) ("I find your lodestar reasonable, the rates appropriate and, in relationship to the work that you did, reasonable.") (Ex. G hereto); Hr'g Tr. at 25:12-16, *Kaess v. Deutsche Bank AG*, No. 09-cv-01714 (GHW) (RWL) (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) ("I find that these billable rates [for Robbins Geller] based on the timekeeper's title, specific years of experience, and market rates for similar professionals in their fields . . . to be reasonable in this context.") (Ex. H hereto).

<sup>7</sup> The Supreme Court and other courts have held that the use of current rates is proper since such rates compensate for inflation and the loss of use of funds. See *Jenkins*, 491 U.S. at 283-84.

recognized that the reasonableness of the fee request under the percentage method is reinforced where, as here, ‘the percentage fee would represent a negative multiplier of the lodestar.’” *Guevuora Fund Ltd. v. Sillerman*, 2019 WL 6889901, at \*18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2019); *In re IMAX Sec. Litig.*, 2012 WL 3133476, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012) (finding 33% award reasonable under the circumstances, which included “a negative multiplier in relation to counsel’s lodestar fee”); *In re Veeco Instruments Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007) (‘Not only is Plaintiffs’ Counsel not receiving a premium on their lodestar to compensate them for their contingent risk factor, their fee request amounts to a deep discount from their lodestar.’”).

In cases of this nature, fees representing positive multiples above lodestar are regularly awarded to reflect the contingency-fee risk and other relevant factors. *See In re FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 2010 WL 4537550, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010) (“a positive multiplier is typically applied to the lodestar in recognition of the risk of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the contingent nature of the engagement, the skill of the attorneys, and other factors”); *In re Comverse Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2010 WL 2653354, at \*5 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2010) (“Where, as here, counsel has litigated a complex case under a contingency fee arrangement, they are entitled to a fee in excess of the lodestar.”).

The multiplier of 0.79 reflected here is far below the range of multipliers found reasonable for cross-check purposes by courts in this Circuit and elsewhere, and is fully justified here given the effort required, the risks faced and overcome, and the results achieved. Indeed, “[i]n contingent litigation, lodestar multipliers of over 4 are routinely awarded by courts[.]” *Spicer v. Pier Sixty LLC*, 2012 WL 4364503, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting *Telik*, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 590); *see also Lopez v. Fashion Nova*, 2021 WL 4896288, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2021) (“In this Circuit, ‘[c]ourts regularly award lodestar multipliers of up to eight times the lodestar, and in some cases,

even higher multipliers.”); *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 123 (upholding multiplier of 3.5); *Christine Asia Co., Ltd. v. Yun Ma*, 2019 WL 5257534, at \*19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2019) (awarding fee representing a 2.15 multiplier, which court found to be “well within the range commonly awarded in securities class actions of this complexity and magnitude”); *BHP Billiton*, 2019 WL 1577313, at \*1-\*2 (awarding fee representing 2.7 multiplier); *Athale v. Sinotech Energy Ltd., et al.*, 2013 WL 11310686, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2013) (awarding multiplier of 5.65, finding it “not unreasonable under the particular facts of this case” and “sufficient to compensate counsel for the work they have put in and the risks they took, as well as to reward them for zealously litigating the dispute and timely resolving the action”); *Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., et al.*, 2011 WL 13263367, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011) (awarding fee representing a multiplier of 4.7); *Davis*, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (awarding fee representing multiplier of 5.3, which was “not atypical” in similar cases).

The lodestar/multiplier is to be used merely as a cross-check on reasonableness. To find otherwise undermines the principles supporting the percentage approach and encourages needless lodestar building litigation. *See also In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 194 F.R.D. 166, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“The court will not reduce the requested award simply for the sake of doing so when every other factor ordinarily considered weighs in favor of approving class counsel’s request of thirty percent.”). As detailed in the Burkholz Declaration, based on its efforts in litigating this case and producing an excellent result, Lead Counsel believes the requested fee, is manifestly reasonable, whether calculated as a percentage of the fund or in relation to Lead Counsel’s lodestar. Moreover, as discussed below, each of the factors cited by the Second Circuit in *Goldberger* also strongly supports a finding that the requested fee is reasonable.

**E. The Relevant Factors Confirm that the Requested Fee Is Reasonable**

In *Goldberger*, the Second Circuit explained that whether the court uses the percentage-of-the-fund method or the lodestar approach, it should continue to consider the traditional criteria that reflect a reasonable fee in common fund cases, including:

- the time and labor expended by counsel;
- the risks of the litigation;
- the magnitude and complexity of the litigation;
- the requested fee in relation to the settlement;
- the quality of representation; and
- public policy considerations.

*Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50. Consideration of these factors demonstrates that the requested fee is fair and reasonable.

**1. The Time and Labor Expended by Counsel**

Lead Counsel expended substantial time and effort pursuing the Action on behalf of the Settlement Class. Since the Action commenced nearly four years ago, Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff and their paraprofessionals devoted in excess of 5,100 hours to prosecuting the Settlement Class's claims. As detailed in the Burkholz Declaration, submitted herewith, counsel, among other things:

- conducted an extensive factual investigation into the underlying facts;
- researched the law relevant to the claims asserted and Defendants' potential defenses thereto, and drafted a detailed amended complaint;
- opposed Defendants' motions to dismiss;
- conducted and responded to class certification discovery;
- moved for class certification;

- consulted damages experts in connection with class certification and mediation;
- participated in lengthy arm's-length settlement negotiations, including a mediation with the Hon. Layn R. Phillips (Ret.) and follow-up negotiations with the assistance of Judge Phillips; and
- negotiated and drafted the Stipulation and exhibits thereto, as well as the motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement.

*See generally* Burkholz Decl.

Moreover, Lead Counsel, with the assistance of its in-house damages expert, prepared the proposed Plan of Allocation based primarily on an analysis estimating the amount of artificial inflation in the price of CBS common stock during the Settlement Class Period. Throughout the Action, Lead Counsel staffed the matter efficiently and avoided any unnecessary duplication of effort. Additional hours and resources will necessarily be expended assisting Members of the Settlement Class with the completion and submission of their Proof of Claim Forms, shepherding the claims process, and responding to Settlement Class Member inquiries. *See Aponte v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc.*, 2013 WL 1364147, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2013). The significant amount of time and effort devoted to this case by Lead Counsel to obtain a \$14.75 million recovery – work that will not end with the Court's approval of the Settlement – confirms that the 25% fee request is reasonable.

## **2. The Risks of the Litigation**

### **a. The Contingent Nature of Lead Counsel's Representation Supports the Requested Fee**

The risk undertaken in the litigation is often considered the most important *Goldberger* factor. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 54; *Comverse*, 2010 WL 2653354, at \*5; *Telik*, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 592. The Second Circuit has recognized that the risk associated with a case undertaken on a contingent fee is an important factor in determining an appropriate fee award:

No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who in advance had agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases producing large recoveries, is it just to make a fee depend solely on the reasonable amount of time expended.

*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974), *abrogated by Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 43. “Little about litigation is risk-free, and class actions confront even more substantial risks than other forms of litigation.” *Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. A.C.L.N., Ltd.*, 2004 WL 1087261, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004); *Am. Bank Note*, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (concluding it is “appropriate to take this [contingent fee] risk into account in determining the appropriate fee to award”); *In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig.*, 985 F. Supp. 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Numerous courts have recognized that the attorney’s contingent fee risk is an important factor in determining the fee award.”). This risk encompasses not just the risk of no payment, but also the risk of underpayment. *See In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig.*, 962 F.2d 566, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court’s fee award where court failed to account for, among other things, risk of underpayment to counsel). When considering the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in a contingency action, the court should consider the risks of the litigation at the time the suit was brought. *See Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 55; *In re Sadia S.A. Sec. Litig.*, 2011 WL 6825235, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011).

Lead Counsel undertook this litigation on a wholly contingent-fee basis, investing a substantial amount of time and money to prosecute a risky action with no guarantee of compensation or even the recovery of expenses. Unlike Defendants’ counsel, who are paid substantial hourly rates and reimbursed for their expenses on a regular basis, Lead Counsel has not been compensated for any time or expenses since this case began in 2018, and would have received no compensation or payment of its expenses had this case not been resolved successfully.

From the outset, Lead Counsel understood that it was embarking on a complex, expensive, and lengthy litigation with no guarantee of ever being compensated for investing the time and money

the case would require. In undertaking that responsibility, Lead Counsel was obligated to assure that sufficient attorney and paraprofessional resources were dedicated to prosecuting the Action and that funds were available to compensate staff and to pay for the considerable costs that a case such as this entails. Under these circumstances, the financial burden on contingent-fee counsel is far greater than on a firm that is paid on an ongoing basis.

In addition to advancing litigation expenses, Lead Counsel faced the possibility that it would receive no attorneys' fees at all. Indeed, it is possible that, if not for this Settlement, the remaining alleged misstatement would have been dismissed at summary judgment or following trial.<sup>8</sup> The Court has indicated that it believed Lead Plaintiff would have a very difficult time establishing liability for the remaining alleged misstatement.<sup>9</sup>

Losses in contingent-fee litigation, especially those brought under the PSLRA, are exceedingly expensive. Lead Counsel's assumption of the contingency fee risk strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested fee. *See FLAG Telecom*, 2010 WL 4537550, at \*27 ("Courts in the

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<sup>8</sup> Moreover, it is wrong to presume that a law firm handling complex contingent litigation always wins. There are numerous class actions in which lead counsel expended thousands of hours and yet received no remuneration, despite their diligence and expertise. *See, e.g., Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.*, 688 F.3d 713, 725 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming judgment as a matter of law following jury verdict partially in plaintiff's favor); *In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2009 WL 1709050 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009), *aff'd*, 627 F.3d 376 (9th Cir. 2010) (court granted summary judgment for defendants after eight years of litigation, after plaintiff's counsel incurred over \$7 million in expenses, and worked over 100,000 hours, representing a lodestar of approximately \$40 million); *In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 4788556, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (jury verdict for defendants); *Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1997) (jury verdict of \$81 million for plaintiffs against an accounting firm reversed on appeal on loss-causation grounds and judgment entered for defendant); *Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.*, 77 F.3d 1215, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (Tenth Circuit overturned securities fraud class action jury verdict for plaintiffs in case filed in 1973 and tried in 1988 on basis of 1994 Supreme Court opinion).

<sup>9</sup> The Court indicated to the parties at a status conference following issuance of the motion to dismiss order that Lead Plaintiff "barely survived the motion to dismiss" and that it had "a big note of skepticism that [Lead Plaintiff would] be able to prove" the case. Hr'g. Tr. at 12:17-20 (Feb. 21, 2020).

Second Circuit have recognized that the risk associated with a case undertaken on a contingent fee basis is an important factor in determining an appropriate fee award.”); *In re Marsh ERISA Litig.*, 265 F.R.D. 128, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“There was significant risk of non-payment in this case, and Plaintiffs’ Counsel should be rewarded for having borne and successfully overcome that risk.”).

**b. Risks of Establishing Liability**

While Lead Plaintiff remains confident in its claims, its ability to prove liability was far from certain. As detailed in the Burkholz Declaration and in the Settlement Memorandum, Defendants raised numerous challenges to the falsity of the misstatements and omissions alleged, whether they were made with scienter, and loss causation. Burkholz Decl., ¶¶21, 50-54. More specifically, Defendants argued that Lead Plaintiff failed to allege that the remaining allegedly false and misleading statement – Moonves’ November 29, 2017 statement – was actionable, because it was too general and did not contain any promise or certainty about his knowledge of his past misconduct or that such conduct would likely become public. *Id.*, ¶50. Defendants also argued that there was no allegation that Moonves’ statements were false at the time they were made or that Moonves did not hold the opinions he expressed. Although one alleged misstatement survived Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court did grant the motion with respect to Lead Plaintiff’s other allegations of materially false and misleading statements and omissions. The Court also dismissed the Former Defendants from the case, holding that they lacked the requisite scienter under §10(b). Burkholz Decl., ¶27. The surviving alleged misstatement would no doubt be challenged again on summary judgment. Therefore, whether Lead Plaintiff ultimately would prove liability was far from assured.

**c. Risk of Establishing Causation and Damages**

With respect to proving causation and damages, Defendants would continue to attack the causal link between the remaining alleged misstatement and Lead Plaintiff’s losses as well as the damages calculations of Lead Counsel’s expert which, if accepted, would severely limit, or entirely

eliminate, the amount of damages that could be recovered. Defendants argued that there was no causal link between the alleged misstatement and the decline in CBS's share price because: (1) the market was already aware of potential sexual misconduct allegations against Moonves as early as January 2018; and (2) the corrective disclosures did not reveal to the market the falsity of the *Variety* Statement because that statement could not reasonably be read to make any representations about Moonves' conduct. *Id.* Defendants would never concede these points and would continue to press this defense at summary judgment and trial.

There is no way to know how the Court or a jury would decide these issues. The damage assessments of the parties' respective trial experts would become a "battle of experts." The outcome of such battles is never predictable, and there existed the very real possibility that the Court or a jury could be swayed by experts for Defendants to minimize the Settlement Class's losses or to show that the losses were attributable to factors other than the alleged misstatements and omissions. Thus, even if Lead Plaintiff prevailed as to liability at trial, the judgment obtained might well be only a fraction of the damages claimed.

### **3. The Magnitude and Complexity of the Litigation**

The complexity of the litigation is another factor examined by courts evaluating the reasonableness of attorneys' fees requested by class counsel. *See Chatelain v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc.*, 805 F. Supp. 209, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). It is widely recognized that "shareholder actions are notoriously complex and difficult to prove." *In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig.*, 2008 WL 5336691, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008); *see also Christine Asia*, 2019 WL 5257534, at \*18 ("Securities class actions in particular are 'notably difficult and notoriously uncertain.'"). "[S]ecurities actions have become more difficult from a plaintiff's perspective in the wake of the PSLRA." *Ikon*, 194 F.R.D. at 194; *see also In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 2006 WL 903236, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) ("[T]he legal requirements for recovery under the securities laws present considerable

challenges, particularly with respect to loss causation and the calculation of damages. These challenges are exacerbated . . . where a number of controlling decisions have recently shed new light on the standard for loss causation.”). This case was no exception. As described herein, this Action involved a number of difficult and complex questions concerning liability and damages that required, and would have continued to require, extensive efforts by Lead Counsel and consultation with experts.

The trial of liability issues alone would have involved substantial attorney and expert time, the introduction of voluminous documentary and deposition evidence, vigorously contested motions, and the considerable expenditures of judicial resources. Because this case revolved around “difficult, complex, hotly disputed, and expert-intensive issues,” this factor favors awarding a 25% fee. *City of Providence*, 2014 WL 1883494, at \*16.

#### **4. The Quality of Representation Supports the Requested Fee**

The quality of the representation by Lead Counsel is another important factor that supports the reasonableness of the requested fee. Lead Counsel submits that the quality of the representation here is best evidenced by the quality of the result achieved. *See, e.g.*, Settlement Memorandum at §III.C.; *see also FLAG Telecom*, 2010 WL 4537550, at \*28; *In re Bisys Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 2049726, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007). Lead Counsel demonstrated a great deal of skill to achieve a settlement at this level in this particular case. Lead Counsel are experienced securities class action and complex litigation practitioners. *See Robbins Geller Decl.*, Ex. F. This Settlement is attributable to the diligence, determination, hard work, and reputation of counsel, who developed, litigated, and successfully negotiated the Settlement of this Action and a substantial immediate cash recovery in a very difficult case, without the risk of further litigation. *See Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys.*, 2004 WL 1087261, at \*6.

Finally, courts repeatedly recognize that the quality of the opposition faced by plaintiff's counsel should also be taken into consideration in assessing the quality of counsel's performance. *See, e.g., Marsh ERISA*, 265 F.R.D. at 148 ("The high quality of defense counsel opposing Lead Plaintiffs' efforts further proves the caliber of representation that was necessary to achieve the Settlement."); *Veeco*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*7 (among the factors supporting a 25% award of attorneys' fees was that defendants were represented by "one of the country's largest law firms"). Here, Defendants are represented by lawyers from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and Dechert LLP, who presented very skilled defenses and spared no effort in representing their clients. Notwithstanding this formidable opposition, Lead Counsel's ability to present a strong case and to demonstrate its willingness to continue to vigorously prosecute the Action through trial and then inevitable appeals enabled Lead Counsel to achieve a very favorable Settlement for the benefit of the Settlement Class.

### **5. Public Policy Considerations**

A strong public policy concern exists for rewarding firms for bringing successful securities litigation. *See Woburn Ret. Sys. v. Salix Pharms., Ltd.*, 2017 WL 3579892, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (fee award was "appropriate, and not excessive, to encourage further securities class actions"); *FLAG Telecom*, 2010 WL 4537550, at \*29 (if the "important public policy [of enforcing the securities laws] is to be carried out, the courts should award fees which will adequately compensate Lead Counsel for the value of their efforts, taking into account the enormous risks they undertook"); *Maley*, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 373 ("In considering an award of attorney's fees, the public policy of vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws must be considered."). Accordingly, public policy favors granting Lead Counsel's fee and expense application here.

**6. The Settlement Class’s Reaction to the Fee Request to Date Supports the Requested Fee**

To date, the Claims Administrator has sent over 162,000 copies of the Notice to potential Settlement Class Members and nominees informing them, *inter alia*, that Lead Counsel intended to apply to the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the Settlement Amount, plus expenses not to exceed \$500,000, plus interest on both amounts.<sup>10</sup> The time to object to the fee request expires on September 19, 2022. To date, not a single objection to the fee and expense amounts set forth in the Notice was received. Such a “low level of objection is a ‘rare phenomenon.’” *In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 396 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2005). The reaction of the Settlement Class supports the fairness of the fee request.<sup>11</sup>

Additionally, Lead Plaintiff supports the fee request. Lead Plaintiff Decl., ¶¶7-8. Lead Plaintiff played an active role in the Action and closely supervised the work of Lead Counsel.

**IV. COUNSEL’S EXPENSES WERE REASONABLY INCURRED AND NECESSARY TO THE PROSECUTION OF THIS ACTION**

Counsel for Lead Plaintiff also respectfully request an award of \$355,355.92 in expenses incurred while prosecuting the Action. Counsel have submitted declarations regarding these expenses, which are properly recovered by counsel. *See* Robbins Geller Decl., ¶¶5-6; Fistel Decl., ¶¶5-6, Rosen Decl., ¶¶5-6. *See, e.g., In re China Sunergy Sec. Litig.*, 2011 WL 1899715, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011) (in a class action, attorneys should be compensated “‘for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to their clients, as long as they were ‘incidental and necessary to the representation’”); *FLAG Telecom*, 2010 WL 4537550, at \*30 (“It is

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<sup>10</sup> *See* accompanying Declaration of Ross D. Murray Regarding Notice Dissemination, Publication, and Requests for Exclusion Received to Date (“Murray Decl.”), Ex. A (Notice).

<sup>11</sup> Lead Counsel will respond to any objections to the fee and expense request in its reply brief, due October 27, 2022.

well accepted that counsel who create a common fund are entitled to the reimbursement of expenses that they advanced to a class.”); *In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig.*, 302 F. Supp. 2d 180, 183 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (court may compensate class counsel for reasonable expenses necessary to the representation of the class).

Counsel’s expenses include, for example, the costs of hiring experts to assist in their efforts, consultants, travel, document database management and storage, mediating the Settlement Class’s claims, and transcript and reporting fees. A complete breakdown by category of the expenses incurred is set forth in the accompanying Firm Declarations. These expenses were critical to Lead Counsel’s success in achieving the Settlement. *See Glob. Crossing*, 225 F.R.D. at 468 (“The expenses incurred – which include investigative and expert witnesses, filing fees, service of process, travel, legal research and document production and review – are the type for which ‘the paying, arms’ length market’ reimburses attorneys. For this reason, they are properly chargeable to the Settlement fund.”). Not a single objection to the expense amount set forth in the Notice was received. Accordingly, Lead Counsel respectfully requests payment for these expenses, plus interest earned on such amount at the same rate as that earned by the Settlement Fund.

**V. LEAD PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE AWARD UNDER 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4)**

Lead Plaintiff seeks approval of an award of \$22,255.46 in time and expenses incurred in representing the Settlement Class.<sup>12</sup> The PSLRA allows an “award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of the class” to “any representative party serving on behalf of a class.” 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4). Many courts, including this Court, have approved such awards under the PSLRA to compensate class representatives for the time and effort

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<sup>12</sup> This amount represents \$20,005.46 in unreimbursed legal fees for its outside counsel and \$2,250 for Mr. Glaza’s time. Lead Plaintiff Decl., ¶9.

they spent on behalf of the class. *See, e.g., In re Nielsen Holdings Plc Sec. Litig.*, No. 1:18-cv-07143-JMF, ECF 156 at ¶¶7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2022) (awarding \$17,750 and \$5,625 to plaintiffs) (Ex. I); *In re Qudian Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2021 WL 2328437, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2021) (awarding lead plaintiff \$12,500); *City of Warren Police and Fire Ret. Sys. v. World Wrestling Entm't*, 2021 WL 2736135, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2021) (awarding \$6,286.70 to lead plaintiff); *Kinross Gold*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181932, at \*14 (awarding \$16,800.11 to Lead Plaintiff and additional named plaintiffs “to compensate them for their reasonable costs and expenses directly related to their representation of the Class”).

As set forth in the Lead Plaintiff Declaration, Lead Plaintiff took an active role in prosecuting the Action, including: (1) communicating with Lead Counsel and its outside counsel on issues and developments in the Action; (2) reviewing documents filed in the case; (3) consulting with Lead Counsel on litigation and settlement strategy; (4) collecting documents in response to Defendants’ requests, responding to interrogatories, and providing deposition testimony; and (5) reviewing and approving the proposed Settlement. Lead Plaintiff Decl., ¶¶4, 9.

These are precisely the types of activities courts have found support PSLRA awards to class representatives. *See, e.g., Veeco*, 2007 WL 4115808, at \*12 (characterizing such awards as “routine[]” in this Circuit); *Hicks*, 2005 WL 2757792, at \*10 (“Courts in this Circuit routinely award such costs and expenses both to reimburse the named plaintiffs for expenses incurred through their involvement with the action and lost wages, as well as to provide an incentive for such plaintiffs to remain involved in the litigation and to incur such expenses in the first place.”).

The Notice informed potential Settlement Class Members that Lead Plaintiff may seek approval for up to \$22,500 for its time and expenses incurred in representing the Settlement Class. Murray Decl., Ex. A (Notice) at 7. The time and expenses requested, \$22,255.46, is below that

amount. To date, no Settlement Class Member has objected to such award. Accordingly, Lead Plaintiff's request is reasonable and fully justified under the PSLRA and should be granted.

**VI. CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, and the entire record herein, Lead Counsel respectfully requests that the Court award attorneys' fees of 25% of the Settlement Amount, plus expenses in the amount of \$355,355.92, plus interest on both amounts, and \$22,255.46 to Lead Plaintiff, as permitted by the PSLRA.

DATED: August 19, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN  
& DOWD LLP  
SAMUEL H. RUDMAN  
VINCENT M. SERRA



---

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jonahg@rgrdlaw.com  
llargent@rgrdlaw.com  
landracchio@rgrdlaw.com

Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on August 19, 2022, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the email addresses on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I hereby certify that I caused the mailing of the foregoing via the United States Postal Service to the non-CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.

s/ VINCENT M. SERRA

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VINCENT M. SERRA

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**Mailing Information for a Case 1:18-cv-07796-VEC Samit v. CBS Corporation et al****Electronic Mail Notice List**

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- **Mary Katherine Blasy**  
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- **Alexander Leonard Cheney**  
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- **Todd G. Cosenza**  
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- **Scott A Edelman**  
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elleng@rgrdlaw.com
- **Brendan V. Sullivan , Jr**  
bsullivan@wc.com

### Manual Notice List

The following is the list of attorneys who are **not** on the list to receive e-mail notices for this case (who therefore require manual noticing). You may wish to use your mouse to select and copy this list into your word processing program in order to create notices or labels for these recipients.


John Lantz

,

**INDEX OF EXHIBITS TO MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF LEAD COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES AND AN AWARD TO LEAD PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §78U-4(A)(4)**

DOCUMENT	EXHIBIT
<i>Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Tr. Fund v. AMC Entm't Holdings, Inc.</i> , No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN-SLC, ECF 230 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022)	A
<i>In re BRF S.A. Sec. Litig.</i> , No. 1:18-cv-02213-PKC, ECF 178 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2020)	B
<i>Xiang v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., et al.</i> , No. 1:16-cv-04923-VM-KNF, ECF 191 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019)	C
<i>Patel v. L-3 Commc'ns Holdings, Inc.</i> , No. 1:14-cv-06038-VEC, ECF 167 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2017)	D
<i>Strougo v. Barclays PLC, et al.</i> , No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF, ECF 146 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2019)	E
<i>In re Genworth Fin. Inc. Sec. Litig.</i> , No. 1:14-cv-02392-AKH, ECF 178 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)	F
Hr'g Tr., <i>In re Am. Realty Cap. Props., Inc. Litig.</i> , No. 15-MC-40 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019)	G
Hr'g Tr., <i>Kaess v. Deutsche Bank AG</i> , No. 09-cv-01714 (GHW) (RWL) (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020)	H
<i>In re Nielsen Holdings Plc Sec. Litig.</i> , No. 1:18-cv-07143-JMF, ECF 156 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2022)	I

# EXHIBIT A



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

HAWAII STRUCTURAL	:	Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN
IRONWORKERS PENSION	:	(Consolidated for all purposes with Civil
TRUST FUND, Individually and	:	Action No. 1:18-cv-00510-AJN)
on behalf of all others similarly situated,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
AMC ENTERTAINMENT	:	
HOLDINGS, INC., <i>et al.</i> ,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

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**ORDER GRANTING MOTION  
FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, EXPENSES, AND AWARDS TO PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT  
TO THE PSLRA**

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This matter came for hearing on February 10, 2022 (the “Final Approval Hearing”), on the application of the International Union of Operating Engineers Pension Fund of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (“Operating Engineers”) and the Hawaii Iron Workers Pension Trust Fund (“Hawaii Iron Workers,” and with Operating Engineers, “Plaintiffs”), to determine whether Plaintiffs’ requests for attorneys’ fees, payment of litigation expenses, and awards to Plaintiffs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) should be approved.

The Court, having considered all matters submitted to it at the Final Approval Hearing and otherwise, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

1. This Order hereby incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (“Stipulation”) filed with the Court on November 1, 2021 (ECF No. 214-1), and all capitalized terms that are not defined herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.

2. This Court has jurisdiction to enter this Order. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Action and over all parties to the Action, including all Class Members.


3. Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of \$6,000,000.00, and expenses in the amount of \$1,290,333.96, plus any applicable interest, such amounts to be paid out of the Settlement Fund immediately following entry of this Order. The Court finds that Class Counsel's efforts in this litigation and the results achieved on behalf of the Class merit an award of the requested attorneys' fees. Further, the Court finds that the litigation expenses incurred by Class Counsel were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of this litigation, such that payment of the requested litigation expenses is warranted.

4. Class Representative Operating Engineers is awarded \$4,625.00 and Class Representative Hawaii Iron Workers is awarded \$21,217.79, as compensatory awards for reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to the representation of the Class as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4), such amounts to be paid from the Settlement Fund upon the Effective Date of the Settlement.

5. There is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Order, and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is directed.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

DATED: 2/14/22



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THE HONORABLE ALISON J. NATHAN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

# EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_____	X	
In re BRF S.A. SECURITIES LITIGATION	:	Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02213-PKC
_____	:	
	:	<u>CLASS ACTION</u>
This Document Relates To:	:	
	:	ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES
ALL ACTIONS.	:	AND EXPENSES AND AWARD TO LEAD
_____	X	PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C.
		§78(u)-4(a)(4)

This matter having come before the Court on October 23, 2020, on the motion of Lead Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses and an award to Lead Plaintiff (the "Fee Motion"), the Court, having considered all papers filed and proceedings conducted herein, having found the Settlement of this Litigation to be fair, reasonable and adequate, and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation of Settlement dated May 5, 2020 (the "Stipulation"), and all capitalized terms used, but not defined herein, shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.

2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this application and all matters relating thereto, including all Members of the Class who have not timely and validly requested exclusion.

3. Notice of Lead Counsel's Fee Motion was given to all Class Members who could be located with reasonable effort. The form and method of notifying the Class of the Fee Motion met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(7)), due process, and any other applicable law, constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to persons and entities entitled thereto.

4. The Court hereby awards attorneys' fees of \$10,000,000, which is equal to 25% of the Settlement Amount, plus expenses in the amount of \$94,821.84, together with the interest earned on both amounts for the same time period and at the same rate as that earned on the Settlement Fund until paid. The Court finds that the amount of fees awarded is fair, reasonable, and appropriate under the "percentage-of-recovery" method.

5. The fees and expenses shall be allocated among Lead Plaintiff's Counsel in a manner which, in Lead Counsel's good faith judgment, reflects such counsel's contribution to the institution, prosecution, and resolution of the Litigation.

6. The awarded attorneys' fees and expenses and interest earned thereon, shall be paid to Lead Counsel immediately upon execution of the Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and this Order and subject to the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Stipulation, and in particular, ¶6.2 thereof, which terms, conditions, and obligations are incorporated herein.

7. In making this award of fees and expenses to Lead Counsel, the Court has considered and found that:

(a) the Settlement has created a fund of \$40,000,000.00 in cash that is already on deposit, and numerous Class Members who submit, or have submitted, valid Proof of Claim and Release forms will benefit from the Settlement created by Lead Counsel;

(b) over 66,500 copies of the Notice were disseminated to potential Class Members indicating that Lead Counsel would move for attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed 27.5% of the Settlement Amount and for expenses in an amount not to exceed \$150,000.00, plus interest on both amounts, and no objections to the fees or expenses were filed by Class Members;

(c) Lead Counsel pursued the Litigation and achieved the Settlement with skill, perseverance, and diligent advocacy;

(d) Lead Counsel expended substantial time and effort pursuing the Litigation on behalf of the Class;

(e) Lead Counsel pursued the Litigation entirely on a contingent basis;

(f) the Litigation involves complex factual and legal issues and, in the absence of settlement, would involve lengthy proceedings whose resolution would be uncertain;

(g) had Lead Counsel not achieved the Settlement, there would remain a significant risk that the Class may have recovered less or nothing from Defendants;

(h) public policy concerns favor the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in securities class action litigation; and

(i) the attorneys' fees and expenses awarded hereby are fair and reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases within the Second Circuit.

8. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4), the Court awards \$2,889.15 to Lead Plaintiff City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System for the time it spent directly related to its representation of the Class.

9. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval regarding the Fee Motion shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment entered with respect to the Settlement.

10. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided in the Stipulation and shall be vacated in accordance with the Stipulation.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 23, 2020

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
P. Kevin Castel  
United States District Judge


### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, David A. Rosenfeld, hereby certify that on October 16, 2020, I authorized a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such public filing to all counsel registered to receive such notice.

s/ David A. Rosenfeld  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DAVID A. ROSENFELD

# EXHIBIT C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



\_\_\_\_\_  
YI XIANG, Individually and on Behalf of All  
Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

INOVALON HOLDINGS, INC., KEITH R.  
DUNLEAVY, THOMAS R. KLOSTER,  
DENISE K. FLETCHER, ANDRÉ S.  
HOFFMANN, LEE D. ROBERTS, WILLIAM  
J. TEUBER JR., GOLDMAN SACHS & CO.,  
MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC,  
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.,  
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &  
SMITH, INCORPORATED and UBS  
SECURITIES LLC,

Defendants.

X  
: Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-04923-VM-KNF  
: (Consolidated)

: CLASS ACTION

: ORDER AWARDING  
: ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES AND  
: AWARD TO LEAD PLAINTIFF  
: PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §77z-1(a)(4)

\_\_\_\_\_ X

This matter having come before the Court on July 12, 2019, on the motion of Lead Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses (the "Fee Motion"), the Court, having considered all papers filed and proceedings conducted herein, having found the Settlement of this Litigation to be fair, reasonable and adequate, and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation of Settlement dated February 19, 2019 (the "Stipulation"), and all capitalized terms used, but not defined herein, shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this application and all matters relating thereto, including all Members of the Class who have not timely and validly requested exclusion.
3. Notice of Lead Counsel's Fee Motion was given to all Class Members who could be located with reasonable effort. The form and method of notifying the Class of the Fee Motion met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 15 U.S.C. §77z-1(a)(7), the Securities Act of 1933, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, due process, and any other applicable law, constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all persons and entities entitled thereto.
4. The Court hereby awards Lead Counsel attorneys' fees of 27% of the Settlement Amount (or \$4,590,000), plus expenses in the amount of \$623,811.79, together with the interest earned on both amounts for the same time period and at the same rate as that earned on the Settlement Fund until paid. The Court finds that the amount of fees awarded is fair, reasonable, and appropriate under the "percentage-of-recovery" method.

5. The awarded attorneys' fees and expenses and interest earned thereon, shall be paid to Lead Counsel subject to the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Stipulation, and in particular, ¶6.2 thereof, which terms, conditions, and obligations are incorporated herein.

6. In making this award of fees and expenses to Lead Counsel, the Court has considered and found that:

(a) the Settlement has created a fund of \$17,000,000 in cash that is already on deposit, and numerous Class Members who submit, or have submitted, valid Proof of Claim and Release forms will benefit from the Settlement created by Lead Counsel;

(b) over 25,300 copies of the Notice were disseminated to potential Class Members indicating that Lead Counsel would move for attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed 30% of the Settlement Amount and for expenses in an amount not to exceed \$850,000, plus interest on both amounts, and no objections to the fees or expenses were filed by Class Members;

(c) Lead Counsel has pursued the Litigation and achieved the Settlement with skill, perseverance, and diligent advocacy;

(d) Lead Counsel has expended substantial time and effort pursuing the Litigation on behalf of the Class;

(e) Lead Counsel pursued the Litigation on a contingent basis, having received no compensation during the Litigation, and any fee amount has been contingent on the result achieved;

(f) the Litigation involves complex factual and legal issues and, in the absence of settlement, would involve lengthy proceedings whose resolution would be uncertain;

(g) had Lead Counsel not achieved the Settlement, there would remain a significant risk that the Class may have recovered less or nothing from Defendants;

(h) Lead Counsel has devoted over 6,000 hours, with a lodestar value of \$3,483,189.45, to achieve the Settlement;

(i) public policy concerns favor the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in securities class action litigation; and

(j) the attorneys' fees and expenses awarded are fair and reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases within the Second Circuit.

7. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval regarding the Fee Motion shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment entered with respect to the Settlement.

8. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §77z-1(a)(4), the Court awards \$4,500 to Lead Plaintiff Roofers Local No. 149 Pension Fund for the time it spent directly related to its representation of the Class.

9. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided in the Stipulation and shall be vacated in accordance with the Stipulation.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: 15 July 2019

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
THE HONORABLE VICTOR MARRERO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

# EXHIBIT D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

USDC SDNY  
DOCUMENT  
ELECTRONICALLY FILED  
DOC #:  
DATE FILED: 8/17/17

	X	
ZUBAIR PATEL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,	:	Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-06038-VEC <b>(Consolidated)</b>
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	<u>CLASS ACTION</u>
	:	
vs.	:	REVISED <del>PROPOSED</del> ORDER
	:	AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, INC.,	:	EXPENSES AND AWARDS TO LEAD
et al.,	:	PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C.
	:	§78u-4(a)(4)
Defendants.	:	
	:	
	X	

This matter having come before the Court on August 16, 2017, on the motion of Lead Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses (the "Fee Motion"), the Court, having considered all papers filed and proceedings conducted herein, having found the Settlement of this Litigation to be fair, reasonable and adequate, and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation of Settlement dated February 22, 2017 (the "Stipulation"), and all capitalized terms used, but not defined herein, shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.

2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this application and all matters relating thereto, including all Members of the Class who have not timely and validly requested exclusion.

3. Notice of Lead Counsel's Fee Motion was given to all Class Members who could be located with reasonable effort. The form and method of notifying the Class of the Fee Motion met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(7), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, due process, and any other applicable law, constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all persons and entities entitled thereto.

4. The Court hereby awards Lead Counsel attorneys' fees of 25% of the Settlement Fund (or \$8,625,000), plus expenses in the amount of \$475,980.74, together with the interest earned on both amounts for the same time period and at the same rate as that earned on the Settlement Fund until paid. The Court finds that the amount of fees awarded is appropriate and that the amount of fees awarded is fair and reasonable under the "percentage-of-recovery" method.

5. The fees and expenses shall be allocated amongst Lead Plaintiffs' Counsel in a manner that Lead Counsel in good faith believes reflects the contributions of such counsel to the prosecution and settlement of the Litigation.

6. The awarded attorneys' fees and expenses and interest earned thereon, shall be paid to Lead Counsel subject to the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Stipulation, and in particular, ¶6.2 thereof, which terms, conditions, and obligations are incorporated herein.

7. In making this award of fees and expenses to Lead Counsel, the Court has considered and found that:

(a) the Settlement has created a fund of \$34,500,000 in cash that is already on deposit, and numerous Class Members who submit, or have submitted, valid Proof of Claim and Release forms will benefit from the Settlement created by Lead Counsel;

(b) over 47,000 copies of the Notice were disseminated to Class Members indicating that Lead Counsel would move for attorneys' fees in the amount of 25% of the Settlement Fund and for expenses in an amount not to exceed \$600,000, and no objections to the fees or expenses were filed by Class Members;

(c) Lead Counsel has pursued the Litigation and achieved the Settlement with skill, perseverance and diligent advocacy;

(d) Lead Counsel has expended substantial time and effort pursuing the Litigation on behalf of the Class;

(e) Lead Counsel pursued the Litigation on a contingent basis, having received no compensation during the Litigation, and any fee amount has been contingent on the result achieved;

(f) the Litigation involves complex factual and legal issues and, in the absence of settlement, would involve lengthy proceedings whose resolution would be uncertain;

(g) had Lead Counsel not achieved the Settlement, there would remain a significant risk that the Class may have recovered less or nothing from Defendants;

(h) Lead Counsel has devoted over 8,500 hours, with a lodestar value of \$4,391,423.50, to achieve the Settlement;

(i) public policy concerns favor the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in securities class action litigation; and

(j) the attorneys' fees and expenses awarded are fair and reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases within the Second Circuit.

8. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval regarding the Fee Motion shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment entered with respect to the Settlement.

9. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C §78u-4(a)(4), the Court awards the following amounts to Lead Plaintiffs for the time they spent directly related to their representation of the Class: \$390.00 to City of Pontiac General Employees' Retirement System, \$860.00 to Local 1205 Pension Plan, and \$1,000.00 to City of Taylor Police and Fire Retirement System.

10. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided in the Stipulation and shall be vacated in accordance with the Stipulation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 17, 2017


  
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THE HONORABLE VALERIE E. CAPRONI  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

# EXHIBIT E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----- X  
BARBARA STROUGO, Individually and on :  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, :  
 : Case No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF  
 :  
 : Plaintiff(s), :  
 : v. : ECF CASE  
 :  
 : BARCLAYS PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL :  
 INC., ROBERT DIAMOND, ANTONY :  
 JENKINS, CHRISTOPHER LUCAS, TUSHAR :  
 MORZARIA, and WILLIAM WHITE, :  
 :  
 : Defendants. :  
----- X

**FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE**



This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Order Preliminary Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice (“Order”) dated February 4, 2019, on the application of the parties for approval of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated January 28, 2019 (“Stipulation”). Due and adequate notice having been given to the Class as required in said Order, and the Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings had herein and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. This Judgment incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation, and all capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation annexed as Exhibit 1 hereto, unless otherwise set forth herein.

2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Litigation and over all parties to the Litigation, including all Class Members.

3. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court hereby approves the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation and finds that:

(a) the Stipulation and the Settlement described therein, are, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interest of the Class;

(b) there was no collusion in connection with the Stipulation;

(c) the Stipulation was the product of informed, arm’s-length negotiations among competent, able counsel; and

(d) the record is sufficiently developed and complete to have enabled the Class representatives and Defendants to adequately evaluate and consider their positions.

4. Accordingly, the Court authorizes and directs implementation and performance of all the terms and provisions of the Stipulation, as well as the terms and provisions hereof. The Action and all claims contained therein, as well as all of the Released Claims, are dismissed with

prejudice as against Defendants and the Released Parties. The Settling Parties are to bear their own costs, except as otherwise provided in the Settlement Stipulation.

5. In accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, the Court hereby finds that the forms and methods of notifying the Settlement Class of the Settlement and its terms and conditions met the requirements of due process, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 21D(a)(7) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7), as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances; and constituted due and sufficient notice of these proceedings and the matters set forth herein, including the Settlement and Plan of Allocation, to all persons and entities entitled to such notice. No Settlement Class Member is relieved from the terms and conditions of the Settlement, including the releases provided for in the Settlement Stipulation, based upon the contention or proof that such Settlement Class Member failed to receive actual or adequate notice. A full opportunity has been offered to the Settlement Class Members to object to the proposed Settlement and to participate in the hearing thereon. The Court further finds that the notice provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, were fully discharged. Thus, it is hereby determined that all Settlement Class Members are bound by this Final Judgment and Order except those persons listed on Exhibit 2 to this Final Judgment and Order.

6. The Court hereby finds that the proposed Plan of Allocation is a fair and reasonable method to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among Settlement Class Members, and Lead Counsel and the Claims Administrator are directed to administer the Plan of Allocation in accordance with its terms and the terms of the Stipulation.

7. Upon the Effective Date, the Class Representatives shall, and each of the Class Members shall be deemed to have, and by operation of this Judgment shall have, fully, finally,

and forever released, relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims against the Released Persons, whether or not such Class Member executes and delivers the Proof of Claim and Release or shares in the Settlement Fund. Claims to enforce the terms of the Stipulation are not released.

8. Upon the Effective Date, all Class Members, and anyone claiming through or on behalf of any of them, will be forever barred and enjoined from commencing, instituting, prosecuting, or continuing to prosecute any action or other proceeding in any court of law or equity, arbitration tribunal, administrative forum, or any other forum, asserting the Released Claims against any of the Released Persons.

9. Upon the Effective Date, each of the Released Persons shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged the Class Representatives, each and all of the Class Members, and Class Representatives' counsel, including Lead Counsel, from all Defendants' Claims. Defendants' Claims do not include claims to enforce the terms of the Stipulation or any order of the Court in the Litigation.

10. The Settling Parties may file the Settlement Stipulation and/or this Order and Final Judgment in any proceedings that may be necessary to consummate or enforce the Settlement Stipulation, the Settlement, or this Order and Final Judgment.

11. The finality of this Final Judgment and Order shall not be affected, in any manner, by rulings that the Court may make on Lead Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses or an award to the Class Representatives.

12. Neither the Stipulation nor the Settlement contained therein, nor any act performed or document executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the Stipulation or the

Settlement: (i) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the validity of any Released Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of Defendants or their respective Related Parties; (ii) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, any fault or omission of any of Defendants or their respective Related Parties in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal; (iii) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission, or evidence, that any claim asserted by the Class Representatives was not valid in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal or (iv) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the appropriateness of treating the Litigation as a class action for any other purpose than the Settlement. Defendants and/or their respective Related Parties may file the Stipulation and/or this Judgment in any action that may be brought against them in order to support a defense or counterclaim based on principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, good faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or any theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion or similar defense or counterclaim.

13. Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, this Court hereby retains continuing jurisdiction over: (i) implementation of this Settlement and any award or distribution of the Settlement Fund, including interest earned thereon; (ii) disposition of the Settlement Fund; (iii) hearing and determining applications for attorneys' fees, expenses, and interest in the Litigation; and (iv) all parties herein for the purpose of construing, enforcing, and administering the Stipulation.

14. The Court finds that during the course of the Litigation, the Settling Parties and their respective counsel at all times complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

15. Lead Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of \$8,100,000.00, and expenses in the amount of \$791,680.21, plus any applicable interest, such amounts to be paid out of the Settlement Fund immediately following entry of this Order. Class Counsel shall thereafter be solely responsible for allocating the attorneys' fees and expenses among other Plaintiff's counsel in the manner in which Class Counsel in good faith believe reflects the contributions of such counsel to the initiation, prosecution, and resolution of the Actions. In the event that this Judgment does not become Final, and any portion of the Fee and Expense Award has already been paid from the Settlement Fund, Class Counsel and all other plaintiffs' counsel to whom Class Counsel has distributed payments shall within ten (10) business days of entry of the order rendering the Settlement and Judgment non-Final or notice of the Settlement being terminated or precludes the Effective Date from occurring, refund the Settlement Fund the Fee and Expense Award paid to Class Counsel and, if applicable, distributed to other counsel.

16. Class Representative Mohit Sohni is awarded \$20,000 and Class Representative Joseph Waggoner is awarded \$15,000, as a Compensatory Award for reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to the representation of the Settlement Class as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4), such amounts to be paid from the Settlement Fund upon the Effective Date of the Settlement.

17. In the event that the Settlement is terminated as provided in the Stipulation, or the Effective Date otherwise does not occur, then this Judgment, and all orders entered and releases delivered in connection herewith, shall be vacated, rendered null and void to the extent provided by and in accordance with the Stipulation, and this Judgment shall be without prejudice to the rights of the Class Representatives, the other Class Members, and Defendants, and the Settling

Parties shall revert to their respective positions in the Litigation as of December 11, 2018, as provided in the Stipulation.

18. Without further order of the Court, the Settling Parties may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions of the Stipulation.

19. The Court directs immediate entry of this Judgment by the Clerk of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 31 May 2019



THE HONORABLE VICTOR MARRERO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## **Exhibit 1**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

----- X  
BARBARA STROUGO, Individually and on :  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, :  
 : Case No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF  
 :  
 : Plaintiff(s), :  
 :  
 : v. : ECF CASE  
 :  
 :  
 : BARCLAYS PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL :  
 : INC., ROBERT DIAMOND, ANTONY :  
 : JENKINS, CHRISTOPHER LUCAS, TUSHAR :  
 : MORZARIA, and WILLIAM WHITE, :  
 :  
 : Defendants. :  
 :  
----- X

**STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT**

This Stipulation of Settlement dated as of January 28, 2019 (“Stipulation”), is made and entered into by and among: (i) Class Representatives Joseph Waggoner and Mohit Sahni (together, “Class Representatives”) on behalf of themselves and each of the Class Members, by and through their counsel of record in the Litigation; and (ii) Defendants Barclays PLC and Barclays Capital Inc. (together “Barclays”) and William White (with Barclays, “Defendants”) by and through their counsel of record in the Litigation. The Stipulation is intended to fully, finally, and forever resolve, discharge, and settle the Released Claims, subject to the approval of the Court and the terms and conditions set forth in this Stipulation.<sup>1</sup>

## **I. THE LITIGATION**

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of the Class. For purposes of this Settlement only, the Class is defined in § IV.1 herein, and the Settling Parties intend that the provisions herein concerning certification of the Class shall have no effect whatsoever in the event that the Settlement does not become Final.

### **1. Commencement of the Litigation and Appointment of the Class Representatives**

The Litigation is pending before the Honorable Victor Marrero in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. An initial complaint was filed by Barbara Strougo on July 28, 2014. The Class Representatives were jointly appointed lead plaintiffs on October 2, 2014. The Class Representatives filed an amended complaint on December 15, 2014.

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<sup>1</sup> All capitalized terms not otherwise defined shall have the meanings ascribed to them in § IV.1 herein.

## **2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss**

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, and the motion was fully briefed as of March 2, 2015. On April 24, 2015, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Judge Scheindlin held that statements about Barclays' general business practices and risk controls, as well as statements concerning a report drafted by Sir Anthony Salz addressing Barclays' values and culture were inactionable "puffery." *See Strougo v. Barclays PLC*, 105 F. Supp. 3d 330, 343-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Judge Scheindlin also held that, although statements concerning Barclays' alternative trading system, LX, were not quantitatively material because LX generated only a small portion of Barclays' overall revenue, such statements could be qualitatively material because they implicated the integrity of the company as a whole. *Id.* at 347-49. Accordingly, Judge Scheindlin denied Defendants' motion to dismiss claims based upon certain statements regarding LX that Plaintiffs allege were false or misleading. *Id.* at 353. Judge Scheindlin also dismissed claims against Dismissed Defendants Chris Lucas and Tushar Morzaria, and held that the Class Representatives could not plausibly allege loss causation with respect to the market's reaction to a June 27, 2014 article in the *Telegraph*. *Id.* at 352.

## **3. The Class Representatives' Motion for Certification of a Litigation Class and Defendants' Appeal**

On July 17, 2015, the Class Representatives moved the Court to certify the Litigation as a class action and appoint themselves as class representatives and their counsel, Pomerantz LLP ("Pomerantz") as class counsel. Defendants opposed this motion. The Class Representatives' class certification motion was fully briefed as of October 26, 2015 and the Court held an evidentiary hearing and oral argument on November 5, 2015. On February 2, 2016, the Court issued an order granting the Class Representatives' motion, certifying the

Litigation as a class action, appointing the Class Representatives, and appointing Pomerantz as class counsel.

On February 16, 2016, Defendants filed a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) seeking review of the February 2, 2016 order granting the Class Representatives' motion for class certification. The petition was fully briefed as of March 7, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the Second Circuit granted Defendants' petition for leave to appeal.

On September 7, 2016, the Second Circuit granted Defendants' July 11, 2016 motion seeking a stay of the District Court proceedings pending resolution of Defendants' appeal. Defendants' Rule 23(f) appeal was fully briefed as of September 12, 2016, and the Second Circuit held oral argument on November 11, 2016. On August 3, 2017, the Second Circuit sought additional briefing from the parties regarding the impact of the Court's decision in *In re Petrobras Securities*, No. 16-1914, which the parties provided on August 24, 2017. On November 6, 2017, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's February 2, 2015 order certifying the Litigation as a class action. On November 20, 2017, Defendants submitted to the Second Circuit a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing *en banc*, which was denied by the Second Circuit on January 5, 2018.

On February 26, 2018, Defendants submitted a petition for a writ of *certiorari* with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition was fully briefed as of April 10, 2018. The Court denied Defendants' petition on April 30, 2018, and the case was returned to the District Court for further proceedings.

On May 9, 2018, pursuant to the Court's individual practices, Defendants submitted letters requesting a pre-motion conference regarding their anticipated motions for

summary judgment. The Class Representatives opposed Defendants' requests by letters dated May 11, 2018. On July 17, 2018, the Court issued an order denying Defendants' request for a pre-trial conference and ordering the parties to prepare for trial, which the order set to commence on March 18, 2019. On July 31, 2018, former Defendants Robert Diamond and Antony Jenkins made a motion for reconsideration of the Court's summary judgment order. After a conference on August 8, 2018 and further letters from the parties, the Court granted the motion and granted summary judgment as to the claims against former Defendants Diamond and Jenkins on September 21, 2018. The remaining parties are still scheduled to commence trial on March 18, 2019.

#### **4. Settlement Negotiations**

In September 2015, the Settling Parties participated in a mediation with the assistance of the Hon. John S. Martin. The Settling Parties did not reach an agreement to settle the litigation at that time but continued to confer periodically to discuss potential settlement of the Litigation. In October, November, and December 2018, the Settling Parties resumed settlement discussions and conferred periodically in an effort to resolve the Litigation. After extended negotiations, the Settling Parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding setting forth their agreement in principle to settle the Litigation ("MOU"). Subsequently, the Settling Parties continued negotiations resulting in the terms and conditions set forth in this Stipulation.

## **II. CLASS REPRESENTATIVES' CLAIMS AND THE BENEFITS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

The Class Representatives believe that the claims asserted in the Litigation have merit and that the evidence developed to date supports the claims. However, the Class Representatives and their counsel recognize and acknowledge the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to prosecute the Litigation against Defendants through trial and

through appeals. The Class Representatives and their counsel have also taken into account the uncertain outcome and the risk of any litigation, especially in complex actions such as this Litigation, as well as the difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. The Class Representatives and their counsel also are mindful of the inherent problems of proof to prosecute, and of possible defenses to, the securities law violations asserted in the Litigation. The Class Representatives and their counsel believe that the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation confers substantial benefits upon the Class. Based on their evaluation, the Class Representatives and their counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation is in the best interests of the Class Representatives and the Class.

### **III. DEFENDANTS' DENIALS OF WRONGDOING AND LIABILITY**

Defendants have denied, and continue to deny, that they have committed any act or omission giving rise to any liability or violation of the law. Specifically, Defendants have denied, and continue to deny, each and all of the claims and contentions alleged by the Class Representatives in the Litigation, along with all of the charges of wrongdoing or liability against them arising out of any of the conduct, statements, acts, or omissions alleged, or that could have been alleged, in the Litigation. Defendants further have denied, and continue to deny, that the Class Representatives suffered any damages or were harmed by the conduct alleged in the Litigation. Defendants have asserted, and continue to assert, that their conduct was at all times proper and in compliance with all applicable provisions of law. In addition, Defendants maintain that they have meritorious defenses to all of the claims alleged in the Litigation.

As set forth below, neither the Settlement nor any of the terms of this Stipulation shall constitute an admission or finding of any fault, liability, wrongdoing, or damage whatsoever, or any infirmity in the defenses that Defendants have, or could have, asserted in the Litigation. Defendants are entering into this Stipulation solely to eliminate the burden and

expense of further litigation. Defendants have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to them that the Litigation be settled in the manner and upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Stipulation.

#### **IV. TERMS OF STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT**

Now, therefore, it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and among the Class Representatives (for themselves and on behalf of the Class Members) and Defendants, by and through their respective counsel or attorneys of record, that, subject to the approval of the Court, the Litigation and Released Claims shall be finally and fully compromised, settled, and released, and the Litigation shall be dismissed with prejudice, as to all Settling Parties, upon and subject to the terms and conditions of the Stipulation, as follows:

##### **1. Definitions**

As used in the Stipulation and its Exhibits, the following terms shall have the meanings specified below. Terms used in the singular shall be deemed to include the plural and vice versa.

1.1 “Authorized Claimant” means any Class Member whose claim for recover is allowed pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.

1.2 “Barclays” means Barclays PLC and Barclays Capital Inc.

1.3 “Claims Administrator” means JND Legal Administration.

1.4 “Class” means all Persons who purchased, held, or otherwise acquired American Depositary Shares (“ADS”) of Barclays PLC during the Class Period. The members of the class shall not include Defendants or Dismissed Defendants, members of the immediate families of each of the Defendants or Dismissed Defendants, any person, firm, trust, corporation, officer,

director, or other individual or entity in which any of the Defendants or Dismissed Defendants has a controlling interest, or which is related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants or Dismissed Defendants, and the legal representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-interest or assigns of any excluded party. Also excluded from the Class are those Persons who are found by the Court to have timely and validly requested exclusion from the Class.

1.5 “Class Member” means any Person who falls within the definition of the Class as set forth in ¶ 1.4 above.

1.6 “Class Period” means the period between August 2, 2011 and June 25, 2014, inclusive.

1.7 “Class Representatives” means Joseph Waggoner and Mohit Sahni.

1.8 “Court” means the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

1.9 “Defendants” means Barclays and individual defendant William White.

1.10 “Defendants’ Claims” means any and all claims and causes of action of every nature and description (including Unknown Claims) whether arising under federal, state, common or foreign law, that have been or could have been asserted in the Litigation or any forum by the Released Persons or any of them against the Class Representatives, the Class Members, and the Class Representatives’ counsel, which arise out of or are related in any way to the institution, prosecution, or settlement of the Litigation. Defendants’ Claims do not include claims to enforce this Stipulation or any order of the Court in the Litigation.

1.11 “Effective Date” or the date upon which this Settlement becomes “effective,” means three (3) business days after the date by which all of the events and conditions specified in ¶ 7.1 herein have been met and have occurred.

1.12 “Escrow Accounts” mean, collectively the Notice Administration Fund and the Settlement Fund, described in ¶ 2.1 herein.

1.13 “Escrow Agent” means Huntington National Bank.

1.14 “Fee and Expense Application” means the application(s) for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses to the Class Representatives’ counsel described in ¶ 6.1 herein.

1.15 “Fee and Expense Award” means the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses of the Class Representatives’ counsel described in ¶ 5.2 herein.

1.16 “Final” means when the last of the following with respect to the Judgment approving the Stipulation, substantially in the form of Exhibit B attached hereto, shall occur: (i) the expiration of the time to file any motion to alter or amend the Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) without any such motion having been filed; (ii) the expiration of the time to appeal from the Judgment without any such appeal having been filed; and (iii) if a motion to alter or amend is filed or if an appeal is filed, immediately after the determination of that motion or appeal so that the Judgment is no longer subject to any further judicial review or appeal whatsoever, whether by reason of affirmance by a court of last resort, lapse of time, voluntary dismissal of appeal, or otherwise, and in such a manner as to permit the consummation of the Settlement substantially in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Stipulation. For purposes of this paragraph, an “appeal” shall include any petition for a writ of *certiorari* or

other writ that may be filed in connection with the approval or disapproval of this Settlement, but shall not include any appeal which concerns only the issue of the Class Representatives' counsel's attorneys' fees and expenses, payments to the Class Representatives for their expenses, the Plan of Allocation of the Settlement Fund, or the procedures for determining Authorized Claimants' recognized claims.

1.17 "Dismissed Defendants" means the former defendants who have been dismissed from the Litigation: Robert Diamond, Antony Jenkins, Christopher Lucas, and Tushar Morzaria.

1.18 "Judgment" means the Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice to be rendered by the Court, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B.

1.19 "Lead Counsel" means the law firm of Pomerantz LLP or its successor.

1.20 "Litigation" means the action captioned *Strougo v. Barclays PLC et al.*, Case No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF (S.D.N.Y.)

1.21 "Net Settlement Fund" means the net settlement fund described in ¶ 5.2 herein.

1.22 "Notice" means the notice described in ¶ 3.1 herein.

1.23 "Notice Administration Fund" means an interest bearing escrow account established by the Claims Administrator to receive funds pursuant to ¶ 2.1.

1.24 "Notice and Administration Expenses" means the costs and expenses described in ¶ 2.8 herein.

1.25 "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability corporation, professional corporation, limited liability partnership, partnership, limited partnership, limited

liability company, association, joint stock company, estate, legal representative, trust, unincorporated association, government or any political subdivision or agency thereof, and any business or legal entity and their respective spouses, heirs, beneficiaries, executors, administrators, predecessors, successors, representatives, or assignees.

1.26 “Plan of Allocation” means a plan or formula of allocation of the Net Settlement Fund whereby the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed to Authorized Claimants. Any Plan of Allocation is not part of the stipulation and neither Defendants nor their Related Parties shall have any responsibility or liability with respect thereto.

1.27 “Preliminary Approval Order” means the order described in ¶3.1 herein.

1.28 “Related Parties” means each of a Defendant’s respective former, present, or future parents, subsidiaries, divisions and affiliates, and the respective employees, members, partners, principals, officers, directors, controlling shareholders, attorneys, advisors, accountants, auditors, and insurers of each of them; and the predecessors, successors, estates, spouses, heirs, executors, trusts, trustees, administrators, agents, legal or personal representatives and assigns of each of them, in their capacity as such.

1.29 “Released Claims” means any and all claims and causes of action of every nature and description (including Unknown Claims) whether arising under federal, state, common, or foreign law, whether class or individual in nature, that the Class Representatives or any Class Member asserted or could have asserted against any Person in the Litigation or any other forum, which (i) were asserted in any Complaint filed in the Litigation, or (ii) could have been asserted or could in the future be asserted in any court or forum that arise out of or relate to any of the allegations, transactions, facts, matters, or occurrences, representations, or omissions involved,

set forth, or referred to in any complaint filed in the Litigation and that relate in any way, directly or indirectly, to the purchase, holding, or sale of Barclays' ADS during the Class Period. Released Claims do not include claims to enforce this Stipulation.

1.30 "Released Persons" means each and all of Defendants and Dismissed Defendants and each and all of their Related Parties.

1.31 "Settlement" means the settlement of the Litigation as set forth in this Stipulation.

1.32 "Settlement Amount" means Twenty Seven Million United States Dollars (US\$27,000,000.00) in cash to be paid to the Escrow Agent pursuant to ¶ 2.1 of this Stipulation.

1.33 "Settlement Fund" means an interest-bearing escrow account established by the Escrow Agent to receive the amounts of funds payable pursuant to ¶ 2.1.

1.34 "Settlement Hearing" means the hearing required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), at which time the Settling Parties will request that the Court approve the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed Settlement embodied by this Stipulation and enter the Judgment. Lead Counsel will also request that the Court approve the Plan of Allocation and the Fee and Expense Application.

1.35 "Settling Parties" means, collectively, each of Defendants and the Class Representatives on behalf of themselves and each of the Class Members.

1.36 "Supplemental Agreement" means the supplemental agreement between the Settling Parties described in ¶ 7.3 herein.

1.37 “Taxes” means any and all taxes, fees, levies, duties, tariffs, imposts, and other charges of any kind (together with any and all interest, penalties, additions to tax and additional amounts imposed with respect thereto) imposed by any governmental authority and arising with respect to income earned by the Settlement Fund as described in ¶ 2.9.

1.38 “Tax Expenses” means expenses and costs incurred in connection with the calculation and payment of taxes or the preparation of tax returns and related documents including, without limitation, expenses of tax attorneys and/or accountants and mailing and distribution costs relating to filing (or failing to file) the returns described in ¶ 2.9 herein.

1.39 “Unknown Claims” means (i) any Released Claims which the Class Representatives or any Class Member do not know or suspect to exist in his, her or its favor at the time of the release of the Released Persons, which, if known by him, her or it, might have affected his, her or its settlement with and release of the Released Persons, or might have affected his, her or its decision not to object to this Settlement or seek exclusion from the Class; and (ii) any Defendants’ Claims that any Defendant does not know or suspect to exist in his, her or its favor at the time of the release of the Class Representatives, the Class Members, and the Class Representatives’ counsel, which, if known by him, her or it might have affected his, her or its settlement with and release of the Class Representatives, the Class Members, and the Class Representatives’ counsel, or might have affected his, her or its decision(s) with respect to the Settlement. With respect to any and all Released Claims and Defendants’ Claims, the Settling Parties stipulate and agree that, upon the Effective Date, the Class Representatives and Defendants shall expressly waive, and each of the Class Members shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, expressly waived any and all provisions, rights, and benefits conferred by California Civil Code §1542, which provides:

**A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.**

The Class Representatives and Defendants shall expressly waive, and each of the Class Members shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, expressly waived any and all provisions, rights, and benefits conferred by any law of any state or territory of the United States, or principle of common law, which is similar, comparable or equivalent to California Civil Code §1542. The Class Representatives, Defendants and Class Members may hereafter discover facts in addition to or different from those which he, she or it now knows or believes to be true with respect to the subject matter of the Released Claims or Defendants' Claims, but the Class Representatives shall expressly, fully, finally, and forever settle and release, and each Class Member, upon the Effective Date, shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever settled and released, any and all Released Claims, and Defendants shall expressly, fully, finally, and forever settle and release any and all Defendants' Claims, in each case known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, contingent or non-contingent, disclosed or undisclosed, matured or unmatured, whether or not concealed or hidden, which now exist, or heretofore have existed, upon any theory of law or equity now existing or coming into existence in the future, including, but not limited to, conduct which is negligent, intentional, with or without malice, or a breach of any duty, law or rule, without regard to the subsequent discovery or existence of such different or additional facts. The Settling Parties acknowledge, and the Class Members shall be deemed by operation of the Judgment to have acknowledged, that the foregoing waiver was separately bargained for and is a key element of the Settlement of which these releases are a part.

## **2. The Settlement**

**a. The Settlement Amount**

2.1 On or before fifteen (15) days after the later of: (i) entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, as defined in ¶ 3.1 herein, and (ii) provision to Defendants of all information necessary to effectuate a transfer of funds, including the bank name and ABA routing number, account name and number, and a signed W-9 reflecting the taxpayer identification number for the Settlement Fund, Barclays shall cause the Settlement Amount to be deposited into the interest bearing Settlement Fund escrow account controlled by the Escrow Agent. The Escrow Agent shall cause \$500,000 from the Settlement Amount to be deposited into the interest bearing Notice Administration Fund escrow account controlled by the Escrow Agent.

2.2 Barclays shall pay the Settlement Amount on behalf of all Defendants and Dismissed Defendants. Such amount is paid as consideration for full and complete settlement of all Released Claims. In the event that the entire Settlement Amount is not funded when due, the Class Representatives shall have the right to terminate the Settlement.

2.3 Other than the obligation of Barclays to pay or cause to be paid the Settlement Amount into the Settlement Fund, Defendants and Dismissed Defendants shall have no obligation to make any other payment into the Settlement Fund pursuant to this Stipulation.

**b. The Escrow Agent**

2.4 The Escrow Agent shall invest the Settlement Amount deposited pursuant to ¶ 2.1 herein in United States Agency or Treasury Securities or other instruments backed by the Full Faith & Credit of the United States Government or an Agency thereof, or fully insured by the United States Government or an Agency thereof, and shall reinvest the proceeds of these instruments as they mature in similar instruments at their then-current market rates. All risks

related to the investment of the Settlement Fund in accordance with the investment guidelines set forth in this paragraph shall be borne by the Settlement Fund, and the Released Persons shall have no responsibility for, interest in, or liability whatsoever with respect to investment decisions or the actions of the Escrow Agent, or any transactions executed by the Escrow Agent.

2.5 The Escrow Agent shall not disburse the Settlement Fund except as provided in the Stipulation, by an order of the Court, or with the written agreement of counsel for Defendants.

2.6 Subject to further order(s) and/or directions as may be made by the Court, or as provided in the Stipulation, the Escrow Agent is authorized to execute such transactions as are consistent with the terms of the Stipulation. The Released Persons shall have no responsibility for, interest in, or liability whatsoever with respect to the actions of the Escrow Agent, or for any transaction executed by the Escrow Agent.

2.7 All funds held by the Escrow Agent shall be deemed and considered to be in *custodia legis* of the Court, and shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as such funds shall be distributed or returned pursuant to the Stipulation and/or further order(s) of the Court.

2.8 The Notice Administration Fund shall be used by the Escrow Agent to pay the reasonable fees and expenses incurred by, and the reasonable fees charged by, the Claims Administrator upon presentation of customary invoices therefor, which invoices have been approved by Lead Counsel, including, without limitation: the cost of identifying and locating members of the Class; mailing Notice and Proof of Claim and publishing the Publication Notice (such amounts shall include, without limitation, the actual costs of publication in national

newswires, printing and mailing the Notice, and reimbursement to nominee owners for forwarding notice to their beneficial owners), soliciting Class claims, assisting with the filing of claims, administering and distributing the Net Settlement Fund (as defined below) to Authorized Claimants, processing Proof of Claim and Release forms, and paying escrow fees and costs, if any, and the administrative expenses incurred and fees charged by the Claims Administrator in connection with providing notice and processing the submitted claims (“Notice and Administration Expenses”). Any residual monies held in the Notice Administration Fund upon the completion of notice administration for the Settlement shall be transferred to the Settlement Fund. The Released Persons shall have no responsibility for or liability whatsoever with respect to the Notice and Administration Expenses, nor shall they have any responsibility for or liability whatsoever for any claims with respect thereto. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Barclays shall be responsible for the costs and expenses of providing to Lead Counsel and/or the Claims Administrator pertinent transfer records for purposes of mailing notice to the Class.

**c. Taxes**

2.9 (a) The Settling Parties and the Escrow Agent agree to treat the Settlement Fund as being at all times a “qualified settlement fund” within the meaning of Treas. Reg. §1.468B-1. In addition, the Escrow Agent shall timely make such elections as necessary or advisable to carry out the provisions of this ¶ 2.9, including the “relation-back election” (as defined in Treas. Reg. §1.468B- 1) back to the earliest permitted date. Such elections shall be made in compliance with the procedures and requirements contained in such regulations. It shall be the responsibility of the Escrow Agent to timely and properly prepare and deliver the necessary documentation for signature by all necessary parties, and thereafter to cause the appropriate filing to occur.

(b) For the purpose of §1.468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, the “administrator” shall be the Escrow Agent. The Escrow Agent shall timely and properly file all informational and other tax returns necessary or advisable with respect to the Settlement Fund (including, without limitation, the returns described in Treas. Reg. §1.468B-2(k)). Such returns (as well as the election described in ¶ 2.9(a) herein) shall be consistent with this ¶ 2.9 and in all events shall reflect that all Taxes (including any estimated Taxes, interest or penalties) on the income earned by the Settlement Fund shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund as provided in ¶ 2.9(c) herein.

(c) All (i) Taxes (including any estimated Taxes, interest or penalties) arising with respect to the income earned by the Settlement Fund, including any Taxes or tax detriments that may be imposed upon the Released Persons or their counsel with respect to any income earned by the Settlement Fund for any period during which the Settlement Fund does not qualify as a “qualified settlement fund” for federal or state income tax purposes, and (ii) expenses and costs incurred in connection with the operation and implementation of this ¶ 2.9 (including, without limitation, expenses of tax attorneys and/or accountants and mailing and distribution costs and expenses relating to filing (or failing to file) the returns described in this ¶ 2.9) (“Tax Expenses”), shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund; in all events the Released Persons and their counsel shall have no responsibility or liability whatsoever for Taxes or Tax Expenses. The Escrow Agent, through the Settlement Fund, shall indemnify and hold each of the Released Persons and their counsel harmless for Taxes and Tax Expenses (including, without limitation, Taxes payable by reason of any such indemnification). Further, Taxes and Tax Expenses shall be treated as, and considered to be, a cost of administration of the Settlement Fund and shall be timely paid by the Escrow Agent out of the Settlement Fund without prior order from the Court,

and the Escrow Agent shall be obligated (notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary) to withhold from distribution to Authorized Claimants any funds necessary to pay such amounts, including the establishment of adequate reserves for any Taxes and Tax Expenses (as well as any amounts that may be required to be withheld under Treas. Reg. §1.468B-2(l)(2)); neither the Released Persons nor their counsel are responsible nor shall they have any liability for any Taxes or Tax Expenses. The Settling Parties hereto agree to cooperate with the Escrow Agent, each other, and their tax attorneys and accountants to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this ¶ 2.9.

**d. Termination of the Settlement**

2.10 In the event that the Stipulation is not approved, the Stipulation is terminated or canceled, or the Effective Date otherwise fails for any reason to occur, the Settlement Funds less Notice and Administration Expenses or Taxes or Tax Expenses paid, incurred, or due and owing in connection with the Settlement provided for herein, shall be refunded pursuant to written instructions for counsel for Defendants in accordance with ¶ 7.4 herein.

**3. Preliminary Approval Order and Settlement Hearing**

3.1 Promptly after execution of the Stipulation, the Class Representatives shall submit the Stipulation together with its Exhibits to the Court and shall apply for entry of an order (“Preliminary Approval Order”), substantially in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto, requesting, *inter alia*, the preliminary approval of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, certification of the Class for settlement purposes, and approval of the mailing of a settlement notice (“Notice”) and publication of a summary notice, substantially in the forms of Exhibits A-1 and A-3 attached hereto. The Notice shall include the general terms of the Settlement set forth in

the Stipulation, the proposed Plan of Allocation, the general terms of the fee and Expense Application, as defined in ¶ 6.1 herein, and the date of the Settlement Hearing, as defined below.

3.2 Lead Counsel shall request that after notice is given, the Court hold a hearing (“Settlement Hearing”) and finally approve the Settlement of the Litigation as set forth herein. At or after the Settlement Hearing, Lead Counsel also will request that the Court approve the proposed Plan of Allocation, the Fee and Expense Application, and the Class Representatives’ request for payment of time and for their expenses, if any.

#### **4. Releases**

4.1 Upon the Effective Date, the Class Representatives shall, and each of the Class Members shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims against the Released Persons, whether or not such Class Member executes and delivers a Proof of Claim and Release or shares in the Settlement Fund. Claims to enforce the terms of this Stipulation are not released.

4.2 The Proof of Claim and Release to be executed by Class Members shall release all Released Claims against the Released persons and shall be substantially in the form contained in Exhibit A-2 attached hereto.

4.3 Upon the Effective Date, all Class Members, and anyone claiming through or on behalf of any of them, will be forever barred and enjoined from commencing, instituting, prosecuting or continuing to prosecute any action or other proceeding in any court of law or equity, arbitration tribunal, administrative forum, or any other forum, asserting the Released Claims against any of the Released Persons.

4.4 Upon the Effective Date, each of the Released Persons shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged the Class Representatives, each and all of the Class Members, and Class Representatives counsel, including Lead Counsel, from all Defendants' Claims. Claims to enforce the terms of this Stipulation or any order of the Court in the Litigation are not released.

**5: Administration and Calculation of Claims, Final Awards and Supervision and Distribution of the Settlement Fund**

5.1 The Claims Administrator, subject to such supervision and direction of the Court as may be necessary or as circumstances may require, shall administer and calculate the claims submitted by Class Members and shall oversee distribution of the Net Settlement Fund (defined below) to Authorized Claimants.

5.2 The Settlement Fund shall be applied as follows:

(a) To pay all the Notice and Administration Expenses described in ¶ 2.8 herein;

(b) To pay the Taxes and Tax Expenses described in ¶ 2.9;

(c) To pay attorneys' fees and expenses of counsel for the Class Representatives ("Fee and Expense Award"), and to pay the Class Representatives for their time and expenses, if and to the extent allowed by the Court; and

(d) After the Effective Date, to distribute the balance of the Settlement Fund ("Net Settlement Fund") to Authorized Claimants as allowed by the Stipulation, the Plan of Allocation, or the Court.

5.3 After the Effective Date, and in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, the Plan of Allocation, or such further approval and further order(s) of the Court as may be necessary or as circumstances may require, the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed to Authorized Claimants, subject to and in accordance with the following:

(a) Each Person claiming to be an Authorized Claimant shall be required to submit to the Claims Administrator a completed Proof of Claim and Release, substantially in the form of Exhibit A-2 attached hereto, signed under penalty of perjury and supported by such documents as are specified in the Proof of Claim and Release.

(b) All Proofs of Claim and Releases must be submitted within seven (7) days of the date of the Settlement Hearing or such other time as may be set by the Court. Except as otherwise ordered by the Court, all Class Members who fail to timely submit a valid Proof of Claim and Release within such period, or such other period as may be ordered by the Court, or otherwise allowed, shall be forever barred from receiving any payments pursuant to the Stipulation and the Settlement set forth herein, but shall in all other respects be subject to and bound by the provisions of the Stipulation and the Settlement, including the terms of the Judgment and the releases provided for therein and herein, and will be barred and enjoined from bringing any action against the Released Persons concerning the Released Claims. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lead Counsel shall have the discretion (but not an obligation) to accept late-submitted claims for processing by the Claims Administrator so long as the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund to Authorized Claimants is not materially delayed thereby. Lead Counsel shall have no liability for not accepting late-submitted claims.

5.4 Persons who otherwise would be Class Members but desire to be excluded from the Settlement shall be required to provide a written statement that the Person wishes to be excluded from the Class for receipt by the Claims Administrator no later than twenty one (21) days prior to the Settlement Hearing or such other time as may be set by the Court. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, any Person who is a Class Member and who does not submit a timely and valid request for exclusion from the Class shall be bound by this Stipulation. Copies of all requests for exclusion received shall be sent to counsel for Defendants and to Lead Counsel within a reasonable time of receipt by the Claims Administrator and in any event not less than fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing. Copies of all written retractions of requests for exclusion received, shall be sent to counsel for Defendants and to Lead Counsel within a reasonable time of receipt by the Claims Administrator and in any event not less than three (3) calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

5.5 The Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed to the Authorized Claimants substantially in accordance with the Plan of Allocation set forth in the Notice and approved by the Court. If there is any balance remaining in the Net Settlement Fund after a reasonable period of time after the date of the initial distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, Lead Counsel shall, if feasible, reallocate (which reallocation may occur on multiple occasions) such balance among Authorized Claimants in an equitable and economic fashion. Thereafter, any *de minimis* balance which still remains in the Net Settlement Fund shall be donated to an appropriate non-profit organization selected by Lead Counsel. This is not a claims-made settlement. There will be no reversion to Defendants.

5.6 Except for Barclays' obligation to pay or cause payment of the Settlement Amount into the Settlement Fund as set forth herein, Defendants and their Related Parties shall

have no responsibility for, interest in, or liability whatsoever with respect to the investment or distribution of the Settlement Fund, the Plan of Allocation, the determination, administration, or calculation of Class claims, the payment or withholding of Taxes or Tax Expenses, or any losses incurred in connection therewith. No Person shall have any claim of any kind against Defendants, their Related Parties, or counsel for Defendants with respect to the matters set forth in ¶¶ 5.1-5.8 herein; and the Class Members, Class Representatives, and Class Representatives' counsel, including Lead Counsel, release Defendants, Dismissed Defendants, and their Related Parties from any and all liability and claims arising from or with respect to the administration, investment or distribution of the Settlement Fund.

5.7 No Person shall have any claim against Defendants, Dismissed Defendants, or their Related Parties, counsel for Defendants, the Class Representatives, Lead Counsel, the Claims Administrator or any other Person designated by Lead Counsel based on determinations or distributions made substantially in accordance with the Stipulation and the Settlement contained herein, the Plan of Allocation, or further order(s) of the Court.

5.8 It is understood and agreed by the Settling Parties that any proposed Plan of Allocation of the Net Settlement Fund, including, but not limited to, any adjustments to an Authorized Claimant's claim set forth therein, is not a part of the Stipulation and is to be considered by the Court separately from the Court's consideration of the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, and any order or proceeding relating to the Plan of Allocation shall not operate to terminate or cancel the Stipulation, or affect or delay the finality of the Judgment approving the Stipulation and the Settlement of the Litigation set forth therein. Defendants will take no position with respect to such proposed Plan of Allocation or such plan as may be approved by the Court.

## **6. The Class Representatives' Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Expenses**

6.1 Lead Counsel may submit an application or applications ("Fee and Expense Application") to the Court for distributions from the Settlement Fund for: (i) an award of attorneys' fees; plus (ii) expenses or charges in connection with prosecuting the Litigation; plus (iii) any interest on such attorneys' fees and expenses at the same rate and for the same periods as earned by the Settlement Fund (until paid) as may be awarded by the Court. The Class Representatives may also submit an application for an award for their time and expenses in connection with the prosecution of the Litigation. Lead Counsel reserve the right to make additional applications for fees and expenses incurred.

6.2 The attorneys' fees and expenses, as awarded by the Court, shall be paid to Lead Counsel from the Settlement Fund, as ordered, immediately after the Court executes an order awarding such fees and expenses, notwithstanding the existence of any objections thereto or potential for appeal therefrom. Lead Counsel may thereafter allocate the attorneys' fees among Class Representatives' other counsel, if any, in a manner in which they in good faith believe reflects the contributions of such counsel to the initiation, prosecution, and resolution of the Litigation.

6.3 In the event that the Effective Date fails for any reason to occur, or the Judgment or the order making the Fee and Expense Award is reversed or modified, or the Stipulation is canceled or terminated for any other reason, and such reversal, modification, cancellation or termination becomes final and not subject to review, and in the event that the Fee and Expense Award has been paid to any extent, then Lead Counsel, and such other Class Representatives' counsel who have received any portion of the Fee and Expense Award, shall, within fifteen (15) calendar days from receiving notice from Defendants' counsel or from a court of appropriate

jurisdiction, be severally and jointly obligated to refund to the Settlement Fund such fees and expenses previously paid to them from the Settlement Fund, plus interest thereon at the same rate as earned on the Settlement Fund in an amount consistent with such reversal, modification, cancellation or termination. Each such Class Representatives' counsel's law firm receiving fees and expenses, as a condition of receiving such fees and expenses, on behalf of itself and each partner and/or shareholder of it, agrees that the law firm and its partners and/or shareholders are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this paragraph.

6.4 The procedure for and the allowance or disallowance by the Court of any applications by any Class Representatives' counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses, or the time and expenses of the Class Representatives, to be paid out of the Settlement Fund, are not part of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, and are to be considered by the Court separately from the Court's consideration of the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, and any order or proceeding relating to the Fee and Expense Application, or the Class Representatives' time and expense application, or any appeal from any order relating thereto or reversal or modification thereof, shall not operate to terminate or cancel the Stipulation, or affect or delay the finality of the Judgment approving the Stipulation and the Settlement of the Litigation set forth therein.

6.5 Any fees and/or expenses awarded by the Court shall be paid solely from the Settlement Fund. Defendants, Dismissed Defendants, and their Related Parties shall have no responsibility for any payment of attorneys' fees and/or expenses to Lead Counsel, Class Representatives' other counsel, the Class Representatives, or any other counsel or Person who receives payment from the Settlement Fund.

6.6 Defendants, Dismissed Defendants, and their Related Parties shall have no responsibility or liability whatsoever for the allocation among Lead Counsel, Class Representatives' other counsel, or any other counsel or Person who may assert some claim thereto, of any Fee and Expense Award that the Court may make in the Litigation.

**7. Conditions of Settlement, Effect of Disapproval, Cancellation or Termination**

7.1 The Effective Date of the Stipulation shall be conditioned on the occurrence of all the following events:

- (a) The Court has entered the Preliminary Approval Order, as required by ¶ 3.1 herein;
- (b) The Settlement Amount has been deposited into the Escrow Account;
- (c) Defendants have not exercised their option to terminate the Stipulation pursuant to ¶ 7.3 herein;
- (d) The Court has entered the Judgment, or a judgment substantially in the form of Exhibit B attached hereto; and
- (e) The Judgment has become Final, as defined in ¶ 1.16 herein.

7.2 Upon the Effective Date, any and all remaining interest or right of Defendants in or to the Settlement Fund, if any, shall be absolutely and forever extinguished. If all of the conditions specified in ¶ 7.1 herein are not met, then the Stipulation shall be canceled and terminated subject to ¶ 7.4 herein, unless Lead Counsel and counsel for Defendants mutually agree in writing to proceed with the Settlement.

7.3 Defendants shall have the unilateral right to terminate the Settlement in the event that Class Members who or which, pursuant to timely and valid requests for exclusion from the Class, meet the conditions set forth in a confidential supplemental agreement (“Supplemental Agreement”) between the Settling Parties. The Supplemental Agreement, which is being executed concurrently herewith, shall not be filed with the Court and its terms shall not be disclosed in any other manner (other than the statements herein, to the extent necessary, or as otherwise provided in the Supplemental Agreement), unless and until the Court otherwise directs or a dispute arises between the Settling Parties concerning its interpretation or application. If submission of the Supplemental Agreement is required for resolution of a dispute or is otherwise ordered by the Court, the Settling Parties will undertake to have the Supplemental Agreement submitted to the Court *in camera* or filed under seal.

7.4 In the event that the Stipulation is not approved, the Stipulation is terminated or canceled, or the Effective Date otherwise fails for any reason to occur, then:

(a) Within fifteen (15) calendar days after written notification of such event is sent by counsel for Defendants or Lead Counsel to the Escrow Agent, the Settlement Fund (including accrued interest), less any expenses which have either been disbursed pursuant to ¶¶ 2.8 or 2.9 herein, or are chargeable to the Settlement Fund pursuant to ¶¶ 2.8 or 2.9 herein, shall be refunded by the Escrow Agent to Barclays pursuant to written instructions from Defendants’ counsel. The Escrow Agent or its designee shall apply for any tax refund owed to the Settlement Fund and pay the proceeds to Barclays, after deduction of any fees or expenses incurred in connection with such application(s) for refund, pursuant to written instructions from Defendants’ counsel;

(b) Neither the Class Representatives nor any of their counsel shall have any obligation to repay any amounts disbursed pursuant to ¶¶ 2.8 or 2.9 herein, and any expenses already incurred pursuant to ¶¶ 2.8 or 2.9 herein, but which have not been paid, shall be paid by the Escrow Agent in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation prior to the balance being refunded in accordance with ¶¶ 2.10 and 7.4(a) herein;

(c) The Settling Parties shall revert to their respective positions in the Litigation as of December 11, 2018; and

(d) The terms and provisions of the Stipulation, with the exception of this ¶ 7.4(d) and ¶¶ 1.1-1.39, 2.8-2.10, 6.3, 8.3, and 8.6 herein, shall have no further force and effect with respect to the Settling Parties and shall not be enforceable, or used in this Litigation or in any other proceeding for any purpose, and any Judgment or order entered by the Court in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation shall be treated as vacated, *nunc pro tunc*. No order of the Court, or modification or reversal on appeal of any order of the Court, concerning the Plan of Allocation, or the amount of any attorneys' fees, expenses, and interest awarded by the Court to any of the Class Representatives' counsel or the Class Representatives, shall operate to terminate or cancel this Stipulation or constitute grounds for cancellation or termination of this Stipulation.

## **8. Miscellaneous Provisions**

8.1 The Settling Parties: (i) acknowledge that it is their intent to consummate this Stipulation; and (ii) agree to cooperate to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate and implement all terms and conditions of the Stipulation and to exercise their best efforts to accomplish the foregoing terms and conditions of the Stipulation.

8.2 The Settling Parties intend this Settlement to be a final and complete resolution of all disputes between them with respect to the Litigation. The Settlement compromises claims which are contested and shall not be deemed an admission by any Settling Party as to the merits of any claim or defense. The Class Representatives and Defendants agree that all Settling Parties and their respective counsel have complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Judgment will contain a finding that, during the course of the Litigation, the Settling Parties and their respective counsel at all times complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Settling Parties agree that the Settlement Amount and the other terms of the Settlement were negotiated in good faith by the Settling Parties, and reflect a settlement that was reached voluntarily after consultation with competent legal counsel. The Settling Parties reserve their right to rebut, in a manner that such party determines to be appropriate, any contention made by any of the Settling Parties in any public forum regarding the Litigation, including that the Litigation was brought or defended in bad faith or without a reasonable basis.

8.3 Neither this Stipulation nor the Settlement contained herein, nor any act performed or document executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the Stipulation or the Settlement: (i) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the validity of any Released Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of Defendants or their respective Related Parties; (ii) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, any fault or omission of any of Defendants or their respective Related Parties in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal; (iii) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission, or evidence, that any claim asserted by the Class Representatives was not valid in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal or (iv) is or may be deemed to

be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the appropriateness of treating the Litigation as a class action for any other purpose than the Settlement. Defendants and/or their respective Related Parties may file this Stipulation and/or the Judgment in any action that may be brought against them in order to support a defense or counterclaim based on principles of *res judicata*, collateral estoppel, release, good faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or any theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion or similar defense or counterclaim.

8.4 Defendants shall provide notice under the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, as appropriate, at their own expense.

8.5 Except as otherwise provided for herein, all agreements made and orders entered during the course of the Litigation relating to the confidentiality of information shall survive this Stipulation.

8.6 All of the Exhibits to the Stipulation are material and integral parts hereof and are fully incorporated herein by this reference.

8.7 The Stipulation may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by or on behalf of all Settling Parties or their respective successors-in-interest.

8.8 The Stipulation, the Exhibits attached hereto, and the Supplemental Agreement constitute the entire agreement among the Settling Parties hereto. No representations, warranties or inducements have been made to any party concerning the Stipulation, its Exhibits, or the Supplemental Agreement other than the representations, warranties, and covenants contained and memorialized in such documents.

8.9 Except as otherwise provided for herein, each Settling Party shall bear his, her or its own costs.

8.10 Lead Counsel, on behalf of the Class, are expressly authorized by the Class Representatives to take all appropriate action required or permitted to be taken by the Class pursuant to the Stipulation to effectuate its terms and also are expressly authorized to enter into any modifications or amendments to the Stipulation on behalf of the Class which they deem appropriate.

8.11 Each counsel or other Person executing the Stipulation or any of its Exhibits on behalf of any party hereto warrants that such Person has the full authority to do so.

8.12 The Stipulation may be executed in one or more counterparts. All executed counterparts and each of them shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument. A complete set of executed counterparts shall be filed with the Court. Signatures sent by facsimile or e-mail shall be deemed originals.

8.13 The headings herein are used for the purpose of convenience only and are not meant to have legal effect.

8.14 The waiver by one party of any breach in this Stipulation by any other party shall not be deemed a waiver by any other party or a waiver of any other prior or subsequent breach of this Stipulation.

8.15 The Stipulation shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the successors and assigns of the Settling Parties hereto.


8.16 The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to implementation and enforcement of the terms of the Stipulation, and all Settling Parties submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of implementing and enforcing the Settlement embodied in the Stipulation and matters related to the Settlement.

8.17 Pending approval of the Court of the Stipulation and its Exhibits, other than by agreement of the Settling Parties, all proceedings in this Litigation shall be stayed and the Class Representatives and all Class Members shall be barred and enjoined from prosecuting any of the Released Claims against any of the Released Persons.

8.18 This Stipulation, the Exhibits attached hereto, and the Supplemental Agreement shall be considered to have been negotiated, executed, and delivered, and to be wholly performed, in the State of New York, and the rights and obligations of the Settling Parties to the Stipulation shall be construed and enforced in accordance with, and governed by, the internal, substantive laws of the State of New York without giving effect to that State's choice-of-law principles.

8.19 This Stipulation shall not be construed more strictly against one party than another merely by virtue of the fact that it, or any part of it, may have been prepared by counsel for one of the Settling Parties, it being recognized that it is the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Settling Parties, and the Settling Parties have contributed substantially and materially to the preparation of this Stipulation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Settling Parties hereto have caused the Stipulation to be executed by their duly authorized attorneys, dated January 28, 2019.

By:   
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**SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

----- X  
 BARBARA STROUGO, Individually and on :  
 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, :  
 : Case No. 1:14-cv-05797-VM-DCF  
 Plaintiff(s), :  
 v. : ECF CASE  
 BARCLAYS PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL :  
 INC., ROBERT DIAMOND, ANTONY :  
 JENKINS, CHRISTOPHER LUCAS, TUSHAR :  
 MORZARIA, and WILLIAM WHITE, :  
 Defendants. :  
 ----- X

**EXHIBIT 2**  
**From Declaration of Luiggy Segura – Exhibit C**  
**Docket 144-1, filed April 12, 2019**  
**List Of Persons Requesting Exclusion From The Settlement**

1. Neil Harold M. Hauser
2. Stanley J. Chimahusky
3. Charles Anthony Belotte
4. Ong Chao Ying Eunice
5. Lynette Grants
6. Gloria Pettersen, representative for James C. Pettersen
7. Lucile E. Einess
8. Victor Manuel Cruz Cuellar
9. Rachel Foster (FKA Rachel Harris)
10. Anatole Vernon Kung

# EXHIBIT F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

\_\_\_\_\_ X  
In re GENWORTH FINANCIAL, INC. : Master File No. 1:14-cv-02392-AKH  
SECURITIES LITIGATION :  
\_\_\_\_\_ : CLASS ACTION  
:   
This Document Relates To: : ~~PROPOSED~~ ORDER AWARDING  
: ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES AND  
ALL ACTIONS. : REIMBURSEMENT OF THE CLASS  
: REPRESENTATIVES' EXPENSES  
: PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4)  
\_\_\_\_\_ X

USDC SDNY  
DOCUMENT  
ELECTRONICALLY FILED  
DOC #:  
DATE FILED: 11/16/17

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on November 15, 2017, for a hearing to determine, among other things, whether and in what amount to award Class Counsel in the above-captioned consolidated securities class action (the “Litigation”) attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses and Class Representatives City of Hialeah Employees’ Retirement System (“City of Hialeah”) and New Bedford Contributory Retirement System (“New Bedford”) expenses relating to their representation of the Class. All capitalized terms used herein have the meanings as set forth and defined in the Stipulation of Settlement, dated as of June 15, 2017 (the “Stipulation”). The Court having considered all matters submitted to it at the hearing and otherwise; and it appearing that a notice of the hearing, substantially in the form approved by the Court (the “Notice”), was mailed to all reasonably identified Class Members; and that a summary notice of the hearing (the “Summary Notice”), substantially in the form approved by the Court, was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted over *Business Wire*; and the Court having considered and determined the fairness and reasonableness of the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses requested;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Litigation and over all parties to the Litigation, including all Class Members who have not timely and validly requested exclusion and the Claims Administrator.
2. Notice of Class Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and payment of expenses was given to all Class Members who could be identified with reasonable effort. The form and method of notifying the Class of the motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses met the requirements of Rules 23 and 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 21D(a)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(7), as amended by the Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”), due process, constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all persons and entities entitled thereto.

3. Class Counsel are hereby awarded, on behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, attorneys’ fees of 30% of the Settlement Amount (or \$6,000,000), plus interest at the same rate earned by the Settlement Fund, and payment of litigation expenses in the amount of \$576,617.55, plus interest at the same rate earned by the Settlement Fund, which sums the Court finds to be fair and reasonable.

4. In accordance with 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4), for their representation of the Class, the Court hereby awards City of Hialeah reimbursement of its reasonable lost wages and expenses directly related to its representation of the Class in the amount of \$4,948.00, and hereby awards New Bedford reimbursement of its reasonable lost wages and expenses directly related to its representation of the Class in the amount of \$6,600.00.

5. The awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses and interest earned thereon shall be paid to Class Counsel from the Settlement Fund immediately upon entry of this Order, subject to the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Stipulation, which terms, conditions, and obligations are incorporated herein.

6. In making this award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to be paid from the Settlement Fund, the Court has considered and found that:

(a) The Settlement has created a common fund of \$20 million in cash and that numerous Class Members who submit acceptable Claim Forms will benefit from the Settlement created by the efforts of Plaintiffs’ Counsel;

(b) The requested attorneys' fees and litigation expenses have been approved as fair and reasonable by the Class Representatives, which are sophisticated institutional investors that have been directly involved in the prosecution and resolution of the Litigation and which have a substantial interest in ensuring that any fees paid to Plaintiffs' Counsel are duly earned and not excessive;

(c) Over 41,700 copies of the Notice were disseminated to potential Class Members indicating that Class Counsel, on behalf of Plaintiffs' Counsel, would move for attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed 30% of the Settlement Amount, plus accrued interest, payment of litigation expenses not to exceed \$675,000, plus accrued interest, and the expenses of Class Representatives, as reimbursement of their reasonable lost wages and costs directly related to their representation of the Class;

(d) There were no objections to the Settlement, Plan of Allocation or the application for attorneys' fees and expenses;

(e) Plaintiffs' Counsel have expended substantial time and effort pursuing the Litigation on behalf of the Class;

(f) The Litigation involves complex factual and legal issues and, in the absence of settlement, would involve lengthy proceedings whose resolution would be uncertain;

(g) Plaintiffs' Counsel pursued the Litigation on a contingent basis, having received no compensation during the Litigation, and any fee award has been contingent on the result achieved;

(h) Plaintiffs' Counsel conducted the Litigation and achieved the Settlement with skillful and diligent advocacy;

(i) Public policy concerns favor the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in securities class action litigation;

(j) The amount of attorneys' fees and expenses awarded are fair and reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases within the Second Circuit; and

(k) Plaintiffs' Counsel have devoted more than 21,480 hours, with a lodestar value of \$10,717,448.25, to achieve the Settlement.

7. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval of any attorneys' fee and expense application shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment entered with respect to the Settlement.

8. Exclusive jurisdiction is hereby retained over the subject matter of this Litigation and over all parties to the Litigation, including the administration and distribution of the Net Settlement Fund to Class Members.

9. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided by the Stipulation and shall be vacated in accordance with the Stipulation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: Nov. 15, 2017

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
THE HONORABLE ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

# EXHIBIT G

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

3 In Re:

15-MC-40 (AKH)

4 AMERICAN REALTY CAPITAL  
5 PROPERTIES, INC. LITIGATION,

6 Fairness Hearing

7  
8 New York, N.Y.  
9 January 23, 2019  
10:15 a.m.

10 Before:

11 HON. ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN

12 District Judge

13 APPEARANCES

14  
15 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP  
Attorneys for TIAA and Class Plaintiffs  
16 BY: DEBRA J. WYMAN, ESQ.  
MICHAEL J. DOWD, ESQ.  
17 ROBERT M. ROTHMAN, ESQ.  
ELLEN GUSIKOFF-STEWART, ESQ.

18  
19 GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP  
Attorneys for the Witchko Derivative  
20 BY: MATTHEW M. HOUSTON, ESQ.

21 MILBANK LLP  
Attorneys for Defendant ARCP  
22 BY: SCOTT A. EDELMAN, ESQ.

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1 THE COURT: Who is going to do the application for  
2 Robbins Geller?

3 MR. DOWD: I will, your Honor. Michael Dowd.

4 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Dowd.

5 MR. DOWD: Good morning, your Honor.

6 THE COURT: I've read your extensive declaration, that  
7 is, the declaration of Ms. Wyman.

8 I want to take up just your fees, your activities.  
9 The first to file the class action lawsuit were four firms, who  
10 don't seem to be involved: Pomerantz LLP, Wolf Popper LLP, Wolf  
11 Haldenstein LLP, and the Rosen Law Firm. Is it clear that they  
12 are making no claim?

13 MR. DOWD: They are making no claim, your Honor.

14 THE COURT: OK. Did they do anything in the lawsuit?

15 MR. DOWD: No, your Honor. I mean, I'm sure they  
16 filed complaints early on. But the Court, when it appointed us  
17 lead plaintiff, told us to work with other firms and form a  
18 working group, a global working group. And there were a group  
19 of firms, I believe it was nine firms, that agreed to be part  
20 of that working group and to work on the case. And we've  
21 submitted their time with our time. And those are the only  
22 attorneys that would be entitled to fees in this casement.

23 THE COURT: The second thing, I did not appreciate how  
24 many counsel there were. My impression was that there were  
25 three or four at the time that I said what you said.

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1 MR. DOWD: Pardon me, your Honor?

2 THE COURT: I didn't know there were nine other law  
3 firms involved.

4 MR. DOWD: There were, your Honor. The Court --

5 THE COURT: I didn't know that, I said. When I asked  
6 you to coordinate services and organize the plaintiffs' group,  
7 I thought there were just two or three law firms.

8 MR. DOWD: No, they were not. And they each had  
9 clients in the case, except I believe there was one firm that  
10 did not. But they each had clients. They were all class reps.  
11 They were all either on our "may call" or "will call" witness  
12 list. And so they provided valuable service. And they did a  
13 lot of work in the case. We've limited it and tried to give  
14 them discrete projects or dealing with just their plaintiffs,  
15 you know, because that's what we thought the Court wanted with  
16 the working group, and we did do that. Their time is about 10  
17 percent of our time. And I think that's fair considering what  
18 they did in the case.

19 THE COURT: You have a rather detailed description of  
20 the various things you were doing.

21 MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor. That would be in  
22 Ms. Wyman's, the longer declaration.

23 THE COURT: The declaration in support of application  
24 for award of attorney's fees and expenses is what I'm looking  
25 at. I have the larger one as well.

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1 Ms. Wyman's affidavit identifies the lawyers -- all  
2 your firm?

3 MR. DOWD: Yes. They're all our firm.

4 THE COURT: Why so many lawyers?

5 MR. DOWD: Well, your Honor, there are different  
6 people that helped with different tasks. When I looked at it,  
7 this is what struck me. We had a working group that I really  
8 thought were the people that were going to be responsible for  
9 trying this case. That group was about 15 people, 13 lawyers  
10 and the two forensic accountants that were involved in it from  
11 beginning to end. Those 15 people account for about 72 percent  
12 of our lodestar, \$47 million, just those 15 people. They were  
13 all people that the Court would probably be familiar with or  
14 would have seen their names. Certainly most of us have been  
15 here in court.

16 And then if you add in the four people at our office,  
17 three of our internal staff attorneys and another associate,  
18 that were primarily responsible for the document review, so  
19 that would be another four people, bringing it to 19. I think  
20 those people together would account for about 82 percent of our  
21 entire lodestar.

22 So it may look like a lot of people because there were  
23 timekeepers that did individual things or who were on the case  
24 for a given period of time. But if you look at those people  
25 that really drove the case, you're talking about the 15 main

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1 people that did everything. That's 72 percent of the time.

2 And if you take in those other four that were responsible for a  
3 lot of the document work, that's, I think, about 82 percent of  
4 the lodestar.

5 THE COURT: 12 people billed more than a thousand  
6 hours.

7 MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor.

8 THE COURT: How many people were involved in your  
9 firm, Mr. Edelman? Roughly.

10 MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, I would bet a comparable  
11 number. This was complicated litigation in a big case.

12 THE COURT: I understand.

13 MR. EDELMAN: That doesn't sound at all outlandish to  
14 me. Their the core team.

15 THE COURT: OK. Then I pass that observation.

16 MR. DOWD: That's just Mr. Edelman's firm. There were  
17 also Grant Thornton's lawyers.

18 THE COURT: They had a separate job to do.

19 MR. DOWD: Well, and we had to do the job on the other  
20 side of them as well.

21 THE COURT: That's true.

22 MR. DOWD: They had, at summary judgment --

23 THE COURT: Mr. Dowd, I withdraw that implied  
24 criticism.

25 The hourly rates, for example, what did Jason Forge

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1 do?

2 MR. DOWD: Jason Forge, your Honor? Jason Forge was a  
3 critical part of this team. He worked on the case primarily  
4 towards the end at summary judgment, when he got ready for  
5 trial. He did fantastic work with their damages experts. He  
6 was a former assistant U.S. attorney. He was an AUSA who did  
7 huge cases in LA and San Diego before I talked him into coming  
8 over to our firm. He's a great lawyer, your Honor. He's been  
9 in front of you. I don't think he argued in this case. He was  
10 certainly in the courtroom. He's argued in other cases that  
11 I've been on with him in front of this Court. So you've met  
12 him.

13 THE COURT: Now, the top billing rate of \$1,150 of  
14 Samuel Rudman, \$1,250, he only had 29 hours.

15 MR. DOWD: It's really, it's probably Mr. Coughlin,  
16 myself, and Mr. Robbins.

17 THE COURT: Several billing more than a thousand  
18 dollars. Those seem like New York rates rather than San Diego  
19 rates.

20 MR. DOWD: Well, Mr. Rudman is in New York. But I  
21 think you should look at the rates for lawyers that do this  
22 type of litigation. If you look, the *National Law Journal* said  
23 over a thousand dollars an hour is common now for partners. If  
24 you look at some of the firms on the other side of this case --

25 THE COURT: I wouldn't try.

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1 MR. DOWD: We submitted a declaration showing that  
2 Weil Gotshal -- and they were on the other side of this case,  
3 good lawyers -- we showed that they filed an application in the  
4 Sears bankruptcy earlier last year, and they had nine lawyers,  
5 at \$1500 an hour, and dozens at over a thousand dollars an  
6 hour. So higher than us.

7 THE COURT: The bankruptcy rates are out of sight, and  
8 that's often because the allowances are heavily discounted.

9 Tell me now how the other firms worked.

10 MR. DOWD: How did the other firms work? What did  
11 they do, your Honor?

12 THE COURT: What did they do, yes.

13 MR. DOWD: Well, I can tell you that, for example, if  
14 you just go down the list, if you start with Lowey Dannenberg,  
15 for example. They represented Corsair. And Corsair was a  
16 shareholder and class member for the Cole shares and also the  
17 May 2014 common stock offering. Corsair produced, I believe,  
18 145,000 pages of documents, all of which had to be reviewed for  
19 privilege. They were on our "will call" witness list. They  
20 are on, I believe, also a "may call" witness list. Their  
21 client was deposed. They also assisted with the summary  
22 judgment briefing on the discrete project that Ms. Wyman gave  
23 them.

24 THE COURT: What project was that?

25 MR. DOWD: Do you remember which briefing it was?

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1 MS. WYMAN: Your Honor, we needed some assistance with  
2 the research of some tricky issues, and we asked them to help  
3 us with that, and they prepared --

4 THE COURT: You what?

5 MS. WYMAN: We asked them to help us with some  
6 research and prepared an insert to one of the briefs.

7 MR. DOWD: So you're looking at, your Honor, document  
8 review, analysis of the claims, data collection, motion to  
9 dismiss, negotiation of discovery disputes. Ms. Wyman would  
10 have had to coordinate with them for what their --

11 THE COURT: You're taking it out of their declaration,  
12 what you just said.

13 MR. DOWD: Pardon me?

14 THE COURT: What you just read, is that from their  
15 declaration?

16 MR. DOWD: It's from their declaration, yes, your  
17 Honor, that was submitted.

18 THE COURT: Now, Motley Rice makes no description in  
19 its declaration. What did they do?

20 MR. DOWD: Motley Rice, your Honor, they had two  
21 clients in the case. They had the national sheet metal workers  
22 union. And they were on both the Cole and the May 2014  
23 offering. They were on our "will call" witness list,  
24 Mr. Myers. They had also Union Asset Management, which was a  
25 German entity that was on the July and December 2013 bond

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1 claims. They had two witnesses that they produced,  
2 Mr. Riechwald and Mr. Fischer, who came over from Germany, as I  
3 recall, to have their depositions taken. Similarly, Sheet  
4 Metal Workers had Mr. Myers, so they had three days of  
5 deposition testimony. And all three of those witnesses were on  
6 our "will call" witness list. They are coming.

7 They also assisted us, as I recall, with the motion to  
8 dismiss briefing that related, I think, to the Exxon exchange.  
9 They attended the first mediation. And they would have spent a  
10 lot of time on depo prep and the depositions. And they also  
11 would have interacted, I'm sure, with Ms. Wyman in terms of  
12 document production and disputes with the defendants, so that,  
13 you know, their views would be expressed to the defendants as  
14 well.

15 THE COURT: Johnson Fistel.

16 MR. DOWD: Johnson Fistel, your Honor, represented  
17 their client in the case. There was a class rep. It was Paul  
18 Matten. He was an ARCT IV shareholder. He was on our "may  
19 call" witness list, I believe. They also assisted, they gave  
20 us an associate who came to our office, I believe, in New York,  
21 and assisted with document review of the defendants' documents.  
22 They also produced documents for their client. And I believe  
23 Mr. Matten was also interviewed by the Department of Justice  
24 when they were insistent that they wanted one of our class  
25 reps, or a couple of our class reps, to be interviewed about

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1 their case.

2 THE COURT: Cohen Milstein.

3 MR. DOWD: Cohen Milstein, your Honor, represented the  
4 New York City funds. They were in the July 2013 offering, the  
5 Cole offering, the May 2014 offering. They produced two  
6 witnesses on behalf of the New York City funds, Horan and  
7 Jeter. They were both deposed. They were both on our "will  
8 call" witness list. They had, your Honor, as I recall,  
9 produced 190,000 pages of documents, which had to be reviewed.  
10 And they would have been involved, I'm sure, in checking class  
11 cert issues. And I believe they assisted also with the motion  
12 to dismiss briefing as well, your Honor. So they provided a  
13 valuable service. A lot of their work was related to New York  
14 City funds. Obviously, if we were trying a case in front of  
15 your Honor, in front of a New York jury, it would certainly be  
16 helpful to have New York City funds here.

17 THE COURT: What would they testify on?

18 MR. DOWD: They would have testified about their  
19 purchases in all the different offerings as class reps.

20 THE COURT: Those would have come in by stipulation.

21 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, they don't come in by  
22 stipulation.

23 THE COURT: Well, it's a matter of record what they  
24 bought and when they bought.

25 MR. DOWD: Yes. And no one says, we're going to

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1 stipulate to it, your Honor. I've tried a couple of these  
2 cases.

3 THE COURT: There would have been stipulations.

4 MR. DOWD: Well, I've tried cases, and there weren't  
5 stipulations.

6 THE COURT: You would not need any witnesses on this,  
7 and I don't know that the witnesses would have contributed  
8 anything.

9 I'm reacting because a million dollars for each of  
10 these law firms, given the \$65 million of lodestar that you put  
11 into the case, seems excessive.

12 MR. DOWD: I don't think it was, your Honor. I think  
13 what they did, in terms of their clients and document  
14 production, producing the documents, defending them at  
15 depositions -- we didn't take their depositions. The  
16 defendants deposed them.

17 THE COURT: I understand. But the knowledge of a  
18 class member is derivative and really irrelevant. The  
19 knowledge is derivative of what the lawyer finds and irrelevant  
20 because it doesn't prove any proposition against the  
21 defendants. I understand that these depositions are taken as a  
22 matter of course by defendants, and they have to be, the  
23 clients have to be represented and there's a certain time of  
24 preparation, but over a million dollars for each, without time  
25 records showing anything, I haven't seen any time records for

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1 them.

2 MR. DOWD: Well, your Honor, again, we started out  
3 from a different premise. We seek a percentage of the fee, a  
4 percentage of the fund, as our fee. And that's the trend in  
5 the Second Circuit. I know I've argued with your Honor about  
6 this in the past. But that's how we seek a fee. When my firm  
7 is working on a case --

8 THE COURT: I just don't do that, Mr. Dowd. I told  
9 you in the past, I believe that people who just do it on a  
10 basis of percentage do not want to go through the rigor of  
11 review and time. I'll award lodestar. And I'll be candid with  
12 you right now; you will get an award for your lodestar as well,  
13 not as much as you asked for, but you'll get an award. I'm not  
14 sure about those other firms. I don't know what they  
15 contributed. I don't have a justification of their time. I  
16 don't know what activities took up their time. I don't know  
17 how they distributed their work between partners and  
18 associates. I don't understand the substantial expense factors  
19 that they put into this case. It's hard questions.

20 MR. DOWD: They did break down their time by who the  
21 timekeepers were. And they also broke down their expenses.  
22 Those are attached to their declarations that they each  
23 submitted.

24 But, again, your Honor, when my firm goes into a case,  
25 we negotiated with TIAA. We negotiated for a percentage fee.

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1 And we're not sitting there thinking, let's bring in 50 for  
2 attorneys to sit in a room reviewing documents so we can build  
3 up our lodestar. And that's the problem with the lodestar  
4 analysis. I'm just being honest with your Honor. It  
5 encourages lawyers to hire for people that do nothing to add  
6 value to the case. And we don't do that.

7 THE COURT: You don't do that.

8 MR. DOWD: No, we don't. We work for a percentage.  
9 That's what we asked for. If we put people on an assignment,  
10 it's because we needed it done. You know, at summary judgment  
11 the defendants had like 60 people in the courtroom.

12 THE COURT: You had expenses paid outside bankruptcy  
13 counsel, \$171,000, so that they can file a motion in the  
14 bankruptcy court to get permission so that they could litigate  
15 in this court.

16 MR. DOWD: That's correct, your Honor.

17 THE COURT: That's a lot of money.

18 MR. DOWD: I understand that, your Honor. And when  
19 the Court ordered us to go protect those claims and get the  
20 stay lifted, we had to hire bankruptcy counsel. It's not  
21 like --

22 THE COURT: Did you pay them, or are they waiting to  
23 get paid?

24 MR. DOWD: No, we paid them.

25 THE COURT: You are out of pocket.

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1 MR. DOWD: That's out of pocket for us.

2 And, again, you know, there was a court order saying,  
3 you know, go defend the thing in bankruptcy. I'm not a  
4 bankruptcy lawyer.

5 THE COURT: That's right. It is a large amount.

6 MR. DOWD: I understand.

7 THE COURT: One is a simple motion, to lift stay,  
8 which is ordinarily granted in relationship to a large case  
9 like this.

10 MR. DOWD: And then I think they also had to keep  
11 monitoring it, and I think they probably made other  
12 appearances. I'm not positive -- I know they did. Right?

13 THE COURT: It's too high a fee.

14 MR. DOWD: I understand, your Honor. And we paid out  
15 of pocket. We're not trying to give money away. I mean, if  
16 you cut it, it just cuts my money. I don't think they're going  
17 to give it back.

18 THE COURT: Why weren't they required to make an  
19 application?

20 MR. DOWD: Because we didn't consider them part of a  
21 contingent fee. They wanted to get paid hourly, and that's  
22 what we paid.

23 THE COURT: You paid over a million dollars to  
24 Crowninshield Financial Research, Inc.

25 MR. DOWD: We absolutely did, your Honor.

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1 THE COURT: And you have people on in your firm who do  
2 the same work. No?

3 MR. DOWD: They do similar work. And frankly a lot of  
4 the partners at our firm know a lot about damages. I mean,  
5 that million dollars, your Honor, was, we had to spend it. I  
6 cannot tell you how much work they did.

7 THE COURT: Were they going to be witnesses?

8 MR. DOWD: Pardon me?

9 THE COURT: Were they going to be --

10 MR. DOWD: Yes. It's Dr. Feinstein. He also  
11 testified in front of you on class cert. He was going to  
12 testify again at trial, your Honor.

13 THE COURT: Was his deposition taken?

14 MR. DOWD: His deposition was taken four times, your  
15 Honor.

16 THE COURT: So this million dollars reflects that  
17 activity.

18 MR. DOWD: Absolutely. And the defendant has six  
19 experts, on just loss causation. And you throw in truth on the  
20 market, they had 12. And I guarantee you, because I've worked  
21 with some of them, they paid a lot more than a million dollars  
22 for their 12 guys or six people, whatever you want to call  
23 them.

24 THE COURT: They're not asking me to give them any  
25 allowances to have a law firm relationship with a client who

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1 will or will not pay, I think, in advance. I will not give you  
2 that. You paid William H. Purcell Consulting over \$350,000 --

3 MR. DOWD: We did.

4 THE COURT: -- for testimony concerning due diligence  
5 issues. I remarked that I did not see the due diligence issues  
6 as having experts. It was really a fact and a law issue.

7 MR. DOWD: Yes. And then defendants --

8 THE COURT: I understand that, given defendants'  
9 insistence to have experts of that like, and a certain degree  
10 of uncertainty whether they will or will not be able to use  
11 them, you need to have your own.

12 MR. DOWD: Correct. And they had three.

13 THE COURT: What about Harvey Pitt?

14 MR. DOWD: Harvey Pitt, your Honor --

15 THE COURT: \$200,000 to Harvey Pitt --

16 MR. DOWD: Like 198,000.

17 THE COURT: -- to trace securities.

18 MR. DOWD: Well, and he was also going to testify  
19 about the SEC regulatory framework.

20 THE COURT: I told you I wasn't going to allow that.

21 MR. DOWD: No, I think you said I could award for  
22 that. In fact, I'm pretty sure you awarded that --

23 THE COURT: No. When I commented, you said that he  
24 was going to trace shares, a job that an accountant could do.

25 MR. DOWD: I think you also said he could testify

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1 about the SEC regulatory framework as well.

2 THE COURT: No, I did not.

3 MR. DOWD: I think you did, your Honor.

4 And, you know, your Honor, a lot of Mr. Pitt's bill is  
5 because the defendant showed up with between 15 and 20 lawyers  
6 in Washington, D.C., to take his deposition for two days. At  
7 the end of the first day, I walked out, because I said, this is  
8 a waste of time. And then defendants filed a letter brief  
9 complaining that I had walked out. And we had to go back for a  
10 second day.

11 I didn't want to have Harvey Pitt get deposed twice to  
12 talk about stuff that, you know, frankly I thought was not that  
13 remarkable.

14 THE COURT: You have almost \$50,000 paid to John  
15 Barron and \$384,000 to the firm that Barron went to.

16 MR. DOWD: Correct. Barron.

17 THE COURT: Barron.

18 MR. DOWD: We could have had several experts on  
19 accounting. And we found a REIT auditor and accountant who was  
20 going to testify to both, as to the company and as to Grant  
21 Thornton. I think his expenses are very reasonable.

22 THE COURT: I find your lodestar reasonable, the rates  
23 appropriate and, in relationship to the work that you did,  
24 reasonable. I'll go into lodestar a bit later.

25 The next firm I want to hear from is Lowey Dannenberg.

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1 MR. SKELTON: Good morning, your Honor. Thomas  
2 Skelton of Lowey Dannenberg. Ms. Hart sends her apologies.  
3 She had a client meeting in California with a client who was in  
4 hospice care and may pass at any time and felt that she needed  
5 to keep that appointment.

6 THE COURT: Thank you.

7 MR. SKELTON: Your Honor, my firm represents the  
8 Corsair group of funds. They had a \$19 million loss and were  
9 the second largest shareholder at the lead plaintiff stage. We  
10 were obviously not appointed lead counsel. Throughout the  
11 course of the case, we took our direction from Robbins Geller.  
12 We worked on numerous aspects of the case, including, as set  
13 forth in Ms. Hart's declaration, motions to dismiss, motions  
14 for class certification, motions for summary judgment.

15 THE COURT: What did you do on the motion to dismiss?

16 MR. SKELTON: We did discrete projects and we reviewed  
17 motion papers at the direction of lead counsel, particularly in  
18 any issues that might have related to Corsair. And they would  
19 apply throughout the case. Much of our work was specifically  
20 directed to issues that related to Corsair. For example, one  
21 of the issues that went throughout the case was the issue of  
22 tracing, as Mr. Dowd alluded to. We were able to find  
23 documents through our document platform that showed, in  
24 connection with the May 2014 offering, that Corsair purchased  
25 shares at the offering price on the date of the offering from

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1 one of the underwriters at a price that was outside of the  
2 trading price on that given day.

3 THE COURT: That's an accountant's work for Corsair.  
4 Why was it your work?

5 MR. SKELTON: Corsair retained to us perform these  
6 services and to represent them in the case. And the issue was  
7 whether we could trace the shares to the offering. And our  
8 work, we did the work analyzing the documents and providing the  
9 information to --

10 THE COURT: But normally that work would be done  
11 internally within a company. Corsair is what, a management  
12 company?

13 MR. SKELTON: It's an investment manager, yes.

14 THE COURT: Investment manager.

15 MR. SKELTON: Yes.

16 THE COURT: An investment manager knows what he  
17 bought, what he sold, when he bought it, how much he paid.

18 MR. SKELTON: An investment manager would have had to  
19 find all the documents and analyze them. We analyzed them in  
20 the context of the arguments that the defendants were making  
21 regarding tracing. They argued that we couldn't trace the  
22 shares to the offering because shares are fungible and they're  
23 held electronically and therefore we couldn't recover on the  
24 Section 11 claims. And the client, this is --

25 THE COURT: You bought these shares on the offerings,

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1 did you not?

2 MR. SKELTON: Corsair brought the shares on the  
3 offering, yes.

4 THE COURT: Which offering did you buy on?

5 MR. SKELTON: The May 2014 offering, as well as Cole  
6 merger shares. But the offering at issue was the May 2014  
7 offering.

8 THE COURT: Did you buy from the underwriters?

9 MR. SKELTON: Yes.

10 THE COURT: So what was the big problem?

11 MR. SKELTON: The problem was that the defendants were  
12 arguing in the in limine motions and in summary judgment that  
13 we couldn't trace the shares to the offering because shares are  
14 fungible and, because we couldn't say that these particular  
15 shares did not exist before the offering, we couldn't recover  
16 on the Section 11 claim.

17 THE COURT: That's a legal issue.

18 MR. SKELTON: Yes. And we needed to argue that legal  
19 issue with supporting documents. And the documents we were  
20 able to find showed that Corsair purchased, on the date of the  
21 offering, at the offering price, from one of the underwriters.  
22 And we compared that to publicly available information that  
23 showed that the lowest trading price of the day was above the  
24 price at which Corsair purchased, so therefore they must have  
25 purchased on the offering. This is not a routine analysis that

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1 Corsair would do. They didn't understand the nuances of  
2 Section 11, of the 1933 Act. We did. They retained us to do  
3 this, and that was part of what we did. And we were able to  
4 establish, through documentary evidence, that the shares were  
5 purchased on the offering. And ultimately, your Honor ruled in  
6 favor of the plaintiffs on that issue.

7 Other matters that we dealt with --

8 THE COURT: What was your contribution to the result?

9 MR. SKELTON: Corsair was a certified class  
10 representative. They purchased the shares on the open market.  
11 They purchased shares in the Cole offering. They purchased  
12 shares in the May secondary offering. All of our work, your  
13 Honor, was done either at the direction of lead counsel or in  
14 consultation with lead counsel, and consult --

15 THE COURT: Did you take any depositions of the  
16 defendants?

17 MR. SKELTON: We did not, your Honor. We were not  
18 asked to do that.

19 THE COURT: So all you did was represent your client.

20 MR. SKELTON: Well, we represented our client, who had  
21 issues relating to the various -- the offering and the merger  
22 and common shares. We were asked to perform tasks on the  
23 summary judgment motion, on class certification.

24 THE COURT: In relationship to your client.

25 MR. SKELTON: Well, generally, in relation -- in

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1 relation to our client and other tasks that Ms. Wyman called me  
2 and asked me if we could do certain research projects related  
3 to omissions and related to the admissibility of the financial  
4 restatement, which was an earlier issue that came up during the  
5 case. Our client produced 145,000 pages of documents. We  
6 reviewed the documents for responsiveness and privilege. We  
7 dealt with issues relating to the ESI and follow-up questions  
8 from the defendants regarding the documents that were produced.  
9 Mr. Mishaan of Corsair was deposed. Mr. Rothman from Robbins  
10 Geller attended the prep sessions, worked with us to get ready  
11 for the deposition. He attended the deposition. And the  
12 deposition went very well, and Corsair was certified as a class  
13 representative by your Honor.

14 THE COURT: What did the interview with the Department  
15 of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have to  
16 do with this lawsuit?

17 MR. SKELTON: Well, it involved parallel proceedings  
18 that the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's Office were contemplating  
19 bringing. They wanted to interview Corsair as a witness, and  
20 we prepared our client -- and he was the same person who was  
21 ultimately deposed.

22 THE COURT: So why should the class pay for that?

23 MR. SKELTON: Well, that was time that was spent  
24 learning facts that the government had, and they presented  
25 hypotheticals to us that helped us to understand some of the

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1 issues that they were considering. And we recognized that the  
2 government has different burdens of proof and different  
3 elements, but the underlying facts and the approach that the  
4 government was taking helped to us understand better the  
5 underlying facts in this case.

6 THE COURT: Why shouldn't that be a fee chargeable to  
7 your client, rather than to the class?

8 MR. SKELTON: Well, the information that we learned  
9 and that the client provided to the government was very similar  
10 to the information that was being argued in the case. The  
11 adjusted funds from operations was one of the issues that was  
12 discussed at that meeting. And we believed that that helped  
13 sharpen our focus. And Mr. Mishaan, who was the witness at the  
14 SEC and DOJ meeting, was also the deponent that Corsair  
15 proffered for his deposition.

16 THE COURT: These interviews with the Department of  
17 Justice and with the SEC were not on the record, were they?

18 MR. SKELTON: No, your Honor.

19 THE COURT: They couldn't be used in the lawsuit.

20 MR. SKELTON: No, they could not be used to be  
21 submitted as evidence. But it was helpful to us in  
22 understanding the government's approach and learning facts  
23 about the case that helped us proceed.

24 Just to put a finer point on it, your Honor, the  
25 interview was a short interview. It lasted a couple hours. We

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1 had a prep session the day before. It was not a lengthy period  
2 of time. But we do believe that the information that we  
3 learned during that process was helpful.

4 THE COURT: How much of your fees went into that?

5 MR. SKELTON: I could find it in our time sheets and  
6 submit this, your Honor, but it was probably six to eight hours  
7 of my time and a couple of hours of Ms. Hart's time.

8 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, could I just mention one thing?  
9 This happens in our cases sometimes, and it did here, where DOJ  
10 reaches out and says, we want a victim witness, and since you  
11 already have a lawsuit, we want your victim witness. And the  
12 first thing I say to them and I'm sure is what we said in this  
13 case -- I think Mr. Forge dealt with it -- is, get out of here,  
14 go find your own witnesses. And then they say, well, you know,  
15 if we want, we can subpoena your witnesses.

16 And so I think at times, you get stuck in this  
17 position with the U.S. Attorney's Office. And I say, you got  
18 to go in there and protect them because I don't know what  
19 they're going to write down, that your witness may or may not  
20 have said, and turn over in Jencks Act discovery before their  
21 trial.

22 And so you have to protect your witness. And it's not  
23 our fault, your Honor. We always tell them just go away, find  
24 your own witnesses, OK, you do your job, we'll do ours. It's  
25 not like they are going to help us.

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1           And I say that with all due respect. I used to be an  
2 assistant U.S. attorney, so --

3           THE COURT: One last question. If I were to give a  
4 lesser bonus to your and to the other firms than I give to  
5 Robbins Geller, would that it be unjust?

6           MR. SKELTON: Well, as I understand it, your Honor,  
7 Robbins Geller as lead counsel has the discretion, unless your  
8 Honor orders otherwise, to distribute the fees in accordance  
9 with its discretion as to the contributions that were made by  
10 the firms. We believe that our contribution was valid and  
11 meritorious, but of course Robbins Geller, they did the lion's  
12 share of the work, they took the depositions, they did a  
13 phenomenal job and they got a phenomenal result.

14           THE COURT: My thought was that I would make awards to  
15 each of your firms so that Robbins Geller would not have the  
16 burden of redistribution.

17           MR. SKELTON: That is certainly within your  
18 discretion, your Honor, to do that and to award what you think  
19 our firms' contribution was. We do believe we contributed to  
20 the success of the case. I believe that Robbins Geller agrees  
21 with that. Obviously Robbins Geller did the lion's share of  
22 the work. They took the depositions. And they created a  
23 tremendous result. So I'm not going to sit here and tell you  
24 that your Honor has to award me the same multiplier that  
25 Robbins Geller gets. They were lead counsel. But we do

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1 believe that our contribution was meritorious and that our time  
2 was valid and that our application should be granted.

3 THE COURT: Thank you.

4 MR. SKELTON: Thank you, your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Tell me your name again?

6 MR. SKELTON: Thomas Skelton from Lowey Dannenberg.

7 THE COURT: I'll hear Motley Rice next.

8 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, I'm not sure that all the  
9 co-counsel came. I mean, we were here to present for them,  
10 just like everything else in this case. We tried to keep a  
11 tight rein on everybody just so that there wouldn't be waste of  
12 time. And I'm pretty sure Cohen Milstein was here on Tuesday  
13 and they may have sent a different person today because they  
14 couldn't be here again today. But most of the people, we told  
15 them, we submitted your time and we'll argue for you. And  
16 that's typically the way we did things in this case. We didn't  
17 want ten firms showing up. I mean, the Court's order said, "As  
18 reported in yesterday's status conference, lead plaintiff's  
19 counsel, Robbins Geller, will work with and lead a working  
20 group of all interested plaintiff's counsel." And that's what  
21 we did.

22 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Dowd. But I have to  
23 examine the reasonableness of all the constituent parts of your  
24 fee, of your fee request, notwithstanding that you're  
25 requesting for everybody.

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1 I'm looking at Mr. Levin's declaration, Mr. Levin  
2 being a member of Motley Rice. That firm does not have offices  
3 in New York, does it?

4 MR. DOWD: I don't know whether they have an office in  
5 New York.

6 They do. Mr. Rothman says they do.

7 THE COURT: But the lawyers that worked on the case,  
8 were they from the New York office or another office?

9 MR. ROTHMAN: There was one lawyer who was either from  
10 Westchester or Kentucky, maybe from Connecticut, and the rest,  
11 Mr. Levin is in the South Carolina office.

12 THE COURT: It doesn't seem to be right to charge for  
13 transportation. I will disallow that charge.

14 I don't know what they did. What did they do in the  
15 case?

16 MR. DOWD: Well, I talked to you about that already,  
17 your Honor. They had the sheet metal workers. They produced  
18 Mr. Myers for his deposition. They also had Union Asset  
19 Management.

20 THE COURT: Tell me what they did to contribute to the  
21 victory.

22 MR. DOWD: Well, that does contribute to the victory,  
23 your Honor. You're producing deponents and witnesses who  
24 bought different offerings that contribute to the victory. I  
25 mean, they flew these guys over, as I understand it, from

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1 Germany to have their depositions taken, which is probably part  
2 of the travel expenses in this case. They assisted with the  
3 motion to dismiss briefing on the Exxon exchange. They  
4 attended the first mediation. They did all that depo prep and  
5 depo work. They produced respectively about, between them, the  
6 two plaintiffs, over 26,000 pages of documents, your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Johnson Fistel.

8 MR. DOWD: Johnson Fistel we talked about as well.  
9 That was Paul Matten. He was one of the ARCT IV witnesses.  
10 They also assisted with the document review. They lent us an  
11 associate to assist with document review.

12 They also produced about 1100 pages of documents on  
13 behalf of Mr. Matten. I believe their client was also  
14 interviewed by the DOJ.

15 THE COURT: The Weiss law firm, are they here? Is  
16 Weiss here?

17 MR. DOWD: I don't believe so, your Honor. Again, we  
18 kept tight reins on everybody to try to keep the numbers down.

19 THE COURT: This is an interest in their fee, not a  
20 matter of -- they're not getting paid for coming here today.  
21 They just have an interest in getting paid.

22 What about the Weiss law firm? What did they do?

23 MR. DOWD: Their client was Simon Abadi. He was, I  
24 believe, in the Cole offering. And they produced documents for  
25 their client. Their client was deposed in the case. He was on

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1 one of the "may call" witness lists. And so they did do work  
2 that related to their client in the case.

3 THE COURT: Stull Stull & Brody.

4 MR. DOWD: Stull Stull & Brody represented  
5 Dr. Esposito and another gentleman named Noah Bender. Esposito  
6 was one of the witnesses that really gave a standing on ARCT  
7 IV. He was together with Mr. Matten. But Dr. Esposito was  
8 deposed, and he was on our "will call" witness list because he  
9 gave a standing on the ARCT IV issue. And so they would have  
10 represented Dr. Esposito at his deposition and assisted with  
11 anything related to Dr. Esposito's briefing.

12 THE COURT: Gardy & Notis.

13 MR. DOWD: Gardy & Notis, your Honor, they had a  
14 client who was not named as a class rep in this case named  
15 Shenker. I think that he sought lead plaintiff appointment.  
16 However, because they were on the Cole exchange, they went down  
17 to Maryland because there had been a securities case against  
18 Cole, and they tried to make sure, their primary role was to  
19 make sure that our claims, our claims asserted in this case,  
20 didn't get cut out in the release in the Maryland Cole case.  
21 Not only did they argue below in this case, in the district  
22 court, but then I believe they also argued it on appeal as  
23 well, your Honor. And so that was their main role in the case,  
24 was objections and appeals in the Cole case to protect our  
25 clients to make sure their claims didn't get released in

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1 Maryland, in sort of an end-around. And so that was the work  
2 we gave them to do, and they did it, and they did it well.

3 THE COURT: The Polaszek Law Firm.

4 MR. DOWD: The Polaszek Law Firm represented the City  
5 of Tampa funds. They were on the May 2014 offering. They  
6 produced their client, who was one of the class reps, was  
7 Ernest Carrera, on behalf of Tampa, obviously, and he was on  
8 our "may call" witness list at the end of the day. They  
9 produced documents. Their client was deposed.

10 Frequently, when I looked at their lodestar, I was  
11 thinking I would have thought it would have been higher. But  
12 that was just my view.

13 THE COURT: Cohen Milstein.

14 MR. DOWD: Cohen Milstein we discussed. They  
15 represented the New York City funds. They were on a host of  
16 offerings, I think three different offerings. They produced  
17 two witnesses, Mr. Horan and Mr. Jeter. They were both  
18 deposed. They were both on our "will call" witness list. They  
19 did significant work in the case. They produced 190,000 pages  
20 of documents that had to be reviewed for privilege and  
21 responsiveness. And they also assisted with the motion to  
22 dismiss briefing in the case, as I recall. And so I think that  
23 their work was very good, and they did a good job, and helped  
24 us with the case.

25 MR. LOMETTI: Your Honor, I'm sorry. It's Chris

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1 Lometti from Cohen Milstein. Julie Reiser was here on Tuesday,  
2 is in court in California, had a mediation, actually, in  
3 California today. She couldn't be here. I'm here if you have  
4 any additional questions.

5 But I think there may have been four offerings that  
6 the New York City funds were involved with.

7 THE COURT: Did you take part in any depositions  
8 against defendants?

9 MR. LOMETTI: No, your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Or any motions?

11 MR. LOMETTI: I think the firm worked on the motion to  
12 dismiss, on class cert issues, and I believe -- Michael,  
13 correct me if I'm wrong -- but there was some work that the  
14 firm did in relation to the investment managers in general.  
15 New York City funds had five investment managers, and there was  
16 a time where the defendants were possibly wanting to depose  
17 some or all of them and we had to fight that, and which we did  
18 successfully. And we may have been involved with other  
19 investment manager-type issues as well in the case, your Honor.

20 MR. DOWD: That's correct, your Honor.

21 THE COURT: Thank you.

22 And Levi & Korsinsky.

23 MR. DOWD: They had clients Mitchell and Bonnie Ellis.  
24 They were on the ARCT IV offering. They were on our "may call"  
25 witness list. They produced documents. The defendants did not

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1 take their depositions. I noted that their expenses were zero,  
2 which was consistent with that. But that would have been their  
3 primary role: protecting their client, producing documents,  
4 reviewing them, and responding to issues on motion to dismiss  
5 that dealt with their clients.

6 THE COURT: If I were to give you whatever I give you,  
7 as a fee for everyone, what would be the methodology of  
8 distribution?

9 MR. DOWD: What would be our process? I think we  
10 would have to --

11 THE COURT: Your theory of distribution.

12 MR. DOWD: We would have to look at what everyone did  
13 and then figure out how to divide it. A large part of it would  
14 be based on what the Court ordered and how much we got, and we  
15 would have to think that through and then talk to the firms and  
16 make a decision. That's what would happen. It's not like  
17 there's some mathematical equation that we use.

18 THE COURT: I feel I want to reward your law firm more  
19 than the others proportionally.

20 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, I will say this. In this case,  
21 we kept those co-counsel to 10 percent of our lodestar,  
22 basically. And they did work on the case. And they did good  
23 work, with everything they had to do. And they cooperated with  
24 us. And they worked with their witnesses. And it added value  
25 to the case. I don't think it's fair --

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1 THE COURT: I'm sure they did. But the driving force  
2 in this case --

3 MR. DOWD: Absolutely.

4 THE COURT: -- and the reason that the result is  
5 uncommon, was the work of your firm.

6 MR. DOWD: I understand, your Honor. But I can't  
7 stand here and denigrate these other firms that I feel made a  
8 legitimate contribution to this case. And I won't do it.

9 THE COURT: OK. I'll take a short break and then  
10 I'll --

11 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, I would like to address some  
12 other issues too for the Court's consideration.

13 THE COURT: Go ahead.

14 MR. DOWD: Is that all right?

15 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

16 MR. DOWD: Because I know the Court goes with the  
17 lodestar approach. I understand. But, you know, in this case,  
18 TIAA, the lead plaintiff, did a great job. And the Court  
19 actually said they did an excellent job in this case. They  
20 held our feet to the fire. We had an ex ante negotiated fee  
21 agreement with them, before we were appointed lead plaintiff,  
22 calling for 12.4 percent of the fee.

23 THE COURT: How much?

24 MR. DOWD: 12.4 percent. You have to do some math on  
25 it. But that's what it comes out to. That's where the 127

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1 million comes from, your Honor.

2 TIAA is one of the largest retirement systems in the  
3 world, your Honor. They have almost a trillion dollars in  
4 assets.

5 THE COURT: I'm familiar with that.

6 MR. DOWD: All I'm saying is, they're used to dealing  
7 with lawyers, and they drove a good bargain on behalf of  
8 themselves and the class at 12.4 percent. If you look at the  
9 Second Circuit law, it says an ex ante negotiated fee  
10 agreement, the Second Circuit has said, should be given serious  
11 consideration by the court. Other judges in this court have  
12 said it's entitled to a presumption of reasonableness or  
13 correctness, starting with Judge Lynch, back in the *Global*  
14 *Crossing* case, probably almost 15 years ago.

15 THE COURT: From the point of view of a client wanting  
16 to litigate, there's a choice of paying as you go on a time  
17 basis, but the model for defendants is, the client takes each  
18 bill that comes and looks at it and says, well, I don't need  
19 this service or that service or you billed me too much on that,  
20 and you make adjustments. And at the end of the day, when you  
21 have a recovery, if the client has been paying you on a time  
22 basis and you want a bonus, the client will often say, well, I  
23 hired you because you're good, and I hired you because I'm  
24 willing to pay the high rates that you charge. So why should I  
25 also pay a bonus?

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1           You're getting a percentage from TIAA in lieu of pay  
2 as you go. Therefore you've had to wait. And therefore, from  
3 the perspective of TIAA, which is one of the beneficiaries of  
4 many in this lawsuit, it's not really arm's-length bargaining.

5           MR. DOWD: It is, though, your Honor.

6           THE COURT: It's an indication.

7           MR. DOWD: I understand.

8           THE COURT: I accept it as an indication.

9           MR. DOWD: I'll telling you just what some other  
10 courts have said.

11          THE COURT: I understand.

12          MR. DOWD: That 12.4 --

13          THE COURT: I understand some give lodestar and some  
14 give percentages.

15          MR. DOWD: Right.

16          THE COURT: I give lodestar. I don't give  
17 percentages.

18          MR. DOWD: But the negotiated fee agreement is given a  
19 presumption of reasonableness in courts. And that 12.4  
20 percent, your Honor, it's lower, lower than what a lot of  
21 people get. It is a contingent fee. We're not getting paid by  
22 the hour. It's contingent-fee litigation. And people do it on  
23 a percentage basis. That's how it works. And in this  
24 courthouse last year somebody got 25 percent on 250 million.  
25 The Second Circuit in November affirmed 13 percent on 2.3

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1 billion, your Honor, in a case.

2 THE COURT: The Court of Appeals does not want to  
3 substitute itself for my judgment in the case. It's tough  
4 work. There are very few legal principles involved.

5 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, can I just ask you to consider  
6 two other issues?

7 The defendants, in connection with the audit committee  
8 investigation and, you know, our suit, as well as other issues,  
9 totaled \$264 million that they spent. Now, that's not just our  
10 case.

11 THE COURT: Say that again.

12 MR. DOWD: 264 million.

13 THE COURT: Who?

14 MR. DOWD: The defendants. That's what ARCP paid for  
15 everything that resulted from the audit committee  
16 investigation, a lot of which we had to duplicate and a lot of  
17 which was probably directly on our case. They spent \$69 1/2  
18 million just in the first three quarters of 2019. In the first  
19 three quarters of 2019 I know the lion's share of that money  
20 had to be defending our case. 69 1/2 million, that's more than  
21 my lodestar, just for three quarters last year.

22 I would ask the Court to consider that. These numbers  
23 are not crazy.

24 When you look at what happened in this case, your  
25 Honor, I mean, the quality of the representation, I can tell

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1 you, your Honor --

2 THE COURT: I'm not going to cut your lodestar, if  
3 that's what you're worrying about.

4 MR. DOWD: No, no, I'm not worried about that. I'm  
5 worried about trying to get more than my lodestar.

6 THE COURT: You'll get more.

7 MR. DOWD: I would like to get as much as I could.

8 THE COURT: I could give you all 12.2 percent, but I'm  
9 not going to give you that much.

10 MR. DOWD: All right, your Honor. Just consider this.  
11 Bloomberg News, 2017, had an analyst that said this case would  
12 settled for between 33 and 117 million dollars. We got 1.052  
13 billion. Last summer, JPMorgan said, based on what they paid  
14 the opt-out litigants in this case, which were huge funds, huge  
15 funds -- Vanguard, PIMCO, BlackRock -- they said that we get  
16 450. And we got 1.025 billion, your Honor.

17 I just, I can't sit down before I tell you that. I  
18 mean, we did a remarkable job. And we should benefit from  
19 that -- for not taking the 450 and coming in and getting the  
20 same lodestar award, for saying, no, we're going to roll the  
21 dice on summary judgment and make this case worth more for the  
22 class, your Honor. And that's what we did. And we should be  
23 rewarded for taking that risk.

24 That's all I ask the Court to consider. I know the  
25 Court wants to rule, and I don't want to belabor it, but I ask

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1 you to consider that.

2 THE COURT: What did you perceive to be the risk, the  
3 probability, of my granting summary judgment to the defendant?

4 MR. DOWD: I don't know. To be honest, your Honor, I  
5 thought that we could very possibly get thrown out on Grant  
6 Thornton, who ended up paying 50 million --

7 THE COURT: What did you think that?

8 MR. DOWD: I don't know. Because I think that  
9 auditors get out of these cases an awful lot. I think they did  
10 a study and only like 2 percent --

11 THE COURT: They were not responsible for the AFFO --

12 MR. DOWD: Exactly.

13 THE COURT: But they were responsible to know how  
14 their numbers were being used.

15 MR. DOWD: No, I understand that.

16 THE COURT: And their numbers were being used in a way  
17 that you considered and you were likely to prove to be false  
18 and misleading.

19 MR. DOWD: But it was a risk. And you look at some of  
20 these other people that filed opt-out cases, they weren't  
21 taking that risk.

22 THE COURT: I don't mean to denigrate what you did.  
23 Because I think what you did was very good. A 50 percent  
24 discount of proveable damage is a much lower figure than that,  
25 because the number of over \$2 billion ascribable to the overall

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1 damage is subject to many, many pitfalls, failures of claims  
2 and the like. So your achieving over a billion dollars is  
3 highly significant.

4 MR. DOWD: Thank you.

5 THE COURT: And I don't want to take away from it. I  
6 think you did outstanding work. I think you have to be  
7 rewarded for your persistence and your stubbornness and for  
8 your leadership in the case. You stood up to the most powerful  
9 law firms in the City of New York and were their equal.

10 MR. DOWD: Thank you, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: However, your lodestar rates for partners  
12 are pretty high.

13 MR. DOWD: They're also lower than the rates of the  
14 firms on the other side.

15 THE COURT: Yes. But they had to get it on a  
16 pay-as-you-go basis, and you're getting it from me.

17 MR. DOWD: Well, that's even better, your Honor.

18 THE COURT: You have a significantly lower expense.

19 MR. DOWD: They're \$1500 an hour, your Honor.

20 THE COURT: I know.

21 MR. DOWD: They got it in 2014 and 2015, some of these  
22 firms. That money is worth 50 percent more now, because they  
23 got it then and they had higher rates than us. You know, I  
24 mean, it's not -- our rates are not high, you know what. I  
25 mean --

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1 THE COURT: We have an imperfect world.

2 MR. DOWD: I understand that. But, you know, my world  
3 isn't much different from theirs when it comes to, you know,  
4 meeting salary obligations and funding expenses and everything  
5 else. I don't get paid on the 30th day of every month like  
6 they do.

7 THE COURT: Is the transportation from San Diego --  
8 you're in San Diego, right?

9 MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor.

10 THE COURT: And Ms. Wyman is in San Diego.

11 MR. DOWD: Yes.

12 THE COURT: Are your transportation costs chargeable  
13 as an expense?

14 MR. DOWD: Yes, it is an expense.

15 THE COURT: You're taking advantage of a lower cost  
16 structure in San Diego, significantly lower structure.  
17 Charging the transportation cost and asking to be paid New York  
18 rates, that's significant.

19 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, our transportation costs were  
20 significantly higher because we cut out a lot of the airline  
21 fees. So out of pocket I'm losing about 130 grand on that,  
22 your Honor.

23 THE COURT: I'll take a short recess.

24 (Recess)

25 THE COURT: I've considered the arguments, read the

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1 fee justifications and the expense itemizations. I find the  
2 lodestars of each of the firms reasonable and appropriate and  
3 the expenses reasonable as well.

4 My award for all of the counsel who will be sharing  
5 this fee is \$100 million, plus allowance of expenses of  
6 \$5,164,539.91.

7 It comes out to a multiplier of 1.376, but regardless  
8 of the accuracy of my arithmetic, the number is \$100 million of  
9 fee and \$5,164,539.91.

10 I believe that, in this case, as I said before, the  
11 services delivered by the Robbins Geller firm were outstanding,  
12 that Ms. Wyman, Mr. Dowd, and your colleagues, Mr. Rothman, did  
13 outstanding work. I think in the fees of some of the other  
14 firms it was hard for me to see the same amount of  
15 productivity, in terms of obtaining the result, and in some  
16 cases whether or not all the fees that were presented were fees  
17 that should be allowed. But it's very hard to pierce through  
18 this, as Mr. Dowd has suggested that everything went into the  
19 final result, and so I determined that each of the firms would  
20 be considered as having had a full lodestar, and that the  
21 add-on, the bonus, would be done in the aggregate for all  
22 firms.

23 How the fees are ultimately allocated is something, I  
24 guess, the firms are going to have to work out for themselves.  
25 As I understand it, I have no continuing jurisdiction, should

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1 there be any dispute.

2 There's no interest to be awarded on this amount. It  
3 will be paid, how did you say, about third, Mr. Dowd, one third  
4 on when?

5 MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor. There's a third now, a  
6 third in 90 days, and a third on the initial distribution, the  
7 big distribution.

8 THE COURT: OK. And it will be payable by the funds  
9 that have already been paid by the defendants.

10 MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor. The money, we got the  
11 money in October, your Honor.

12 THE COURT: All the money.

13 MR. DOWD: Yes. And that actually, if we had awaited  
14 the final approval like a lot of firms do -- they don't fight  
15 for that. We've made the class about \$4 million on that alone,  
16 just by standing, holding out for that.

17 THE COURT: That's not unusual. Payment on the  
18 agreement.

19 MR. DOWD: A lot of people won't fight for it anymore,  
20 your Honor.

21 THE COURT: OK. That's my award. And I congratulate  
22 all of you. Thank you very much.

23 MR. DOWD: Thank you, your Honor.

24 MS. WYMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

25 MS. GUSIKOFF STEWART: Thank you, your Honor.

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1 MR. HOUSTON: Your Honor --

2 THE COURT: Two minutes.

3 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, we have an order that we  
4 adjusted, I think we filed it yesterday, to reflect a third, a  
5 third, a third. And I think our expenses went down about  
6 \$9,000.

7 THE COURT: Hand it up. Then I'll talk to  
8 Mr. Houston.

9 MR. DOWD: Oh, it has a percentage in it. So if you  
10 want us to just submit one later?

11 THE COURT: Yes.

12 MR. DOWD: Or I can write it in now, whichever you  
13 prefer.

14 THE COURT: You can write it in now.

15 Meanwhile, I'll hear from Mr. Houston.

16 MR. HOUSTON: Your Honor, very briefly. We had a  
17 couple issues with process on the submissions in the derivative  
18 matter. We have asked for, with counsel for VEREIT, that we be  
19 given the opportunity to file a reply statement once they have  
20 gone through our time records and identified their issues. We  
21 think this will create the greatest and clearest record.

22 THE COURT: I think this is what you do. Without  
23 giving me anything, give Mr. Edelman what you propose.

24 Mr. Edelman will then give you his objections. You will  
25 negotiate to whatever extent you feel appropriate. And then

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1 there will be a filing on a joint basis, just the way you do  
2 with a 2(e) letter, so I don't get separate filings. So just  
3 give me the outside date by which you can accomplish all that.  
4 Discuss it with Mr. Edelman. And then we'll issue an order.

5 MR. HOUSTON: Your Honor, that was the second issue.  
6 We have discussed some dates. We had asked for a month to put  
7 together the records in accordance with your Honor's directive  
8 on Tuesday.

9 THE COURT: How much time do you want?

10 MR. HOUSTON: OK. So we'll take that month.  
11 Mr. Edelman, how long do you want? Do you want your two weeks  
12 that you suggested, or longer than that, to review what we are  
13 submitting?

14 MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, so as I understand it, you  
15 want us to do a joint letter.

16 THE COURT: At the end.

17 MR. EDELMAN: At the end?

18 THE COURT: Outlining the positions.

19 MR. EDELMAN: And do you want us to be limited to the  
20 page limits? Because as I understand it, Mr. Houston is  
21 planning on now submitting a different set of time records.

22 THE COURT: What do you propose?

23 MR. EDELMAN: I would propose that Mr. Houston submit  
24 whatever he wants to submit. To the extent that there was  
25 stuff in the time records that shouldn't have been in there,

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1 take them out, put them in a letter responding to our position.  
2 We put in a letter responding to that. And then your Honor is  
3 in a position to decide. And we do it as quickly as we can.  
4 We've already had extensive briefing and argument on this.

5 MR. HOUSTON: The only problem with that is that we  
6 never did get the chance to respond to the initial issues. And  
7 Mr. Edelman has already said that, on review of the next  
8 submission of records, there may be additional issues.

9 THE COURT: Mr. Houston, February 21, you file with  
10 the Court your submission, backed up by whatever supporting  
11 data you think is appropriate.

12 Mr. Edelman, on March 13, you respond.

13 MR. EDELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

14 THE COURT: And Mr. Houston, another week, March 20,  
15 to reply. And I'll endeavor to decide on the papers or, if I  
16 need to see you, I'll do that as well.

17 OK? Are those dates satisfactory?

18 MR. EDELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

19 MR. HOUSTON: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

20 THE COURT: All right.

21 Anything further?

22 MR. EDELMAN: Yes. Your Honor, on behalf of VEREIT  
23 and, I think, all the counsel, we want to thank you for all  
24 your work and your attention and your good humor throughout  
25 what was a very contentious fight. Thank you.

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1 MR. DOWD: Thank you, your Honor. And I would also  
2 thank your staff as well. They were fabulous too.

3 THE COURT: Yes. The staff is fantastic and they make  
4 people look good, to the extent I look good. Metaphorically  
5 speaking.

6 It's been a pleasure to have you. It's not common to  
7 have a case this well argued, this well presented. There were  
8 lots of discovery issues throughout. Your ability to cooperate  
9 in this procedure that I have facilitated my work enormously,  
10 and where I couldn't resolve it, we had hearings on a short  
11 basis. My goal in this, which I don't suppose was  
12 accomplished, was to reduce transaction costs as much as  
13 possible and move the case along as much as I could. You'll  
14 judge me whether I succeeded or not, but that was my goal. And  
15 I think it was facilitated by the way you cooperated with each  
16 other, while at the same time representing your respective  
17 clients most zealously. So I thank you.

18 MR. DOWD: Thank you.

19 MR. EDELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

20 MS. WYMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

21 THE COURT: When is finality, Mr. Dowd?

22 MR. DOWD: Well, there's no objection, so it should be  
23 30 days from judgment, which I believe the Court entered  
24 yesterday.

25 THE COURT: What about my not giving a fee award yet?

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1 I've done everything in the class action.

2 MR. DOWD: Oh, no, they are separate cases. They  
3 weren't even consolidated ever. They were coordinated for  
4 discovery but not consolidated, so my case is down right now,  
5 and it will be final in 30 days because there are no  
6 objections.

7 MR. EDELMAN: Also, it's our understanding that the  
8 derivative judgment makes that case final and the fee issue is  
9 separate.

10 THE COURT: Will be supplementary to the judgment.

11 MR. HOUSTON: Yes. That's right, your Honor.

12 THE COURT: OK. Thank you.

13 MR. DOWD: Thank you.

14 MR. EDELMAN: Thank you again, your Honor.

15 (Adjourned)

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# EXHIBIT H

K6BKDEUC

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

3 NORBERT G. KAESS, et al,

4 Plaintiffs,

5 v.

09 CV 1714 (GHW) (RWL)  
Telephone Conference

6 DEUTSCHE BANK AG, et al.,

7 Defendants.

8 -----x  
New York, N.Y.  
9 June 11, 2020  
4:30 p.m.

10 Before:

11 HON. GREGORY H. WOODS,

12 District Judge

13 APPEARANCES

14 GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP  
15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

16 BY: BRIAN P. MURRAY  
-and-

17 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP

18 BY: THEODORE J. PINTAR  
ERIC NIEHAUS  
KEVIN LAVELLE

19 CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP  
20 Attorneys for Deutsche Bank Defendants

21 BY: DAVID JANUSZEWSKI  
SAMUEL MANN

22 SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP  
Attorneys for Underwriter Defendants

23 BY: WILLIAM J. O'BRIEN  
ANDREW BEATTY

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1 (The Court and all parties appearing telephonically)

2 THE COURT: This is Judge Woods.

3 Is there a court reporter on the line?

4 (Pause)

5 THE COURT: Let me just say a few words at the outset  
6 of today's conference.

7 First, you should conceive of this conference as if it  
8 was happening in the courtroom. As you know, the dial-in  
9 information for this call is publicly available; members of the  
10 public and the press are welcome to dial in.

11 Second, let me ask you to all keep your phones on mute  
12 at all times when you're not speaking on the phone. I can hear  
13 some background noise right now, shuffling some paper. We  
14 should not hear any background noise during the course of the  
15 conference. Please keep your phones on mute at all times when  
16 you are not speaking during the conference. That will help us  
17 to keep a clear record of what we say today.

18 Third, I'd like to ask each of the people who will  
19 speak during this conference to please identify themselves each  
20 time that they speak during this conference. So, if you speak  
21 during this conference, you should say your name each time that  
22 you speak. You should do that regardless of whether or not  
23 you've spoken previously during the conference. That will help  
24 us to keep a clear record of today's conference.

25 Last, as you've heard, there is a court reporter on

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1 the line. You should not be surprised if he chimes in at any  
2 point. If he does, and if he asks you to do something to help  
3 him to hear or understand what you're saying, please do what he  
4 asks. That will help us to, again, keep a clear record of the  
5 conference today.

6 Because there is a court reporter on the line  
7 transcribing the conference, I'm ordering that there be no  
8 recordings or rebroadcasts of any portion of the conference.

9 So, with those introductory remarks in hand, let me  
10 turn to the parties.

11 I'd like to ask for counsel for each side to identify  
12 counsel who are on the line for each of the parties and any  
13 representatives for each of the parties. What I'm going to ask  
14 is that, if you can, that one person from each side identify  
15 herself and the members of her team; that way, we won't have to  
16 hear many people chiming in at a time.

17 So let me begin with counsel for plaintiffs.

18 Who's on the line for plaintiffs?

19 MR. PINTAR: Good afternoon, your Honor. It's Ted  
20 Pintar, and I'm here with Eric Niehaus and Kevin Lavelle, from  
21 Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, for plaintiffs.

22 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

23 Who is on the line for defendants?

24 MR. MURRAY: Excuse me. I hate to interrupt, but this  
25 is also for plaintiffs, Brian Murray, from Glancy Prongay &

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1 Murray. Sorry to interrupt you.

2 Now the defendants.

3 THE COURT: Fine.

4 Counsel for defendants?

5 MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is  
6 David Januszewski, and I have my colleague, Samuel Mann. We  
7 are both from Cahill Gordon & Reindel, representing Deutsche  
8 Bank and the Deutsche Bank defendants. And on the line, we  
9 also have, from Deutsche Bank, Stella Tipi, in-house counsel at  
10 Deutsche Bank.

11 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

12 So, counsel --

13 MR. O'BRIEN: I'm sorry. Good afternoon, your Honor.  
14 I just wanted to introduce myself and my colleagues. William  
15 J. O'Brien and Andrew Beatty, from the firm of Skadden Arps  
16 Slate Meagher & Flom, on behalf of the underwriter defendants.

17 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

18 So, counsel, first, let me thank you all for being on  
19 the call. I scheduled this conference as a settlement hearing  
20 or approval hearing with respect to the proposed resolution of  
21 this case. I have reviewed all of the materials that have been  
22 submitted on the docket to date in connection with this matter.  
23 I'd like to hear, however, from each of the parties, to hear,  
24 in particular, if there's anything that any of you would like  
25 to add to any of your written submissions in connection with

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1 the proposed resolution of the case.

2 Let me begin with counsel for plaintiffs.

3 Counsel?

4 MR. PINTAR: Again, good afternoon, your Honor. Ted  
5 Pintar, for plaintiffs.

6 I had a number of things I wanted to mention just at  
7 the outset. Obviously, we're here on the final approval of an  
8 \$18.5 million settlement. We are very proud of that result.  
9 As we have indicated, and I won't repeat all of what's in the  
10 papers, but it represents a very significant percentage of  
11 reasonably recoverable damages.

12 On February 27, 2020, this Court entered its  
13 preliminary approval order. Pursuant to that order, notice was  
14 disseminated. The claims administrator mailed over 112,000  
15 notice packages, published the summary notice in the Wall  
16 Street Journal and Business Wire, and set up a settlement  
17 website where the notice and other settlement-related documents  
18 were posted.

19 And, as a result, there was one objection. It's not  
20 clear to me whether that has been withdrawn. I won't attempt  
21 to characterize Mr. Agay's email. We submitted it to the  
22 Court. He indicates, however, that he would not be  
23 participating today. There were only four opt-outs. And I do  
24 have some information on claims to date. Over 11,000 claims  
25 have been submitted, and they are still processing claims --

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1 the mailed claims, so that number is likely to rise even from  
2 there.

3 So, we believe that not only is it a good settlement,  
4 that the class has reacted very positively to it, and, as you  
5 know, today we're asking the Court to enter three orders: The  
6 final judgment, the order approving plan of allocation, and the  
7 order awarding attorneys' fees and expenses and award to class  
8 plaintiffs. Other than that, your Honor, I certainly don't  
9 have anything to add to our papers. I'm happy to address any  
10 questions the Court may have, though.

11 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much, counsel.

12 Let me hear from each of the groups of defendants.

13 First, counsel for the Deutsche defendants.

14 MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Yes, your Honor. Again, this is  
15 David Januszewski, from Cahill Gordon.

16 We have nothing to add to what was submitted, which  
17 was designed to address the objection that my friend just  
18 addressed. We have nothing to add to that.

19 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

20 Counsel for the remaining defendants, anything that  
21 you'd like to add to your written submissions?

22 MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. William O'Brien, from the firm of  
23 Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, on behalf of the underwriter  
24 defendants.

25 And like Mr. Januszewski, we have nothing further to

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1 add.

2 THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

3 Is there anyone else on the line who wishes to be  
4 heard?

5 So, hearing none, counsel, I'm going to approve the  
6 proposed resolution of this action, or series of actions. What  
7 I'd like to do is to ask you to place your phones, again, on  
8 mute, if you would, please. I'd like to review the reasoning  
9 for my decision. I'm going to do so now orally. At the end,  
10 I'll take up the two orders and judgment that the parties have  
11 proposed. Let me begin with, first, an overview.

12 So, I. Overview:

13 Plaintiffs brought this securities class action in  
14 February 2009 on behalf of all persons who purchased the  
15 7.35 percent Noncumulative Trust Preferred Securities of  
16 Deutsche Bank Capital Funding Trust X and/or the 7.60 percent  
17 Trust Preferred Securities of Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital  
18 Trust III securities from Deutsche Bank AG pursuant to public  
19 offerings from November 6, 2007, to February 14, 2008.  
20 Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Sections 11,  
21 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act (the "Securities Act")  
22 and (15, U.S.C., Section 77k, 771(a)(2), and 77o) by omitting  
23 material facts from the offering documents. See declaration of  
24 Eric I. Niehaus ("Niehaus dec."), Docket No. 308, paragraph 3.

25 Since then, plaintiffs have extensively litigated this

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1 case. The parties have engaged in significant motion practice,  
2 and have completed fact discovery. Niehaus declaration  
3 paragraphs 3-4. Now, plaintiffs seek final approval of the  
4 class action settlement and approval of their plan for  
5 allocating the net proceeds of the settlement. Plaintiffs'  
6 counsel also seek an award of attorneys' fees and litigation  
7 costs, and the lead plaintiffs seek an award for expenses  
8 incurred while representing the class.

9 Judge Batts presided over this case for almost the  
10 entire time that it has been pending in this court. The case  
11 was reassigned to me on February 20, 2020, after Judge Batts'  
12 untimely death.

#### 13 II. Class Certification:

14 On October 2, 2018, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal  
15 Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Batts granted plaintiffs'  
16 motion to certify a class defined as: All persons or entities  
17 who purchased or otherwise acquired the 7.35 percent  
18 Noncumulative Trust Preferred Securities of Deutsche Bank  
19 Capital Funding Trust X ("7.35 percent Preferred Securities"),  
20 and/or the 7.60 percent Trust Preferred Securities of Deutsche  
21 Bank Contingent Capital Trust III ("7.60 percent Preferred  
22 Securities"), pursuant or traceable to the public offerings  
23 that commenced on or about November 6, 2007, and February 14,  
24 2008. Excluded from the class are defendants, the officers and  
25 directors of Deutsche Bank, and the underwriter defendants at

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1 all relevant times, members of their immediate families and  
2 their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns and  
3 any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling  
4 interest. Docket No. 224 at 10.

5 III. Approval of the Settlement Agreement:

6 Rule 23(e) requires court approval for a class action  
7 settlement to ensure that it is procedurally and substantively  
8 fair, reasonable, and adequate. Federal Rule of Civil  
9 Procedure 23(e). To determine procedural fairness, courts  
10 examine the negotiating process leading to the settlement.  
11 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116  
12 (2d Cir. 2005). To determine substantive fairness, courts  
13 analyze whether the settlement's terms are fair, adequate, and  
14 reasonable according to the factors set forth in City of  
15 Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).

16 The court examines procedural and substantive fairness  
17 in light of the "strong judicial policy favoring settlements"  
18 of class action suits. Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 116. A  
19 "presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may  
20 attach to a class action settlement reached in arm's-length  
21 negotiations between experienced capable counsel after  
22 meaningful discovery." Id. "Absent fraud or collusion,  
23 [courts] should be hesitant to substitute [their] judgment for  
24 that of the parties who negotiated the settlement." In re EVCI  
25 Career Colls. Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 2230177, at \*4

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1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007).

2 A. Procedural Fairness:

3 The settlement is procedurally fair, reasonable,  
4 adequate and not a product of collusion. The settlement was  
5 reached after the parties had conducted a thorough  
6 investigation and evaluated the claims and defenses; the  
7 agreement in principle was reached after sessions with the  
8 Honorable Judge Layn R. Phillips, a former United States  
9 District Judge and an experienced mediator of securities class  
10 actions and other complex litigation. Niehaus declaration  
11 paragraph 6, 129. In advance of the mediation, the parties  
12 exchanged detailed mediation statements addressing both  
13 liability and damages. *Id.* The parties reached a final  
14 resolution on September 12, 2019, with the assistance of Judge  
15 Phillips, after formal mediation. *Id.*

16 B. Substantive Fairness:

17 The settlement is also substantively fair. The  
18 factors set forth in Grinnell provide the analytical framework  
19 for evaluating the substantive fairness of a class action  
20 settlement. The Grinnell factors are: (1) the complexity,  
21 expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the  
22 reaction of the class; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the  
23 amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing  
24 liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks  
25 of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the

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1 ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8)  
2 the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of  
3 the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness  
4 of the settlement fund to a recovery in light of all of the  
5 attendant risks of litigation. Grinnell 295 F.2d at 463.  
6 Litigation here through trial will be complex, expensive, and  
7 long. It has been complex, expensive, and long. Thus, the  
8 first Grinnell factor weighs in favor of final approval. See  
9 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust  
10 Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11, 36 (E.D.N.Y 2019) ("Settlement is  
11 favored if settlement results in substantial and tangible  
12 present recovery, without the attendant risk and delay of  
13 trial.").

14 With respect to the second factor, the class members'  
15 reaction to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive.  
16 Of the 112,397 notice packets mailed to potential members of  
17 the settlement class, four exclusion requests were received.  
18 Supplemental declaration of Ross D. Murray (Supplemental Murray  
19 Dec.") Docket No. 324, Paragraphs 4, 6. Only one class member,  
20 Mr. Richard Agay, objected. See Richard Agay letter ("Agay  
21 letter") Docket No. 320-21.

22 That objection did not challenge the settlement, the  
23 resolution of this case, the reasons for the settlement, the  
24 manner in which class plaintiffs and lead counsel prosecuted  
25 the litigation, the work lead counsel performed, or lead

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1 counsel's fee and expense application. Instead, the objection  
2 asserted only that Mr. Agay received his copy of the notice  
3 late, and that he was confused by certain aspects of the  
4 submission, and that the claims administrator did not  
5 sufficiently respond to Mr. Agay's telephonic inquiry. On  
6 June 5, 2020, Mr. Agay emailed lead counsel in an email that I  
7 construe as him withdrawing his objections, perhaps because he  
8 recognized that he was apparently persuaded by the response of  
9 the parties showing that he was not entitled to recovery in the  
10 suit. See Docket No. 329. While Mr. Agay received his notice  
11 later than expected, he received it with enough time to submit  
12 objections, and the delay was caused by a failure at his  
13 broker. His objection does not suggest that the overall  
14 distribution or notice program was ineffective in design or  
15 execution.

16           The absence of objections, with the exception of one  
17 retail investor, who literally withdrew his objection, coupled  
18 with the minimal number of requests for exclusion, strongly  
19 supports the finding that the settlement plan of allocation and  
20 fee and expense requests are fair, reasonable, and adequate.  
21 See *In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 965 F. Supp. 2d 369, 382  
22 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); *In re Bisys Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 2049726, at  
23 \*1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007); *In re Veeco instruments Inc. Sec.*  
24 *Litig.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85629, at \*40.

25           In sum, the overall favorable response demonstrates

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1 that the class approves of the settlement and supports final  
2 approval.

3           The plaintiffs completed fact discovery, so counsel  
4 "had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before  
5 negotiating." *Beckman v. KeyBank, N.A.*, 293 F.R.D. 467, 475  
6 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting *In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*,  
7 391 F.3d 516, 537 (3rd Cir. 2004); see also Niehaus declaration  
8 paragraph 5. Lead plaintiffs spent significant time and  
9 resources analyzing and litigating the legal and factual issues  
10 of this case, including an extensive factual and legal  
11 investigation into the settlement class's claims and engaging  
12 in the detailed formal mediation process. Niehaus declaration  
13 paragraph 5.

14           Turning to the fourth and fifth factors, the risk of  
15 establishing liability and damages further weighs in favorable  
16 of final approval. "Litigation inherently involves risks." *In*  
17 *re PaineWebber Ltd. Partnerships Litig.*, 171 F.R.D. 104, 126  
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Indeed, the primary purpose of settlement is  
19 to avoid the uncertainty of a trial on the merits. See *Velez*  
20 *v. Majik Cleaning Serv., Inc.*, 2007 WL 7232783, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y.  
21 June 25, 2007). Here, plaintiffs face significant risks as to  
22 both liability and damages; defendants challenged the premise  
23 that the allegedly omitted information was material and the  
24 notion that plaintiffs could prove that the drop in price was  
25 related to the allegedly omitted information. See Niehaus

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1 declaration paragraphs 106, 115 to 17. The proposed settlement  
2 eliminates these uncertainties. These factors, therefore,  
3 weigh in favor of final approval.

4 The risk of obtaining class certification is  
5 nonexistent here. Therefore, the sixth Grinnell factor weighs  
6 in favor of final approval. Settlement generally eliminates  
7 the risk, expense, and delay inherent in the litigation process  
8 as a whole.

9 Turning to the seventh factor, there is nothing to  
10 suggest that Deutsche Bank or the underwriter defendants would  
11 be unable to withstand a greater judgment than the settlement  
12 amount. "But a defendant is not required to empty its coffers  
13 before a settlement can be found adequate." Shapiro v.  
14 JP Morgan & Co., 2014 WL 1224666, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,  
15 2014) (quotation omitted).

16 Deutsche Bank's financial circumstances -- or I should  
17 say the defendants' financial circumstances do not ameliorate  
18 the force of the other Grinnell factors, which lead to the  
19 conclusion that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and  
20 adequate.

21 Finally, the amount of the settlement, in light of the  
22 best possible recovery and the attendant risks of litigation,  
23 weighs in favor of final approval. The determination of  
24 whether a settlement amount is reasonable "is not susceptible  
25 of a mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum." In

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1 re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F.Supp. 2d 164,  
2 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Instead, "There is a range of  
3 reasonableness with respect to a settlement - a range which  
4 recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular  
5 case and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent  
6 in taking any litigation to completion." Newman v. Stein, 464  
7 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1972).

8 Here, lead plaintiffs assert that the settlement would  
9 constitute 47 percent of the estimated recoverable damages.  
10 Niehaus declaration paragraph 19. This is a reasonable result  
11 when compared to the median ratio of settlement to investor  
12 losses of 2.1 percent for securities class action settlements  
13 in 2019. Id. Therefore, the amount of this immediate recovery  
14 is reasonable, and this factor weighs in favor of final  
15 approval.

16 Weighing the Grinnell factors, I find that the  
17 settlement is substantively fair and weigh in favor of final  
18 approval.

19 IV. Plan of Allocation:

20 "To warrant approval, the plan of allocation must also  
21 meet the standards by which the settlement was  
22 scrutinized - namely, it must be fair and adequate...an  
23 allocation formula need only have a reasonable, rational basis,  
24 particularly if recommended by experienced and competent class  
25 counsel." In Re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d

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1 319, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(citation and quotation omitted). "A  
2 plan of allocation need not be perfect," in re EVCI Career  
3 Colleges Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 2230177, at \*11  
4 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007)(collecting cases), or "tailored to the  
5 rights of each plaintiff with mathematical precision,"  
6 PaineWebber, 171 F.R.D. at 133; see also RMed  
7 International, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 2000 WL  
8 420548, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2000) (recognizing that  
9 "aggregate damages in securities fraud cases are generally  
10 incapable of mathematical precision"). Thus, "In determining  
11 whether a plan of allocation is fair, courts look primarily to  
12 the opinion of counsel." In re EVCI Career Colleges Holding  
13 Corp. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 2230177, at \*11.

14 Lead counsel, who are experienced and competent in  
15 complex class actions, prepared the plan of allocation in  
16 connection with plaintiffs' damages expert. Niehaus  
17 declaration paragraphs 100, 134. The settlement fund, minus  
18 attorneys' fees and expenses, will be allocated on a pro rata  
19 basis according to the relative size of class members'  
20 "Recognized claims." Id. at paragraphs 9, 10. The expert has  
21 calculated an estimated individual class members' claim based  
22 on (i) allegations when the alleged concealed facts and trends  
23 became known (i.e., realization events); (ii) an event study  
24 that estimates price changes in the securities as a result of  
25 realization events; and (iii) the statutory formula used to

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1 calculate recoverable damages during the settlement class  
2 period. Declaration of Steven P. Feinstein ("Feinstein dec"),  
3 Docket No. 177-1, paragraphs 29-42.

4 Because the plan of allocation has a clear rational  
5 basis, equitably treats the class members, and was devised by  
6 experienced and estimable class counsel, the Court finds it  
7 fair and adequate. See *In re Telik, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 576  
8 F.Supp. 2d, 570, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

9 V. Dissemination of Notice:

10 On February 27, 2020, the Court entered an order  
11 granting preliminary approval of the settlement as "fair,  
12 reasonable and adequate" to class members. In accordance with  
13 that order, lead counsel retained Gilardi & Co. LLC ("Gilardi")  
14 as claims administrator to supervise and administer the notice  
15 procedure in connection with the settlement and to process all  
16 claims. Declaration of Ross D. Murray ("Murray dec"), Docket  
17 No. 310, paragraph 2.

18 Gilardi sent a copy of the notice to potential members  
19 of the settlement class. First, Gilardi mailed, by first class  
20 mail, the notice packet to 283 nominees - banks, brokerage  
21 companies, and other institutions - that Gilardi had in its  
22 proprietary database. *Id.* at paragraph 5.

23 Next, Gilardi mailed the notice packet to 4,643  
24 additional institutions or entities on the U.S. Securities and  
25 Exchange Commission's ("SEC") list of active brokers and

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1 dealers. Id. paragraph 5.

2 Gilardi also delivered electronic copies of the notice  
3 packet to 381 registered electronic filers, primarily  
4 institutions and third-party filers, and to the depository  
5 trust company ("DTC") on the DTC legal notice system ("LENS"),  
6 which enables bank and broker nominees to contact Gilardi for  
7 copies of the notice for their beneficial holders. Id.  
8 paragraph 7. Gilardi received multiple responses and  
9 additional names of potential settlement class members from  
10 individuals or other nominees, with requests for over 64,000  
11 notice packets to be forwarded directly to nominees' customers.  
12 Id. paragraph 9. Gilardi also published the summary notice in  
13 the Wall Street Journal and transmitted it over Business Wire.  
14 Id. paragraph 11. Gilardi also posted the date and time of the  
15 hearing on the settlement website. Id. paragraph 12.

16 Gilardi ultimately mailed a total of 112,397 notice  
17 packets, including mailing notice packets to persons a second  
18 time when the first set were returned as undeliverable.  
19 Supplemental Murray declaration paragraph 4.

20 These notices apprised settlement class members, among  
21 other things, of: (i) the amount of the settlement; (ii) the  
22 reasons why the parties are proposing the settlement; (iii) the  
23 maximum amount of attorneys' fees and expenses that will be  
24 sought; (iv) the identity and contact information for  
25 representatives of lead counsel available to answer questions

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1 concerning the settlement; (v) the right of settlement class  
2 members to object to the settlement; (vi) the right to request  
3 exclusion from the settlement class; (vii) the binding effect  
4 of a judgment on settlement class members; (viii) the dates and  
5 deadlines for certain settlement-related events; and (ix) the  
6 way to obtain additional information about the action and the  
7 settlement by contacting lead counsel and the settlement  
8 administrator. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
9 23(c)(2)(B).

10 I find that these efforts fairly and adequately  
11 advised class members of the terms of the settlement, as well  
12 as the right of Rule 23 class members to opt out of, or to  
13 object to the settlement, and to appear at the final fairness  
14 hearing today. I find that the notice and its distribution  
15 comported with all constitutional requirements, including those  
16 of due process.

17 VI. Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses:

18 Lead counsel requests attorneys' fees in the amount of  
19 what the Court calculates to be \$6,166,666.67 plus interest  
20 earned at the same rate as the settlement fund. This amounts  
21 to one-third of the settlement fund, or 33.3 percent of the  
22 settlement fund. Lead counsel also seeks reimbursement of:  
23 (i) \$1,203,502.39 in litigation expenses in total, with Robbins  
24 Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP ("Robbins Geller") seeking  
25 \$1,170,981.31, Glancy Prongay & Murray seeking \$28,740.22, and

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1 Murray Frank LLP seeking \$3,780.86; and (ii) to approve the  
2 award to the lead plaintiffs, or class plaintiffs, of "20,000  
3 in the aggregate pursuant to 15, U.S.C., Section 77Z-1(a)(4) in  
4 connection with their representation of the class." Niehaus  
5 declaration paragraph 17.

6 Now, the trend in the Second Circuit is to use the  
7 percentage of the fund method to compensate attorneys in common  
8 fund cases, although the Court has discretion to award  
9 attorneys' fees based on the lodestar method or the percentage  
10 of recovery method. See *Fresno County Employees' Ret.*  
11 *Association v. Isaacson/Weaver Family Trust*, 925 F.3d 63, 68  
12 (2d Cir. 2019).

13 The notice provided to class members advised that  
14 class counsel would apply for attorneys' fees for up to  
15 33.3 percent of the settlement fund, in addition to litigation  
16 costs not to exceed 1.3 million. See Gilardi declaration  
17 Exhibit A Notice at 2. No class member objected to the  
18 request.

19 A. Goldberger Factors:

20 Reasonableness is the touchstone when determining  
21 whether to award attorneys' fees. In *Goldberger v. Integrated*  
22 *Resources, Inc.*, 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit  
23 set forth the following six factors to determine the  
24 reasonableness of a fee application: (1) the time and labor  
25 expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the

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1 litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation; (4) the quality of  
2 representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the  
3 settlement; and (6) public policy considerations. Id at 50.

4 1. Class Counsel's Time and Labor:

5 Plaintiffs' counsel have expended more than 26,000  
6 hours of attorney time in total over the course of this action,  
7 the vast majority of which was time expended by of counsel at  
8 Robbins Geller. Declaration of Eric Niehaus in support of lead  
9 counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees ("Niehaus fee  
10 declaration"), Docket No. 311 paragraph 5. Niehaus declaration  
11 paragraph 135.

12 2. Magnitude and Complexity of the Litigation:

13 The size and difficulty of the issues in a case are  
14 significant factors to be considered in making a fee award. In  
15 re Prudential Sec, Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 912 F. Supp.  
16 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "In evaluating the settlement of a  
17 securities class action, federal courts, including this Court,  
18 have long recognized that such litigation is notably difficult  
19 and notoriously uncertain." In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd.  
20 Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 4537550, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010)  
21 (quotation omitted). This case is one of substantial  
22 magnitude. In addition to all of the complications that are  
23 attendant to any large securities class action, this matter  
24 involved events that happened over ten years ago, extensive  
25 discovery, and litigation. The amount sought by plaintiffs'

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1 counsel is commensurate with the magnitude and complexity of  
2 this litigation.

3 3. The Risk of Litigation:

4 As discussed, lead counsel faced significant risk in  
5 prosecuting this action and proving the merits of the claims.  
6 All of the fact-finding has concluded. Given the complexity of  
7 the case, the risk at summary judgment and trial is  
8 significant. Defendants adamantly denied any wrongdoing, and,  
9 in the event that litigation had continued, would have  
10 continued to aggressively litigate their defenses through  
11 summary judgment, Daubert motions, trial, and any appeals.

12 4. Quality of Representation:

13 Lead counsel has considerable expertise in securities  
14 litigation. See Robbins Geller resume, Niehaus fee  
15 declaration, Exhibit G; see also declaration of Brian P. Murray  
16 filed on behalf of Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP in support of  
17 application for award of attorneys' fees and expenses ("Murphy  
18 fee declaration"). Robbins Geller attorneys are currently  
19 "lead or [are] named counsel in hundreds of securities class  
20 action or large institutional-investor cases" and are  
21 "responsible for the largest securities class action in  
22 history." Niehaus fee declaration, Exhibit G. RiskMetrics  
23 Group has recognized Glancy Prongay & Murray as one of the top  
24 plaintiffs' law firms in the United States in its securities  
25 class action services report for every year since the inception

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1 of the report in 2003. See Murphy fee declaration, Exhibit I.

2 The high quality of defense counsel opposing  
3 plaintiffs' efforts further proves the caliber of  
4 representation that was necessary to achieve the settlement.  
5 Cahill Gordon & Reindel and Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom  
6 are two prominent defense firms, and "the ability of  
7 plaintiffs' counsel to obtain a favorable settlement for the  
8 class in the face of such formidable opposition confirms the  
9 quality of their representation of the class." In re Marsh  
10 ERISA Litig., 265 F.R.D. 128, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

11 Accordingly, the Court finds that this Goldberger  
12 factor weighs in favor of the requested fee award.

13 5. The Requested Fee in Relation to the Settlement:

14 Generally, courts consider the size of a settlement to  
15 ensure that the percentage awarded does not constitute a  
16 windfall. In this case, the requested fee is 33.3 of the  
17 settlement, within the range of reasonableness, in light of  
18 other class action settlements in this circuit. See Mohny v.  
19 Shelly's Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, 2009 WL 5851465,  
20 at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) ("Class counsel's request for  
21 33 percent of the settlement fund is typical in class action  
22 settlements in the Second Circuit.").

23 6. Public Policy Considerations:

24 When determining whether a fee award is reasonable,  
25 courts consider the social and economic value of the class

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1 action "and the need to encourage experienced and able counsel  
2 to undertake such litigation." In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.,  
3 74 F. Supp. 2d 393, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). "Courts have, as a  
4 generic matter, frequently observed that the public policy of  
5 vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws must be  
6 considered in calculating an award." In re BioScrip, Inc. Sec.  
7 Litig., 273 F.Supp. 3d 474, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quotation  
8 omitted) affirmed sub nom. Fresno County Employees Retirement  
9 Association v. Isaacson/Weaver Family Trust, 925 F.3d 63  
10 (2d Cir. 2019).

11 Vigorous, private enforcement of the federal  
12 securities laws can only occur if private investors can obtain  
13 some parity in representation with that available to large  
14 corporate defendants. Accordingly, public policy favors  
15 granting lead plaintiffs' fee request.

16 After considering all of the Goldberger factors, the  
17 requested fee award appears to be reasonable.

18 B. Lodestar "Cross Check":

19 In Goldberger, the Second Circuit "encouraged the  
20 practice of requiring documentation of hours as a 'cross check'  
21 on the reasonableness of the requested percentage."  
22 Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50. "Of course, where used as a mere  
23 cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be  
24 exhaustively scrutinized by the district court." Id.

25 As of April 17, 2020, plaintiffs' counsel have

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1 expended over 26,000 hours in total in this case, resulting in  
2 a total lodestar of \$16,069,646. Niehaus fee declaration  
3 paragraph 4, Exhibit A; Murphy fee declaration, Exhibit A.  
4 Robbins Geller expended 17,356.85 hours with a lodestar of  
5 \$12,021,477, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP expended 8,097.8 hours  
6 with a lodestar of \$3,639,826.50, the Frank Murray LLP expended  
7 562.2 hours with a lodestar of \$355,902.50. Id. Plaintiffs'  
8 counsel submitted declarations and time reports in support of  
9 their motion for attorneys' fees. Id. Counsel submitted a  
10 summary time records detailing the billable rate and hours  
11 worked by each attorney and professional support staff in this  
12 case. I find that these billable rates based on the  
13 timekeeper's title, specific years of experience, and market  
14 rates for similar professionals in their fields nationwide and  
15 in New York, where Robbins Geller LLP is based, to be  
16 reasonable in this context.

17           Based on plaintiffs' counsel's requested  
18 fee - one-third of the settlement, or by the Court's  
19 calculation, \$6,166,666.67 - the lodestar yields a negative  
20 "cross-check" multiplier of about 0.38; therefore, the fee is  
21 well below the typically awarded multipliers in this circuit.  
22 "Courts regularly award lodestar multipliers from 2 to 6 times  
23 lodestar in this circuit." *Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Insurance*  
24 *Company*, 2015 WL 10847814, at \*18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,  
25 2020) (quotation omitted) (collecting cases). Thus, the lodestar

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1 "cross-check" confirmation that plaintiffs' counsel requested  
2 fee is reasonable.

3 The Court therefore finds that, based on the  
4 Goldberger factors and the lodestar "cross-check," that  
5 plaintiffs' counsel's requested fees are reasonable.

6 C. Litigation Expenses:

7 Plaintiffs' counsel requests \$1,203,502.39 total in  
8 litigation expenses, including filing fees, process service,  
9 mailing expenses, document management and hosting services,  
10 investigative and expert witnesses, legal research, travel and  
11 mediation. See Niehaus fee declaration paragraph 5, Exhibit B.  
12 Robbins Geller seeks \$1,170,981.31, Glancy Prongay & Murray  
13 seeks \$28,740.22, and Murray Frank LLP seeks \$3,780.86. The  
14 largest component of plaintiffs' counsel's expenses was the  
15 cost of experts and consultants, amounting to \$750,458, or  
16 approximately 62 percent of total expenses. Niehaus fee  
17 declaration paragraph 6. The next largest components of  
18 plaintiffs' counsel's expenses were for transportation, hotels,  
19 and meals (\$227,852.66), court transcripts and deposition  
20 materials (\$68,030.54), and mediation (\$27,210). See Niehaus  
21 fee declaration, Exhibit B. The notice disclosed that lead  
22 counsel would seek up to \$1,300,000 in litigation expenses. No  
23 objection to these expenses was received.

24 "It is well-established that counsel who create a  
25 common fund are entitled to the reimbursement of expenses that

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1 they advance to a class." In re Giant Interactive Group, Inc.,  
2 279 F.R.D. 151, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also In re Indep.  
3 Energy Holdings, 302 F.Supp. 2d 180, 183 Note 3 (S.D.N.Y.  
4 2003). "Attorneys may be compensated for reasonable  
5 out-of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to  
6 their clients as long as they were 'incidental and necessary to  
7 the representation of those clients.'" (quotation omitted).  
8 The expenses for which lead counsel seeks payment are the type  
9 of expenses that courts typically approve. See In re Global  
10 Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 468 (S.D.N.Y.  
11 2004). Therefore, the Court finds that the requested  
12 litigation expenses are reasonable and necessary to the  
13 representation of the class and are appropriately reimbursed to  
14 class counsel.

15 D. Lead Plaintiffs' Expenses:

16 Lead plaintiffs seek an award of \$20,000 for both of  
17 them in recognition of the time and expense that they incurred  
18 on behalf of the class. Motion in support, Docket No. 307, at  
19 31; see also Niehaus declaration paragraph 17. 15, U.S.C.,  
20 Section 77Z-1(a)(4) allows "the award of reasonable costs and  
21 expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the  
22 representation of the class to any representative party serving  
23 on behalf of a class."

24 As set forth in their declaration, lead plaintiffs  
25 dedicated a significant amount of time to the successful

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1 prosecution of this action, including by reviewing pleadings  
2 and motions, discussing strengths and risks of the case, and  
3 consulting with lead counsel regarding settlement. Kaess and  
4 Farrugio declaration paragraphs 2 through 12. These are the  
5 kinds of activities which regularly are found to support awards  
6 to class representatives.

7 As set forth in their declaration, lead plaintiffs  
8 assert that the value of their time and resources invested in  
9 this case is substantially in excess of the \$20,000 award that  
10 they seek here. Id. And the application here is consistent  
11 with the notice, which disclosed that "Class plaintiffs may  
12 seek an award pursuant to 15, U.S.C., Section 77z-1(a)(4) in  
13 connection with their representation of the class in an amount  
14 not to exceed \$20,000 in the aggregate." Murphy fee  
15 declaration, Exhibit A notice.

16 Thus, I find that the requested award of \$20,000 to  
17 lead plaintiffs is reasonable.

18 VII. Conclusion:

19 In conclusion, I approve the class action settlement  
20 for \$18,500,000 and approve the plan for allocating the net  
21 proceeds of the settlement. I also award plaintiffs' counsel  
22 attorneys' fees in the amount of what the Court calculates to  
23 be \$6,166,666.67, plus interest earned at the same rate as the  
24 settlement fund. This amounts to one-third of the settlement  
25 fund, or 33.3 percent of the settlement fund. I am also

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1 awarding \$1,203,502.39 in litigation expenses to be divided as  
2 outlined by lead counsel. Finally, I award lead plaintiffs  
3 \$20,000 in the aggregate for time and expenses incurred while  
4 representing the class.

5 So, counsel, thank you very much for your patience as  
6 I got through the reasoning for my decision to approve the  
7 settlement here.

8 I received the proposed orders and judgment, and I  
9 expect to act on those promptly after today's conference.

10 Is there anything else that we should take up now,  
11 before we adjourn?

12 First, counsel for plaintiffs?

13 MR. PINTAR: Not for plaintiffs, your Honor. Again,  
14 Ted Pintar. Thank you very much.

15 THE COURT: Thank you.

16 Counsel for the Deutsche Bank defendants?

17 MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Your Honor, David Januszewski.

18 Nothing else from us.

19 THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

20 Counsel for the underwriter defendants?

21 MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. William O'Brien, from Skadden Arps  
22 Slate Meagher & Flom LLP.

23 Nothing further from us as well.

24 THE COURT: Good. Thank you, all.

25 COUNSEL: Thank you. \* \* \*

# EXHIBIT I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE NIELSEN HOLDINGS PLC  
SECURITIES LITIGATION

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-07143-JMF

**ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES**

WHEREAS, this matter came on for hearing on July 20, 2022 (the "Settlement Hearing") on Lead Counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and payment of expenses, including awards to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Court having considered all matters submitted to it at the Settlement Hearing and otherwise; and it appearing that notice of the Settlement Hearing substantially in the form approved by the Court was mailed to all Settlement Class Members who could be identified with reasonable effort, and that a summary notice of the hearing substantially in the form approved by the Court was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted over *PR Newswire* pursuant to the specifications of the Court; and the Court having considered and determined the fairness and reasonableness of the award of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses requested,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated as of March 15, 2022 (the "Stipulation"), and all capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.
2. The Court has jurisdiction to enter this Order and over the subject matter of the Action and all Parties to the Action, including all Settlement Class Members.

3. Notice of Lead Counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and payment of expenses was given to all Settlement Class Members who could be identified with reasonable effort, and they were given the opportunity to object by June 29, 2022. The form and method of notifying the Settlement Class of the motion for an award of attorneys' fees and payment of expenses satisfied the notice requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), and Section 21D(a)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(7), as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances; and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all Persons entitled thereto.

4. There have been two objections to Lead Counsel's request for attorneys' fees. *See* ECF Nos. 146-9, 147, 155. One was submitted by Mr. Larry Killion. ECF Nos. 146-9 and 147. He does not object to the expense requests. Additionally, the Court received a letter from Ms. Monica Bohlman, objecting to the proposed fee award. ECF No. 155. The Court has considered the arguments raised by Mr. Killion, as well as his proposed fee schedule, and the arguments raised by Ms. Bohlman, but for the reasons stated on the record during the fairness hearing, and under the circumstances of this case, their objections are overruled.

5. Lead Counsel is hereby awarded, on behalf of Plaintiffs' Counsel, attorneys' fees in the amount of \$18,037,433.00, plus interest at the same rate earned by the Settlement Fund (*i.e.*, 25% of the Settlement Fund, minus litigation expenses of \$850,266.93) and \$850,266.93 in payment of litigation expenses, plus accrued interest, which sums the Court finds to be fair and reasonable. Lead Counsel shall allocate the attorneys' fees awarded amongst Plaintiffs' Counsel.

6. In making this award of attorneys' fees and expenses to be paid from the Settlement Fund, the Court has considered and found that:

(a) The Settlement has created a substantial fund of \$73,000,000 in cash that

has been paid into escrow pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, and that numerous Settlement Class Members who submit valid Claim Forms will benefit from the Settlement that occurred because of the efforts of counsel;

(b) The fee sought by Lead Counsel has been reviewed and approved as reasonable by Plaintiffs, sophisticated institutional investors that oversaw the prosecution and resolution of the Action;

(c) 273,687 copies of the Notice were mailed to potential Settlement Class Members and nominees stating that Lead Counsel would apply for attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the Settlement Fund and litigation expenses in an amount not to exceed \$1,100,000, and they were given an opportunity to object;

(d) The Action required the navigation of highly challenging and complex issues spanning Nielsen's business, the data analytics industry, accounting practices, privacy regulations, and complicated falsity, market efficiency and loss causation issues;

(e) Had Lead Counsel not achieved the Settlement, there would remain a significant risk that Plaintiffs and the other members of the Settlement Class may have recovered less or nothing from Defendants;

(f) Plaintiffs' Counsel conducted the litigation and achieved the Settlement with skill, perseverance, and diligent advocacy;

(g) The attorneys' fees awarded and litigation expenses to be paid from the Settlement Fund are fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case and consistent with awards made within this District;

(h) Public policy concerns favor the award of attorneys' fees and expenses in securities class action litigation; and

(i) Plaintiffs' Counsel expended slightly more than 17,200 hours with a lodestar value of \$10,382,315.75, to achieve the Settlement, representing a substantial effort.

7. Lead Plaintiff the Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi is hereby awarded \$17,750 from the Settlement Fund as reimbursement for its reasonable costs and expenses directly related to its representation of the Settlement Class, pursuant to §21D(a)(4) of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4).

8. Named plaintiff Monroe County Employees' Retirement System is hereby awarded \$5,625 from the Settlement Fund as reimbursement for its reasonable costs and expenses directly related to its representation of the Settlement Class, pursuant to §21D(a)(4) of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4).

9. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval of any attorneys' fees and expense application, including that of Lead Counsel, shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment.

10. Exclusive jurisdiction is hereby retained over the Parties and the Settlement Class Members for all matters relating to this Action, including the administration, interpretation, effectuation, or enforcement of the Stipulation and this Order.

11. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or the Effective Date of the Settlement otherwise fails to occur, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided by the Stipulation.

12. There is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Order, and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly directed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 20th day of July, 2022



HONORABLE JESSE M. FURMAN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE